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Abstract
This dissertation critically analyzes the commercial practices and products of the 1976
Montreal, 1988 Calgary and 2010 Vancouver Olympics. The central questions I ask are:
how did the Olympics in Canada become a platform for the intersection of patriotism and
consumption? What were the key ideas about Canadian identity, history, and citizenship
that Olympic organizers and corporate sponsors promoted? How did commodities
symbolize these ideas? Finally, how do these ideas relate to political policies and
practices?

This work contributes to an understanding of how branded commodities shape Canadian
identity and citizenship norms by arguing that the objects sold during the Montreal,
Calgary and Vancouver Olympics embodied unresolved contradictions in the meaning of
national identity. Commodities (like mascots, Petro-Canada glassware and Hudson’s Bay
Company mittens) represented a version of national identity that glorified European
settlement in Canada and obscured the disparity between Indigenous and Settler
Canadians’ quality of life. Further, by buying these commodities, Settler Canadians
constructed their identity as valued citizens who make important material contributions to
the nation. The production, consumption and promotion of branded products helped
popularize the idea that reconciliation between Indigenous and Settler Canadians has
been achieved when, in fact, it is an ongoing and unfinished process. Moreover, these
practices deepened pre-existing conflicts involving land and natural resources in Canada,
often at the expense of Indigenous peoples’ interests and well-being.

The research is grounded in material from Olympic archives in Montreal, Calgary and
Vancouver, which I use to conduct the first book-length study of the Olympics hosted in
Canada. The theoretical framework that underpins this project is based on Anne
McClintock’s conceptualization of fetish and Avery Gordon’s theory of “ghostly
hauntings.” McClintock’s work helps explain how commodities can hold together
contradictory ideas about Canadian identity while Gordon’s theory provides a basis for
understanding how the absence of information (e.g. facts about Canada’s colonial past)
can become perceptible or, in her words, “seething absences.” Using this approach, I
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demonstrate the importance of studying the symbolic significance of Olympic
commodities rather than focusing exclusively on Olympic-related sponsorship and
marketing practices. I argue that the production, consumption, promotion, and symbolism
of the commodities have significant social and political consequences which include:
shaping Canadian identity, influencing public knowledge about the nation’s past,
intervening in debates about land possession and resource allocation, including and
excluding citizens from participation in civic life, educating children and teens about the
nation, and influencing reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.
This research contributes to scholarship on branded nationalism by demonstrating the
importance of studying the symbolic significance of Olympic commodities rather than
focusing exclusively on Olympic-related sponsorship and marketing practices. It also
illustrates that the rise of neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism in the 1980s helped
popularize branded nationalism, cause-related marketing, and region branding in the
Olympic Games hosted in Canada. Finally, this dissertation contributes to scholarship on
the modern Olympic Movement by showing that the commercialism of the Olympics in
Canada did not eclipse the political dimensions of the Games. Rather, they mutually
reinforced one another.

Keywords
The Olympics; Canadian identity; branded nationalism; nation branding; Indigenous
rights; consumer culture; fetish; Marx; McClintock; ghostly haunting; contractualization
of citizenship; consumer-citizen hybrid.
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Chapter 1
Marx and McClintock Go to the Games: Introduction and
Theoretical Context
During the opening ceremony of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games, the flag
bearer for the Canadian team marching in the Parade of Nations, Clara Hughes, was
distinguished from the other athletes by her blue, red, green, yellow, and white striped
scarf, the stripes an iconic Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) pattern. As the athletes waved
to the crowd and the camera, the white maple leafs etched on their red mittens, also
produced by the HBC, echoed the movement of Hughes’ flag. The athletes’ hands
appeared as smaller Canadian flags, a literal and metaphorical embodiment of national
identity. They walked toward a large group of Indigenous peoples dancing at the far end
of the stage. The joyful music, cheering crowd, and exuberant expression on the athletes’
faces juxtaposed against a surprising, and likely unintentional scene: from afar, the
athletes, dressed mostly in red, looked like Mounties who were invading the Indigenous
dancers’ space.1

1

I am grateful to an insightful commentator at the 2012 International Symposium on Olympic Research
who drew my attention to this juxtaposition.
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Figure 1: Vancouver 2010 Olympics opening ceremony, IOC Marketing Report Vancouver 2010, 89.

Figure 2: Vancouver 2010 Olympics opening ceremony, screen grab from YouTube,
www.youtube.com.

3

Although the HBC initially designed the red and white mittens exclusively for torch
bearers and Canadian Olympians to wear, consumer demand for them was immense. The
company sold more than three million mittens by the end of the Vancouver Olympics and
news stories quoted everyday Canadians saying that wearing the mittens made them feel
proud of their national identity.2 According to the HBC, the garments “became the iconic
item for Canadians as the Games were celebrated on home soil.”3 While many Canadian
consumers embraced the HBC mittens, other groups saw them more critically. The
Olympic Resistance Network (ORN), a coalition of activists who opposed the Vancouver
Olympics, distributed pamphlets showing the red and white HBC mittens dripping with
blood under the caption “Blood On Your Hands.”4 The activists argued that, because the
federal government did not negotiate treaties with most of British Columbia’s First
Nations, the province lay on unceded Indigenous territory. The pamphlet told readers
that, prior to Canada’s political founding in 1867, the HBC “acted as the colonial
government” and it encouraged readers to boycott the company.5

2

See: Trish Crawford, "$10 Olympic mittens a runaway success," Toronto Star, February 9, 2010.
http://www.thestar.com/life/2010/02/09/10_olympic_mittens_a_runaway_success.html;
Karon Liu, "HBC's Olympic mittens are the it item at the Games,” Toronto Life, February 9, 2010.
http://www.torontolife.com/style/toronto-stores/2010/02/09/hbcs-olympic-mittens-are-the-it-item-at-thegames/
3
“Hudson’s Bay: Official Outfitter,” Canadian Olympic Committee.http://olympic.ca/partners/hudsonsbay/hudsons-bay-official-outfitter/
4
“Blood On Your Hands,” PAM 2010-37, AM1519: City of Vancouver Archives pamphlet collection
(PC), City of Vancouver Archives (CVA).
5
Ibid.
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Figure 3: “Blood On Your Hands” pamphlet, City of Vancouver Archives, PAM 2010-37, Fonds:
AM1519: City of Vancouver Archives pamphlet collection, City of Vancouver Archives.

Like the HBC mittens, many commodities sold during the Olympic Games in Canada
contained symbols of the nation and some Canadians used them to express their national
identity and pride, while others used them to express their disaffection with the nation.
These objects include commemorative coins and stamps, plush toys of Olympic mascots,
glassware and clothing produced by Olympic sponsors, and trinkets like key chains,
buttons and pens etched with the Olympic Games’ emblem. I argue that the production,
consumption, promotion, and symbolism of the commodities linked to the Olympics in
Canada have significant social and political consequences that are not immediately
obvious. The symbolic meaning of these commodities and the activities surrounding them
are part a broad set of practices that, collectively, shape Canadian identity, influence
public knowledge about the nation’s past, intervene in debates about land possession and
resource allocation, include and exclude citizens from participation in civic life, educate
children and teens about the nation, and publicize government-led reconciliation efforts
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. By arguing that the symbolism and
consumption of commodities are equally as important as the content of promotional
narratives that link a brand’s identity to national identity, I seek to make an original

5

contribution to the existing scholarship on the interplay of national identity and consumer
culture.
My examination of the commodities sold during the Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver
Olympic Games and the promotional and consumptive practices surrounding these
commodities gives rise to the following questions: How did the Olympics in Canada
become a platform for the intersection of patriotism and consumption? What were the
key ideas about Canadian identity, history, and citizenship that Olympic organizers and
corporate sponsors promoted? How did commodities symbolize these ideas?
Furthermore, how do these ideas relate to political policies and practices? Finally, how
were Canadian children educated about the meaning and value of consumer goods that
represent national identity?
I advance four key lines of argument in this dissertation. First, relying on Anne
McClintock’s conceptualization of fetish, I argue that many Olympic objects embodied
unresolved contradictions in the official narratives about Canadian identity, history, and
citizenship. Some commodities represented and obscured traumatic moments in Canadian
history, such as the existence and ongoing legacy of the Indian Residential School
System. Other commodities symbolized the fact that official narratives about national
identity recognized and repudiated Indigenous peoples’ rightful claim to land and natural
resources in Canada. A third group of commodities represented the fact that, as an
identity category, some Canadians were both included and excluded as citizens in the
nation. Second, applying the works of Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida on haunting to
the Olympics in Canada, I argue that the Olympic Games, and related commodities, were
haunted by information, such as Canada’s identity as a Settler colonial country and the
historic and ongoing trauma of the assimilation of Indigenous peoples in Canada.6 This
information, I argue, breaks the coherence of official narratives about national identity,
history, and citizenship promoted during the Games. If, as I argue, Olympic commodities
both represented and effaced facts that complicated or contradicted official narratives

6

As I discuss later in this chapter, I define Settlers as all non-Indigenous Canadians, including immigrants
to the country.
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about the nation, these facts were, in Gordon’s words, “seething absences.” Although not
always obvious, their presence could be felt.7
Third, I use Margaret Somers’ concept of the contractualization of citizenship to argue
that, in Canada, the rights and privileges of citizenship became something that individuals
had to earn, in this case by consuming Olympic commodities. By purchasing such
commodities, many Canadians endorsed official narratives about the nation and ignored
the contradictions embodied in these commodities. However, as I argue in my fourth and
final point, it was not possible to completely obscure the unsettling truths about national
identity, history, and citizenship that Olympic commodities represented. Anti-Olympic
activists and protestors publicized these unsettling truths and exposed the contradictions
inherent in official narratives about the nation promoted during the Games. Exposing this
information had the potential to arouse an uncanny feeling in consumers. This
uncanniness, in turn, could undermine the idea that Olympic commodities represented
familiar and positive ideas about Canada.
This research highlights the socio-cultural significance of critically analyzing the
symbolic meaning of consumer goods. Although Olympic-related commodities are banal,
their impact on the construction of Canadian identity and citizenship norms is anything
but banal. These commodities represented a version of national identity that glorified
European settlement in Canada and obscured the disparity between Indigenous and
Settler Canadians’ quality of life. Further, by buying these commodities, Settler
Canadians constructed their identity as valued citizens who make important material
contributions to the nation. Significantly, the promotion and consumption of Olympic
commodities contributed to a broader cultural process aimed at shaping public memory of
Canada’s colonial past and preserving the state’s claim to posses land and natural
resources that Indigenous peoples argue rightfully belongs to them.
Put another way, what is at stake in this project is an understanding of how commodities
and consumer practices help sustain the legitimacy of Canadian settler society. By

7

Avery Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (Minneapolis: University of
Minneapolis Press, 1997), 21.
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identifying the socio-economic factors that made it possible for commodities to become
popular symbols of national identity, I show how these commodities became intertwined
with other processes and practices that helped maintain the legitimacy of the state.
Moreover, my research shows that despite the popularity of Olympic objects, and the
overt ideas about the nation they represented, their meaning was neither fixed nor
uncontested. Indigenous groups and their supporters used the Olympics in Montreal,
Calgary and Vancouver to raise awareness about the devastating impact of government
policies and business practices on their communities. In doing so, these groups
challenged the privileged meanings of Olympic consumer goods. Moreover, by
highlighting the social exclusion, political disenfranchisement, human rights violations
and low standards of living many Indigenous peoples (and other Canadians) experience,
anti-Olympic activists undermined the coherency of the ideas about Settler society that
were promoted through the Olympics and posed a direct challenge to the legitimacy of
the Settler state.

“A Crisis in Social Meaning:” Commodities as Fetish Objects

The theoretical starting point for my project is a consideration of commodity fetishism. In
1760, the French philosopher Charles de Brosses used the word “fetishisme” to describe
religious practices that, in his view, relied on “primitive” ideas about magic. Karl Marx
drew on this idea to formulate his concept of commodity fetishism, using “the idea of
primitive magic to express the central social form of the modern industrial economy.”8
He argued that in capitalist societies commodities take on a life of their own and appear
to have inherent value.9 Marx famously wrote: “the relationships between the producers,

8

Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest (New York:
Routledge, 1995), 181.
9
Karl Marx, Captial Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), 164.
9
Marx, Capital Volume One, 164, Michael Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s
Capital, trans. Alexander Locascio (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012), 74.
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within which the social characteristics of their labours are manifested, take on the form of
a social relation between the products of the labour.”10
A product becomes a commodity when it is exchanged for other objects.11 The value of
the commodity, however, is created prior to its exchange and is directly related to the
labour required to produce the product. The process of exchange is merely an expression
of the commodity’s value. In other words, the value of a commodity cannot be separated
from the social processes related to the conditions under which it is produced and
exchanged. Thus, individuals remain unaware of the labour involved in commodity
production. Moreover, as Michael Heinrich points out, individuals in capitalist societies
incorrectly assume that all commodities, in every social context, have inherent value.12
A process of concealment is always involved in commodity fetishism because the labour
invested in producing a product becomes concealed when it is exchanged for money.
Michael Billig draws a link between Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism and Freud’s
work on repression when he argues that the act of forgetting lies at the heart of
commodity fetishism. Billig writes that, through commodity fetishism, “the labour
expended in the production is forgotten in the everyday understanding of the value of the
commodity. The result is a routine concealment or forgetting....In daily exchanges, the
labour involved in the production of commodities is pushed from awareness.” 13 Billig
relies on Freud’s concept of repression to describe the psychological process that people
undergo when they forget the labour required to produce a commodity. According to
Freud, people repress disturbing thoughts by banishing them from their conscious
awareness.14 Billig writes: “One might see the routines of consumer capitalism as
practices which accomplish a form of repression, as disturbing thoughts are pushed from
consumer consciousness.” 15 This approach to fetishism is valuable because it includes,
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Marx, Capital Volume One, 164.
Ibid., 59.
12
Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital, 74.
13
Michael Billig, "Commodity Fetishism and Repression: Reflections on Marx, Freud and the Psychology
of Consumer Capitalism," Theory & Psychology 9, no. 3 (1999): 315.
14
Ibid., 320.
15
Ibid., 320.
11
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but goes beyond, considerations about labour and the production of commodities.
Similarly, James Carrier writes that fetishism refers “to the ignoring of denial of the
background of objects” and that Marx’s work on commodity fetishism helps highlight
“the general tendency to obscure the people and processes, of which labour power is a
component, that are part of creating an object and bringing it to market.”16
Like Billig, Anne McClintock’s understanding of fetish relies on a Marxist and
psychoanalytic understanding of the term. She argues against Freud’s assertion that fetish
objects help men psychologically manage their fear of castration. According to Freud,
this fear emerges when men learn that women do not have penises. Moreover, fetish
objects do not entirely erase men’s fear of castration but, rather, allow them to disavow
their fear. 17 He wrote: “The fetish remains a token of triumph over the threat of castration
and a protection against it.”18 For McClintock, fetish objects are not “merely phallic
substitutes.”19 Rather, “fetishes can be seen as the displacement onto an object (or
person) of contradictions that the individual cannot resolve at a personal level.”20 This
approach identifies a key similarity in Marx and Freud’s writing on fetish, namely, that
the fetish represents, in McClintock’s words, “a crisis in social meaning.” 21 According to
McClintock the fetish exists “at the cross-roads of psychoanalysis and social history,
inhabiting the threshold of both personal and historical memory” and is an “embodiment
of an impossible irresolution.”22 Finally, “By displacing power onto the fetish, then
manipulating the fetish, the individual gains symbolic control over what might otherwise
be terrifying ambiguities. For this reason, the fetish can be called an impassioned
object.”23

16

James Carrier, "Protecting the environment the natural way: ethical consumption and commodity
fetishism," Antipode 42, no. 3 (2010): 673.
17
Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol.
XXI, ed. and trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth press, 1953), 153-154.
18
Ibid., 154.
19
McClintock, Imperial Leather, 184.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
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McClintock applies fetish theory to her analysis of national symbols, arguing that
“nationalism inhabits the realm of fetishism” because objects including a country’s flag,
uniforms, airplane logos, maps, anthems, and national flowers are fetish objects that
embody crises in social meaning.24 Unlike Benedict Anderson, who credits the
emergence of nationalism primarily to the development of print media, McClintock
argues that the power of nationalism since the late 1800s “has been its capacity to
organize a sense of popular, collective unity through the management of mass national
commodity spectacle.”25 These commodity spectacles include team sports, military
displays, and mass rallies. McClintock uses the example of the Afrikaner Tweede Trek
through South Africa in the mid-1900s as an example of a national commodity spectacle.
She notes that the trek offered “a potent symbolic amalgam of disjointed times, capturing
in a single fetish spectacle the impossible confluence of the modern and the archaic, the
recent displacement and the ancestral migration.”26
McClintock’s theorization of fetish is applicable to Canadian commodities because it
helps explain how these commodities have the capacity to paradoxically hold together
contradictory ideas. She provides a framework for thinking about how the symbolic
meanings of commodities hold in tension competing ideas about Canadian identity. This
argument is informed by other scholars who have applied McClintock’s work on national
fetishes to a Canadian context. Donica Belisle, for example, writes:
When it is bought and sold as a commodity, for instance, the Canadian
flag becomes a fetish that signifies and displaces the violence of Canadian
nation building. The representation of nature on the flag (the maple leaf)
can be, on the one hand, interpreted as symbolizing the contradiction
between the state's ‘empty lands’ ideology, and on the other, the presence
of Indigenous peoples throughout Canada.27
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According to Belisle, the flag is a fetish object because it draws attention to, but also
hides, the fact that Indigenous peoples lived in Canada before European Settlers first
arrived in the country. Belisle perhaps invests too much symbolic power in the maple leaf
and I am less convinced that it represents an “empty lands ideology.”28 However, her
work provides an early example of scholarship that considers Canadian commodities as
fetish objects in line with McClintock’s definition of the term.
Belisle’s work also draws attention to the fact that symbols of the nation can
paradoxically expose and hide information about Canadian identity and history. Margot
Francis provides a nuanced exploration of this paradox in her book, Creative
Subversions: Whiteness, Indigeneity, and the National Imaginary. Francis argues that
emblems of national belonging in Canada, such as the beaver, the Canadian Pacific
Railway and Banff National Park, convey knowledge about national identity and history
“that is both articulated and refused.”29 She argues that Canadians Settlers’ historical
mistreatment of Indigenous peoples is an open secret, information that is publicly known
but not openly acknowledged. The nation, she contends, is “a country founded on a
commitment to democratic forms of order and good government for some” but
“devastating forms of legal exclusion, forced assimilation, and mass deaths for others.”30
By analyzing Olympic commodities, I extend Francis’ argument that unsettling truths
about the nation’s past inform the meaning of emblems of national identity by arguing
that these truths also inform the meaning of popular consumer objects in Canada.
The image of Canada depicted through Olympic commodities (and, more generally,
through the Olympics), such as the idea that the country is free of conflict and racial
inequality, exists only in a hypothetical future. Thus, like other fetishes, these objects
represent multiple time periods, embodying “contradiction, repetition, multiple agency
and multiple time...time without progress.”31 In other words, the commodities linked to
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the Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver Olympics represented the nation’s shameful past
and an idealized nation that exists in an imagined future.

Merging the Visible and Invisible: Haunted, Uncanny
Commodities
Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida use the concept of ghostly haunting to explain how
the past makes itself felt in the present. I apply Gordon and Derrida’s work to Olympic
commodities, arguing that they are haunted by unsettling knowledge about Canada’s past.
According to Gordon, a ghostly haunting is “a story about what happens when we admit
the ghost – that special instance of the merging of the visible and the invisible, the dead
and the living, the past and the present – into the making of worldly relations and into the
making of our accounts of the world.”32 Similarly, Derrida argues that the line dividing
the past, present, and future is permeable, writing: “Before knowing whether one can
differentiate between the specter of the past and the specter of the future, of the past
present and the future present, one must perhaps ask oneself whether the spectrality effect
does not consist in undoing this opposition, or even this dialectic, between actual,
effective presence and its other.”33
Gordon uses three case studies to explore ghostly hauntings: Sabina Spielrein’s
relationship with Jung and Freudian psychoanalysis, accounts of the disappeared in
Argentina (individuals who were tortured and killed by the state but whose bodies were
never found) and the story of slavery in the United States. She argues that the invisibility
of women haunts psychoanalysis and its history, the disappeared haunt Argentinean
society and, even when slavery ended in America, it haunted former slaves and forced
them to coexist with ghosts.34 For example, in her analysis of Toni Morrison’s book
Beloved, Gordon argues that the book’s characters must confront events in their past that
impact their present condition. In the novel, Sethe, a runaway slave, chose to kill her
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young daughter, Beloved, rather than allow her to be apprehended by slave catchers and
returned to slavery. After the Civil War, when Sethe is free, she is haunted by the
memory and aftermath of her violent act and, more broadly, by the trauma of slavery in
the United States. Beloved, who returns to Sethe’s life as a ghost, is haunted herself and
Morrison uses the figure of a haunted ghost to illustrate that grappling with this double
form of haunting is a necessary part of the reconstruction process in post-Civil War
America.35
Derrida argues that Marx’s theories are still relevant in capital societies and are present in
spectral form. He writes: “At a time when a new world disorder is attempting to install its
neo-capitalism and neo-liberalism, no disavowal has managed to rid itself of all Marx’s
ghosts.”36 When proponents of capitalism declare communism a thing of the past, “they
do no more than disavow the undeniable itself: a ghost never dies, it remains always to
come and to come-back.”37
Fetish objects are often haunted by the past. McClintock argues that fetishes are “haunted
by both personal and historical memory.”38 Olympic-related commodities, I argue, are
haunted by the memory of disturbing parts of Canadian history. Indeed, the authors of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, published in 1996, write that the ghosts of
Canadian history “haunt us still. The ghosts take the form of dishonoured treaties, theft of
Aboriginal lands, suppression of Aboriginal cultures, abduction of Aboriginal children,
impoverishment and disempowerment of Aboriginal peoples.” 39 As I show in my project,
these ghosts also haunt everyday consumer goods like HBC mittens and Petro Canada
glassware.
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Gordon describes ghostly matters as “seething absences”40 or, in other words, absences
that can be perceived and felt and asserts that “the ghostly haunt gives notice that
something is missing.”41 Similarly, Derrida writes that the “non-presence of the specter
demands that one take its times and its history into consideration, the singularity of its
temporality or of its historicity.”42 Noticing how invisible or imperceptible things make
their presence felt is not limited to material things like bodies but, rather, extends to
immaterial things like historical facts. Moreover, an investigation of a haunting brings to
light information that has been excluded from conscious public memory. In Canada,
exposing information about the nation’s history that continues to haunt contemporary
society is an important step toward achieving a more just society because it compels nonIndigenous Canadians to reckon with and come to terms with the nation’s colonial past.
According to Gordon, reckoning with ghosts requires “providing a hospitable memory for
ghosts out of a concern for justice.”43 This type of reckoning draws attention to people or
things that have been neglected and allows scholars to “make contact with what is
without doubt often painful, difficult, and unsettling.” 44 Derrida similarly argues that
exorcising a ghost does not chase it away but, rather, allows scholars to grant ghosts “the
right, if it means making them come back alive, as revenants who would no longer be
revenants, but as other arrivants to whom a hospitable memory or promise must offer
welcome...Not in order to grant them the right to this sense but out of a concern for
justice.”45 He further argues that, if the scholar “loves justice,” he will learn from the
ghost by discovering how to talk to it.46
Learning from the ghosts of Canada’s past means understanding how unjust and
traumatic events in the nation’s history destabilize popular narratives that depict the
nation as harmonious and free of discord. In their introduction to a special edition of
University of Toronto Quarterly journal on haunting and Canadian literature, Marlene
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Goldman and Joanne Saul argue that “the spectral presences of North America’s
Indigenous peoples and the Québécois repeatedly unsettle the imaginary, unified vision
of an Anglo-Canadian nation-state.”47 Sharon Rosenberg, Amber Dean, and Kara
Granzow argue that Alberta’s Centenary Celebrations, held in 2005, were marked by “a
series of haunted encounters that disrupt the centenary’s prevailing remembrance strategy
of coherence, pride and accomplishment.”48 They further contend that “Alberta’s colonial
past bears on and continues through its present rather than being ‘settled’ by a
recognition of (pre)colonial history or the encouragement of (multi)cultural renewal
efforts.”49 For example, a picture included in a handbook about the centenary celebrations
ostensibly showed a single Aboriginal settlement but the authors discovered that it was
actually a composite of 4 or 5 photographs. They argue that the photograph is a
“ghost(ed) image: a representation of a repressed yet haunting presence repeatedly
disavowed by the origin story of a centennial discourse that evacuates colonial history
from the present.”50
Emilie Cameron observes that, after the Nisga’a Nation successfully regained its title
over a portion of the Stein Valley Nlaka’pamux Heritage Park in British Columbia,
unsubstantiated urban legends depicting the valley as haunted emerged. Cameron argues
the ghost stories non-Indigenous Canadians told reflected their anxiety over questions
about Indigenous peoples’ rightful ownership of the land. She interviewed individuals
who described their encounters with the ghosts of the Stein Valley “as frightening,
unsettling, and scary, an impression of being unwelcome trespassers in what is ostensibly
a public park.”51 Cameron concludes that, because the language of haunting can “reinscribe the interests of the powerful upon the meaning and memories of place,”52
geography scholars should be wary of using Gordon’s theorization of haunting in their
work. While I appreciate Cameron’s emphasis on the importance of using appropriate
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language in academic writing, I do not share her conclusions. Unlike the Settlers in
Cameron’s article, Gordon encourages scholars to embrace, rather than repudiate, ghosts
and to find ways to learn from these ghosts. According to this perspective, the ghost
stories about the Stein Valley are haunted themselves. The stories are haunted by the fact
that Settler Canadians settled on land that was inhabited by Indigenous peoples who have
a rightful claim to that land.
Confronting the ghosts that haunt Canada can be an uncanny experience. Warren Cariou
argues that the recent resurgence of Indigenous ghosts in Prairie literature “reflects a
widespread and perhaps growing anxiety suffered by Settlers regarding the legitimacy of
their claims to belonging on what they call ‘their land’.”53 Cariou describes this anxiety
in Freudian terms, as uncanny. Freud argues: “Uncanny is what one calls everything that
was meant to remain secret and has come into the open.”54 The German word for
uncanny is un-heimlech, which literally means unhomely (heimlech means homely).55
Francis writes: “an experience of the uncanny can emerge when the place one considers
home is somehow rendered unfamiliar.”56According to Cariou, the Settlers’ uncanny fear
was linked to “a lurking sense that the places Settlers call home are not really theirs, a
sense that their current legitimacy as owners or renters in a capitalist land market might
well be predicated upon theft, fraud, violence, and other injustices in the past.”57
Conceptualizing Olympic commodities as haunted by unpleasant facts about Canadian
identity and history can arouse an uncanny feeling in consumers. In other words, the
potential for the uncanny emerges when consumers acknowledge and confront the truths
about national history and identity that are not publicized in popular narratives about the
nation. For Derrida, the uncanny and haunting are linked. The word “uncanny,” he writes,
“is the word of irreducible haunting or obsession. The most familiar becomes the most
disquieting....the familiar, the domestic, or even the national (heimlich) frightens itself. It
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feels itself occupied, in the proper secret (Geheimnis) of its inside, by what is most
strange, distant, threatening.”58 Gordon similarly argues that “uncanny experiences are
haunting experiences”59 and emphasizes the importance of confronting the uncanny by
facing ghosts rather than repudiating them. I argue that Canadians must reckon with how
the ghost is felt in the material objects that fill their homes and cover their bodies, even if
(or perhaps because) this confrontation is uncanny.

A “Symbol of Canadian Cool:” Branded/Corporate
Nationalism
By applying McClintock, Gordon and Derrida’s theories to the Olympics hosted in
Canada, I fill a gap in existing scholarship on branded/corporate nationalism and draw
attention to the importance of commodities’ symbolic meanings. Steven Jackson defines
corporate nationalism as “the process by which corporations, both national and
transnational use the nation and its symbolic value for commercial interests.”60 Catherine
Carstairs uses the term branded nationalism to describe the emergence, in the 1980s, of a
new form of Canadian nationalism linked to consumption and branding rather than
cultural or economic factors.61 Carstairs recognizes that many brands use symbols of
national identity in their campaigns. Coca-Cola, Ralph Lauren and Tommy Hilfiger
include the American flag in their promotional material62 while IKEA uses Swedish
colours in its brand and ad designs. Moreover, the Swatch brand emblem is a modified
version of the Swiss flag.63 What is new about the branded nationalism that emerged in
the 1980s, Carstairs argues, is that brands like Roots (a clothing company) have come to
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represent a distinctly Canadian way of life.64 Similarly, Patricia Cormack and John
Cosgrave argue that Tim Hortons, a chain of coffee shops in Canada, is “the most
successful and long-standing private commercial enterprise to brand itself by way of
overt national identity and pride.”65
Like Tim Hortons, Canadian beer companies depict themselves as central to national
identity. Ira Wagman argues that many Canadian beer ads emphasize the idea that
Canadian cultural values are superior to American values.66 Gregory Millard, Sarah
Riegel, and John Wright use examples from Molson Canadian, Labatt’s, and Roots to
debunk the stereotype that Canadians express their national pride less assertively than
Americans. They argue that in these companies’ ads, Canadians loudly announce that
they are quietly and politely patriotic: “Waving the Canadian flag wherever one goes on
grounds that it stands for the ‘quiet North American’ is like entering a library and loudly
announcing one’s silence.”67
Jackson argues that Molson Canadian’s “I Am [Canadian]” ad campaign united
stereotypes about masculinity and Canadian identity and produced hegemonic “masculine
nationalisms” and “national masculinisms.”68 Further, a series of the “I am [Canadian]”
ads that aired during the 2008 Stanley Cup Finals exemplified “the holy trinity of sport,
beer and masculinity within a particular expression of nationalism.”69 Like Jackson, Mary
Louise Adams introduces considerations of sport and gender into scholarship on
branded/corporate nationalism. Adams uses the example of a Labatt’s ad aired during the
1998 Nagano Winter Olympics to support her argument that narratives depicting hockey
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as the iconic symbol of Canadian identity privilege native-born, white men.70 In the
Labatt’s ad, white men play an impromptu game of shinny while women and people of
colour watch the game from the sidelines.
Carstairs notes that, beginning in the 1980s, Canadians began to embrace Roots clothing
as a way to express their patriotism.71 The Roots “poor-boy” hats that sold during the
1998 Nagano Olympics were unexpectedly popular and, in Carstairs’ words, became “an
international symbol of Canadian cool.”72 Cormack and Cosgrave argue that difference
and identity are increasingly being constructed through consumption and “the subtle and
endless meanings that coffee allows makes it the ideal commodity for the work of
identity.”73 Unfortunately, Carstairs and Cormack and Cosgrave do not devote a great
deal of attention to the symbolic meaning of Roots hats or Tim Hortons coffee cups or
other merchandise. I fill this gap by examining the meaning and significance of
commodities that represent the nation. To be clear, I do not ignore the importance of
promotional campaigns but, rather, illustrate that it is important to study the symbolic
meanings of commodities in addition to analyzing ad narratives.
Carstairs argues that Roots nationalism lacks the positive features of earlier versions of
Canadian nationalism such as tolerance, diversity, and community. 74 Similarly, Millard et
al. describe the version of nationalism in ads for Molson, Labatt’s and Roots as an “inyour-face, though ultimately empty nationalism.”75 I take a different view to Carstairs
and Millard et al. and argue that the nationalism represented through Olympic
commodities is not empty or void of positive values like harmony and tolerance. On the
contrary: it is too full of these, bursting with contradictory ideas about national values
and identity. Additionally, Carstairs and Millard et al. do not consider how commodities
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represent ideas about early European settlement in Canada, a form of representation that,
I argue, is highly selective.
Surprisingly, scholars have not studied the significance of the fact that children and teens
often consume nation-branded products like Roots clothing. I argue that, like other
Olympic-related objects, Olympic mascots marketed to children embody contradictory
ideas about the nation. Furthermore, the educational resources that Olympic organizing
committees distributed to schools in Canada taught children about these mascots and
exposed students to ideas about Canadian history, culture, and values that were consistent
with the ones conveyed through Olympic-related promotional practices. These resources
exemplify the fact that, during the Olympic Games in Canada, political and commercial
narratives about national identity often converged.
Wagman and Cosgrave and Cormack argue convincingly that commercial practices in
Canada have political effects. Wagman writes that the Canadian Heritage Minister Sheila
Copps showed a Molson Canadian ad during a talk she delivered at the International
Press Institute’s World Congress in 2000. The talk was part of a panel discussion called
“American Culture: The People’s Choice or a Form of Imperialism?” and Copps used the
ad to argue that Canadians did not like the homogenizing effects of globalization.76
According to Wagman, Copps’ decision to show the Molson ad allowed her to make a
rhetorically effective point and enhanced Molson’s brand image.77 Like Copps, Peter
McKay, Canada’s Foreign Minister, bridged cultural and political spheres in 2006 when
he took the U.S. Secretary of State, Condaleeza Rice, to a Tim Hortons kiosk in
Afghanistan. Cormack and Cosgrave argue that politicians affiliate themselves with the
Tim Hortons brand in order to gain legitimacy and appeal to voters because the company
has effectively positioned itself as “the new authority for the collective practice of
memory over and against other sources.”78
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Marketizing Social Life: Neo-Liberalism and Market
Fundamentalism
The Montreal Olympics occurred in 1976, when branded nationalism had yet to emerge
as a popular phenomenon in Canada. By the time Calgary hosted the Olympics in 1988,
however, branded nationalism had become a popular marketing tool. Thus, a comparison
of the commercial practices linked to the Montreal and Calgary Games provides insight
into the rise and evolution of branded nationalism in the country. Carstairs identifies two
reasons why branded nationalism became prominent in the 1980s. First, brands were
responding to Canadians’ concern that the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, signed in
1988, would cause American culture to eclipse Canadian culture. Second, a number of
events fragmented Canadians’ sense of shared identity.79 In 1990 and again in 1992, the
government failed to pass a constitutional amendment recognizing Quebec as a distinct
society. Moreover, in 1990, a sustained and at times violent confrontation broke out
between the Quebec provincial police (and, eventually the Canadian army) and members
of the Mohawk Nation over contested land in Oka, Quebec. Moreover, during the 1995
referendum on Quebec sovereignty, 49% of Quebecers voted “yes” to the question: “Do
you agree that Québec should become sovereign?”80
Belisle argues that, although branded nationalism became pronounced in the 1980s and
1990s, it did not emerge at that time. Rather, the phenomenon dates back to the 1890s,
when Eaton’s, Simpson’s, and the HBC depicted their department stores as national
icons.81 Similarly, Paula Hastings argues that in the early 1900s representations of the
Canadian landscape and political figures “permeated the language and iconography of
consumer culture.”82 For example, images of the Canadian Parliament buildings, political
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figures, rural landscapes, and Indigenous peoples appeared on labels for products like
canned fruits and vegetables, shoe polish, cream separator, and tomato chutney.83
Carstairs, however, never argues that branded nationalism emerged in the 1980s and she
acknowledges that Canadian companies used symbols of the nation in their marketing
campaigns prior to the ‘80s. Her central argument is: “What is new is the degree to which
Canadians have been willing to drape themselves in branded products such as Roots and
Molson Canadian gear, embracing them as part of a Canadian way of life.”84
The Montreal Olympic coin and stamp programs failed to meet fundraising targets, I
argue, partly because Canadians were not familiar with branded nationalism in 1976. On
the other hand, branded nationalism was prevalent in 1988, when Calgary hosted the
Olympics, and its prevalence helps explain why the Olympic mugs that Petro Canada
produced became so popular. Additionally, the marketing and branding of national
identity in the Vancouver Olympics was more intense and prevalent than in the previous
two Olympic Games. In Vancouver, ideas about the nation permeated Olympic-related
promotional and cultural practices to an unfprecedented degree. Canadians were not only,
in Carstairs words, “willing to drape themselves in branded products” but were inundated
with promotional messages about the value of this activity.85
In addition to the factors Carstairs identifies (NAFTA and the fragmentation of national
identity), another factor helped popularize branded nationalism in the 1980s. The rise of
neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism contributed to the popularity of Olympic
commodities that symbolized the nation and shaped the organizing of the Calgary and
Vancouver Olympic Games. As David Harvey writes, neo-liberalism is an economic
theory which “proposes that human well-being can be best advanced by liberating
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
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characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”86
Proponents of a neo-liberal economic model favour minimal government involvement in
citizens’ lives and few restrictions on market capitalism. Thus, neo-liberals reject
Keynesianism, an economic policy which asserts that the success of capitalist economic
systems depends on government regulation of the market. In contrast to Keynesianism,
neo-liberalism is underpinned by the belief that individuals’ prosperity, freedom, and
happiness thrives when governments allow market capitalism to operate largely
unfettered.87
Margaret Somers uses the term market fundamentalism to describe a comprehensive
worldview and political movement governed by the belief that market capitalism exists in
a natural state outside the realm of politics and government and, as such, should not be
heavily regulated. 88 Somers acknowledges that market fundamentalism is similar to neoliberalism but she prefers the former term because many Americans, who associate
“liberalism” with left-wing ideals, sometimes find the word neo-liberalism confusing.89
Somers also prefers this term because it highlights that market fundamentalists, like
religious fundamentalists, build a system of beliefs around a central idea (the natural state
of the market).90 George Soros used the term to describe the idea that all aspects of social
life should be organized according to market principles.91 Accordingly, any element of
government or civil society that is not marketized is coercive and inefficient. Somers
defines marketization as “the processes, techniques, policies, and technologies used to
convert all areas of social life that are considered inefficiently marketized into markets or
pseudo markets.”92 Thus, under market fundamentalism, goods and services that were not
previously subject to market pressure become treated as commodities that can be priced
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and sold.93 In accordance with Somers, I use the term market fundamentalism to describe
the philosophy that all areas of social life should function according to the logic of the
market. In contrast, I use the term neo-liberalism to describe specific economic practices
and policies.94
Nation, region, and city branding practices exemplify the market fundamentalist drive to
turn all elements of society into marketable commodities. These practices use marketing
strategies taken from the corporate world to situate geographic regions competitively
within the global economy. Thus, nation/region/city branding “allows national
governments to better manage and control the image they project to the world, and to
attract the ‘right’ kinds of investment, tourism, trade and talent, successfully competing
with a growing pool of national contenders for a shrinking set of resources.”95
Scholarship on nation, region, and city branding first emerged in the early 2000s in the
fields of marketing and business studies.96 Simon Anholt’s book, Competitive identity:
The new brand management for nations, cities and regions, is a formative text on this
topic. Anholt is a branding consultant who claims to have coined the term “nation
branding.” 97 Since 2005, Anholt has released an annual Anholt Nations Brands Index
(ANBI), which measures a country’s global brand equity. Anholt also writes about city
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branding and place or destination branding, which relies on the same logic that governs
nation branding and treats geographical locations “as ‘products’ to be marketed, through
tourism development and branding activities.”98
The best known nation branding campaigns associated with the Olympics are linked to
the 2000 Sydney and 2004 Athens Olympics. The Australian Tourist Commission
launched the Brand Australia campaign in 1995, two years after the IOC awarded Sydney
the 2000 Summer Olympics. This campaign brought together and strengthened three
brands: Brand Australia, the Olympic brand, and Olympic partners’ brands.99 Roy
Panagiotopoulou argues that hosting the 2004 Athens Summer Games helped Greece
push for a greater role within the European Union (EU) and improve its infrastructure. 100
Pere Berkowitz et al. argue that one of the reasons that China scores low on the ANBI is
because of incidents like Tiananmen Square which tarnished the country’s international
image.101 Writing before China hosted the Olympics, Berkowitz et al. argued that China
could improve its ANBI rating by using the Beijing Games to re-brand itself and re-shape
the international community’s perception of the government. Writing after the Beijing
Olympics, Li Zhang and Simon Xiaobin Zhao argue that, for Beijing, hosting the 2008
Games only partially changed global perception of the city’s brand. While citizens and
tourists were impressed by its economic growth, the realities of everyday life in Beijing,
such as its substandard housing and poverty contradicted and the ideas that city branders
promoted.102
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Zhang and Zhao do not view the gap between the appearance and reality of Beijing’s city
branding campaign as an ethical problem. Rather, they argue that the campaign failed
because it did not successfully convert citizens into “brand ambassadors.”103 This
perspective overlooks the fact that socially and economically marginalized citizens are
often unable or unwilling to represent their city in a favourable way to the global
community. In fact, these scholars do not consider the social and political implications of
nation branding in the Olympics. In contrast, Aronczyk, Zala Volcic and Mark
Andrejevic have provided insightful critiques of nation branding. Aronczyk argues that
the practice shifts decision making about culture from the political to the corporate
sphere. She writes:
By transposing authority from elected government officials to advertising
and branding professionals, by replacing accountability with facilitation,
and by fitting discussions of the nation into categories that privilege a
particular kind of collective representation over diverse expression, nation
branding affects the moral basis of national citizenship”104
Similarly, Volcic and Andrejevic use the example of Slovenia’s nation branding
campaign to argue that nation branding frames national identity as a consumer choice
“rather than a site of collective belonging and action.” 105 Moreover, Aronczyk and
Volcic and Andrejevic argue that nation branding campaigns oblige citizens to “live” the
nation’s brand by compelling them to build, reinforce, and reproduce a nation’s brand
identity.106 In other words, nation branders offload “the work of message circulation onto
the populace.”107 For Aronczyk, this obligation glosses over the pluralities, conflicts, and
potentials for resistance in public life and, rather, perpetuates a homogenous version of
national identity and culture.108 I add to these critiques by showing how region and
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corporate branding practices mutually supported one another during the Calgary
Olympics. Collectively, they helped shape public perception of the petroleum industry in
Alberta and gave the impression that the province should have jurisdiction over its oil and
gas resources. However, these branding practices obscured the devastating effect that oil
and gas extraction practices were having on the Lubicon Cree, whose territory in northern
Alberta sat on valuable petroleum reserves.

A “Market Exchange:” Cause-Related Marketing and the
Contractualization of Citizenship
In addition to examining nation/city/region branding, my project considers the Olympics
in Canada in relation to two other phenomena that emerged within the context of neoliberalism and market fundamentalism: cause-related marketing and the
contractualization of citizenship. Cause-related marketing (CRM) is a practice in which
brands affiliate themselves with a social cause and create marketing campaigns that help
raise money for this cause.109 CRM campaigns encourage individual consumers, rather
than governments, to contribute to social services and emerged within a neo-liberal
economic environment.110 Inger Stole argues that when governments began to cut
investments in social services in the late 1970s in accordance with neo-liberal economic
policies, businesses teamed up with private not-for profit organizations that were seeking
to repair a broken safety net.111 She writes: “Cause marketing fills a function, not only as
a promoter of products and producer of consumer goodwill, but in [sic] an important tool
in the neo-liberal struggle for greater privatization of welfare and social services.”112
Samantha King argues that CRM is a type of strategic philanthropy. She argues that, prior
to the 1980s, companies used to support charities in random and unscientific ways.
However, they began treating their philanthropic practices as activities that could increase
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profits.113 Most large corporations now focus on one charitable cause (i.e. breast cancer,
environmentalism), integrate their giving programs with their marketing and public
affairs programs, form partnerships with outside groups, provide incentives to employees
who volunteer for the cause and measure the results of their giving programs.114
Like Stole, King situates the emergence of strategic philanthropy within a neo-liberal
economic context. She writes: under neoliberalism, “public-private initiatives and
individual corporate giving are promoted as morally and economically viable means
through which to respond to social needs, in lieu of the state’s role in mitigating the
social effects of capitalism.”115 King points out that, in 1981, U.S. President Ronald
Reagan created the Task Force on Private Sector Initiatives to encourage individuals and
private companies to support non-profit organizations. The President also increased the
amount of charitable donations that companies could deduct from their taxes, which gave
them added incentive to donate money to social causes. At the same time, public funding
for non-profit companies dried up and companies began receiving an unprecedented
number of requests for aid from non-profit organizations.116 As companies fought to
succeed within a highly competitive business environment, businesspeople began
evaluating their companies’ philanthropic practices using the same measures they used to
evaluate other business practices and started to treat charitable donations as investments.
CRM emerged as an effective way for companies to increase their brand value and earn
consumer loyalty.117
A portion of the proceeds from sales of many commodities sold during the Montreal,
Calgary, and Vancouver Olympics helped fund the Games. The promotional campaigns
for these products shared many similarities with CRM. Olympic organizers and sponsors
told Canadians that they could materially support the Olympics hosted in Canada and
demonstrate their national pride and loyalty by buying these commodities. I show that
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this option was open to Canadians as early as the 1976 Montreal Olympics, when the
proceeds of the sales of Olympic coins and stamps helped fund the Games, but it only
became successful during the 1988 Calgary Games.
At the same time as CRM was becoming popular, citizenship was becoming
contractualized. Somers uses the phrase “the contractualization of citizenship” to describe
“the process by which the government’s relationship with its citizenry changes from
noncontractualism to contractual quid pro quo market exchange.”118 She recognizes that
the ability to enter into private contract with others has, historically, been understood as a
right that citizens hold. However, Somers holds that the criteria used to determine
citizenship was never limited to a person’s contractual relationship to the state until the
rise of market fundamentalism. She argues that, under market fundamentalism, inclusion
in a national, civil, and political community is a privilege that citizens earn by
contributing to the nation in economically profitable ways.119 She writes:
when citizenship has been contractualized, failing to provide a good or
service of equivalent market value in exchange for what is now the
privilege of citizenship, results in a reduction of the moral worth of the
citizenship. And depending on the degree and frequency and quality of
such failures to meet contractual criteria, there will be an increasing
refusal to recognize the citizen as deserving of membership altogether in
the political and social community.120
Thus, only individuals who make profitable contributions to their community, such as
adding to the economy by working a job, are valued and included within that
community.121 Somers defines social inclusion as “the right to recognition by others as a
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moral equal treated by the same standards and values and due the same level or respect
and dignity as all other members.”122
Drawing on Somers, I argue that during the 1988 Calgary and 2010 Vancouver Games
Canadians could earn the privilege of citizenship by buying Olympic-related
commodities. For example, a portion of the proceeds from sales of Petro Canada
commemorative mugs and red and white HBC mittens helped fund Olympic athletes; as
such, Canadians made materially valuable contributions to the nation and supported the
Games when they purchased these objects. The fact that Canadians could earn the
privilege of citizenship by consuming Olympic commodities reveals that the categories of
citizen and consumer have become blurred, but not in the way that scholars have
traditionally written about the citizen-consumer hybrid. Lizabeth Cohen and Michael
Schudson argue that consumerism and citizenship, long believed to be oppositional
categories, are interconnected.123 Of course, citizens are also consumers (and vice versa),
but citizenship and consumption were considered separate categories, the former
relegated to the public sphere and the latter to the private sphere.124 In her study of the
history of consumer culture in the United States, Lizabeth Cohen found: “Rather than
isolated ideal types, citizen and consumer were ever-shifting categories that sometimes
overlapped, often were in tension, but always reflected the permeability of the political
and economic spheres.”125 Michael Schudson argues that consumption practices often
have political dimensions to them. Consumer choices, he maintains, have political
implications and, conversely, political choices share many similarities with consumer
choices.126 According to Schudson, people are “doing politics” when they vote, but also
when they choose to hold a trade union meeting in a particular hotel, when they buy a
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ticket to a benefit concert or donate their frequent flyer miles to a charitable
organization.127
Many people use consumption, or non-consumption, to agitate for social change. In 2006,
Deirdre Shaw, Terry Newholm, and Roger Dickinson interviewed ethical shoppers in the
United Kingdom and found that “in many instances participants viewed their market vote
as more effective than a vote in a political election.”128 Similarly, in his study of
consumer boycotts of Starbucks, Bryant Simon argues that citizens often use
consumption as a way to become politically engaged. He writes: “Through their
consumer actions, shoppers are attempting to shape policy and be heard in the corridors
of state power, recognizing that even if formal politics have lost their traction, access to
government and broader structures of power still matters.”129 Americans boycotted
Starbucks to voice their positions on a range of issues including police accountability,
gun control, food production and politics in the Middle East. Simon argues that
consumers are using their “power as consumers, ahead of their power as voters, to try to
shape the social order.”130
In the context of the Olympics in Canada, some activist groups advocated consumer
boycotts as a way to bring about social change. For example, during the Vancouver
Olympics, the ORN encouraged individuals to boycott the HBC. However, most
Canadians did not act like the consumer-citizens Cohen, Shaw et al. and Simon describe,
who linked consumption (or anti-consumption) to social activism. Rather, understood in
the context of Somers’ theory of the contractualization of citizenship, consumption was
often a way that Canadians earned citizenship and, correspondingly, the right to be
included in civil and political society. While these consumers were not trying to change
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public policy, their consumer practices are salient examples of Cohen and Schudson’s
argument that consumption cannot be neatly separated from civic life.
Cormack argues that the roles of citizens and consumers are not easily reconciled: “The
obligation of the citizen is to maintain an imaginative or thoughtful relationship to the
notion of the common good. The consumer is not a political actor in this sense, at least
not without a huge degradation of the notion of the political.”131 Drawing on this critique,
I argue that that using Olympic-related commodities to express and reflect national
identity is deeply flawed. Consumers are not obliged to be thoughtful about the
symbolism of consumer goods. The pleasure derived from buying and owning objects
lies at the core of consumption and consumers often experience pleasure from things that,
on a superficial level, represent positive Canadian values. On the other hand, Canadian
citizens concerned with the common good should grapple with difficult and unpleasant
issues, such as conflicts between Indigenous groups and the government over unresolved
land claims. Moreover, by applying Somers’ work to a consideration of Olympic
commodities, I add to Johnson and Cormack’s critiques of consumer citizens. I show that,
in the context of the Olympics, what is at stake in the convergence of these two identities
is the status of citizenship in Canada. Specifically, individuals who do not endorse the
symbolic meanings of Olympic-related commodities are often unable to earn the rights
and privileges of Canadian citizenship.

The Gap Between “Idealist Rhetoric” and Reality:
Commercializing the Olympic Games
One additional socio-economic factor helps explains why branded nationalism was more
prominent in the 1988 Calgary and 2010 Vancouver Olympics compared to the 1976
Montreal Olympics. Specifically, the Olympics became more commercialized in the
1980s. In their book, Selling the Five Rings: the IOC and the Rise of Olympic
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Commercialism, Bob Barney, Stephen Wenn, and Scott Martyn argue that the IOC
transformed itself from a sporting body to a commercial organization in the early 1980s.
During Juan Antonio Samaranch’s term as President of the International Olympic
Committee (IOC), from 1980-2001, the IOC took control of the TV rights negotiation
process from host cities and forged a closer relationship with corporate sponsors.132
Barney et al. and Alan Tomlinson argue that the 1984 Los Angeles (LA) Summer
Olympics marked a turning point for the commercialization of the Olympics. Unlike
previous Games, which for the most part were unprofitable, organizers of the LA Games
generated a surplus of over $22 million (US) and relied exclusively on private funds to
fund the Games.133 Gary Whannel argues that, before the LA Games, most countries did
not want to host the Olympics because the associated costs were too high. However,
when the 1984 Games showed that one could host the Games without going into
enormous debt, countries renewed their interest in hosting the Olympics.134
Barney et al. argue that, more than any other factor, income from broadcast rights, which
increased significantly in the 1980s, transformed the IOC into a profitable entity.135 TV
networks pay enormous sums of money to secure the broadcast rights to the Olympics
because they can make money off ad sales and can promote their own TV shows to a
large and captive audience.136 Maurice Roche argues that TV influences the nature and
scale of major sporting events, especially the Olympics, and that TV complements the
Olympics by adding to their intensity and dramatic appeal.137 Andrew Billings argues that
broadcasters skew audiences’ perception of the Olympics by creating highly edited and
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packaged telecasts of events. For example, he found that viewers of NBC’s broadcast of
the 2006 Torino Winter Olympics estimated that American athletes won approximately
three times as many medals as were actually won.138
Tomlinson argues that the overt commercialism of the Games transformed them into a
celebration of global consumerism rather than of universalism or idealism.139 Similarly,
Maurice Roche contends that the intrusion of commercialism into the Olympics threatens
Olympism.140 Olympism, the philosophical framework that underpins the Games,
maintains that sport helps people co-exist harmoniously and educates young people about
peace, justice, fair play, mutual understanding, and international friendship.141 However,
according to Roche, “There have always been...major gaps between the idealist rhetoric
of Olympism and the realities of international sport culture and political economy,” with
these gaps widening in the 1980s and 1990s.142 Other scholars argue that the IOC
constructs and articulates Olympic ideals in order to attract commercial interest in the
Games. Joseph Maguire et al.’s study of the IOC’s “Celebrate Humanity” campaign is a
case in point. The ad agency TBWA/Chiat Day developed the Celebrate Humanity
Campaign, a multi-platform ad campaign celebrating the Olympic Movement’s ideals
that launched in 2000.143 However, according to Maguire et al., the campaign’s true aim
was to enhance the brand equity of the Olympics.144 They maintain that, by drawing
attention away from criticisms leveled at the increasing commercialism of the Olympics,
the campaign paradoxically made the Olympic brand more attractive to Olympic
sponsors.145
Momin Rahman and Sean Lockwood argue that the IOC references the ancient roots of
the Olympic Games in order to enhance the authenticity of the modern Games. This
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appearance of authenticity, in turn, allows the IOC to secure “the continued commercial
and cultural viability of the Games.”146 In other words, the IOC tries to prevent audiences
from realizing that they are being interpellated as consumers by referencing the origins of
the Olympics.147 The IOC establishes this link between the contemporary and ancient
Olympics by emphasizing the amateur status of most athletes.148 However, the Olympic
ideal of amateurism is tied to class biases and is historically more nuanced than the IOC’s
account. When the modern Olympic Games were revived in 1896, only the upper classes,
who had access to private means of income, could afford to participate in sport on an
amateur basis.149 Additionally, athletes who participated in the ancient Greek Olympics
often won monetary prizes and were sometimes paid to compete in the Games. Moreover,
upon completion of ancient Olympic Games, many successful athletes were given
money.150
Like Olympic ideals of justice, peace, and international co-operation, the national values
promoted through Olympics in Canada helped make these Olympics more valuable to
marketers and sponsors. The Calgary and Vancouver Games inspired Canadians to feel
national loyalty and pride, and marketers drew on these emotions when they promoted
products like Petro Canada mugs and HBC mittens. Sporting events are an ideal platform
for advertisers to promote brands because viewers are often in a heightened emotional
state when they watch the ads.151 Often, these emotions derive from a sports viewers’
strong feelings of national pride. For example, companies who sponsor the FIFA World
Cup hope that fans will transfer the loyalty they feel for a national team onto their
brands.152 The fact that the national values celebrated through the Olympics in Canada
strengthened their commercial value helps explain why branded/corporate nationalism
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was so prevalent during the Games, and why commodities that represent the nation, like
the HBC mittens, became so popular.
Whannel argues that the commercialism of the Olympic Games undermines their
capacity to engender political protests and activism. He observes that, after 1988, the
Olympics were no longer associated with political protests and boycotts and, instead, host
cities hoped to build their global image and earn money by hosting the Olympics.153
Similarly, Jim McKay contrasts the black power salute of Olympic sprinters Tommie
Smith and John Carlos at the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympics with basketball
players Michael Jordan and Charles’ Barkley’s decision to honour their sponsor, Nike, by
refusing to wear a Reebok jacket during the medal ceremony of the 1992 Barcelona
Summer Olympics. Jordan and Barkley eventually wore the jacket but hid Reebok’s logo
by draping themselves in the American flag. McKay writes that a stark difference exists
“between the defiant fists of Tommie Smith and John Carlos at Mexico City and the loyal
corporate bodies of Barcelona.”154 Helen Lenskyj argues that the Gay Games, which
began in 1982 and were intended to be a radical and egalitarian alternative to the
Olympics, became undermined by commercial interests and came to emulate the profitoriented nature of the Olympics.155
Unlike Wannell, McKay and Lenskyj, I argue that the commercialism of the Olympics in
Canada has not eclipsed the political dimensions of the Games. Rather, they mutually
reinforced one another. The example of Indigenous activists using the 2000 Sydney
Summer Olympics to discuss reconciliation is a case in point. Indigenous groups
pressured the Australian government to apologize for the mass removal of Indigenous
children from their family homes by government agencies, a practice that occurred
between 1910 and 1970. However, the government claimed that the activists would
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tarnish the nation’s global image if they continued to demand an apology.156 Nike
released an ad entitled “Sorry” around the same time that activists were demanding an
apology. It featured Australian Olympians apologizing, ostensibly for being too
preoccupied with training. However, the ad implied that the apology was actually
directed at Cathy Freeman, who was the only Indigenous athlete in the ad and the only
one who did not apologize. Instead, she ran past the camera and asked, “Can we talk
about this later?”157 Indigenous groups criticized the ad for trivializing the importance of
reconciliation as a political issue.158 McKay argues that the ad effaced institutionalized
class and racial barriers that Indigenous peoples face because it only showed successful
racial minorities. 159 The ad is also an example of a company making statements about,
and dismissing, a controversial national issue. Like the Australian government’s
unwillingness to address substantive issues related to reconciliation, the ad suggested that
an apology to Indigenous peoples (presumably for the mass removal of Indigenous
children from their families) could wait.
This dissertation also contributes to scholarship on the commercial dimensions of the
Olympic Games held in Canada by focusing on the political and social significance of the
fusion of nationalism and consumption in the Games. Writing on the Montreal Olympics,
Bruce Kidd, Romain Roult, Sylvain Lefebvre, David Whitson and Donald Macintosh
consider political controversies linked to the Montreal Games, but do not address the
relationship between the commercial and political dimension of these Games. Kidd
argues that the impulse by Montreal Games organizers to “stage grandiose Games and the
failings it led to were magnified by the clash of nationalisms which preoccupied and
polarized Canadian society during the period.”160 Moreover, he argues that the Games
helped ease, but did not eliminate, tensions between French and English Canadians.161
Romain Roult and Sylvain Lefebvre observe that the Montreal Games are “the perfect
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model of post-Olympic failure.”162 Organizers did not adequately plan for post-Olympic
use of the stadium and, as a result, it became underused and unprofitable.163 Additionally,
David Whitson and Donald Macintosh argue that Montreal incurred so much debt from
hosting the 1967 World Expo and 1976 Olympics that it was not left with enough money
to provide adequate social services to citizens.164
A number of authors contribute valuable insight about the political implications of the
Olympics in Canada by arguing that organizers of these Games misrepresented
Indigenous peoples’ cultures and perpetuated long-held stereotypes about them. Christine
O’Bonsawin, who is the only scholar to compare Indigenous groups’ participation in the
Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver Games, writes: “Despite varying efforts to incorporate
Indigenous people and imagery into official Olympic programs, all three organizing
committees (1976, 1988, 2010) have been heavily criticized for failing to follow a
respectful process of dialogue and for misappropriating Indigenous cultures.”165 Janice
Forsyth and Kevin Wamsley argue that Montreal Olympics organizers appropriated
Indigenous images in order to depict Canada as a multicultural nation.166 Wamsley and
Mike Heine argue that organizers of the Calgary Games relied on archetypes such as the
Mountie, the cowboy, and “their symbolic complement, Native people”167 to depict
Calgary as a stereotypical Western Canadian town. Moreover, they argue that organizers
involved Indigenous peoples in the planning of the Games in order to divert attention
from the Lubicon Lake Cree community’s opposition to the Games.168 They write: “The
advocates for the Games and cultural programs appropriated the discursive power not
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only to strategically incorporate Native symbols for the purposes of the Games, but also
to minimize the impact of resistance to the structures of significations produced by such
incorporation.”169
O’Bonsawin argues that organizers and sponsors of the Vancouver Olympics
misappropriated symbols of Indigenous cultures. For example, she criticizes the logo of
the Vancouver Olympics, an inukshuk (plural: inuksuit), arguing: “Attempts to market
inuksuit dishonours Inuit cultures as it threatens to taint and avert their original function”
as directional markers.170 Additionally, the sweaters that the HBC sold at the Vancouver
Games were imitations of traditional sweaters made by members of the Cowichan First
Nation on Vancouver Island. The HBC admitted that it considered hiring Cowichan
knitters, who pass on knitting skills from generation to generation, to make the sweaters
but hired a professional company instead because of strict production deadlines.171
I contribute to literature on Indigenous peoples’ involvement in, and opposition to, the
Olympics in Canada by critically analyzing Olympic commodities using McLintock’s
work on fetish and Gordon’s theory of ghostly. This approach also adds a new
perspective on the Games not shown in existing graduate theses on the Vancouver
Olympics.172 I highlight the role that commodities played in shaping how Indigenous
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peoples’ cultures were represented in the Olympics and makes explicit the commercial
practices of the Games to larger political issues related to Indigenous peoples’ rights and
well-being. I link the meaning of Olympic commodities to broader political struggles
over issues like Indigenous groups’ unresolved land claims in British Columbia and
Alberta. Moreover, by arguing that many Olympic-related commodities are fetish objects,
I consider how these objects embody ambivalent meanings about Indigenous peoples’
cultures and, in so doing, paradoxically celebrate and dishonour Indigenous cultures.
Finally, I describe how the practice of including symbols of Indigenous cultures in the
design of Olympic-related commodities originated in the Montreal Olympics.

Looking and Thinking: Methodology and Terminology
I ground my examination of the Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver Olympics in archival
material from municipal and provincial archives in Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver.
After each Olympic Games is completed, the organizing committee gives all Olympicrelated documents to the archives of the host city or province. I collected material on the
following categories: Olympic mascots and logos; Olympic merchandise; ceremonial and
cultural elements of the Games; educational initiatives related to the Games; partnerships
between organizing committees and civic groups; Olympic sponsors; and print and
broadcast ads. The IOC mandates that select material, including information related to
corporate sponsorship, remains sealed until 15 years after the completion of the Games,
so many documents related to the Vancouver Olympics are inaccessible to the public
until 2025. Moreover, much of the unrestricted material has not been processed yet, so I
have collected less archival material on the Vancouver Olympics than on the Montreal
and Calgary Olympics. I rely mostly on documents about Vancouver’s Olympic Bid and
the anti-Olympic flyers and pamphlets that are housed in the Vancouver municipal
archives.
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The archival documents that were most relevant to my research were correspondence
between organizing committee members, meeting minutes and memos produced by the
fundraising, marketing, and arts and culture departments of the organizing committees. In
addition, I consulted a number of publicly available Olympic-related documents. For
example, I accessed official reports of the Montreal, Calgary and Vancouver Games and
IOC documents, including marketing reports, that are available for download on-line173
as well as Olympic ads and the Vancouver Olympic opening ceremony that are posted on
YouTube. Finally I also used newspaper articles about the Olympics in Canada published
in The Globe and Mail.
Julie D’Acci’s circuit of media study guides how I structure, organize, and analyze my
research material. D’Acci’s circuit modifies Stuart Hall’s Encoding/Decoding model by
expanding it to contain four (rather than two) interconnected sites of analysis: cultural
artifact, production, socio-historical context, and reception.174 Each chapter of my thesis
discusses consumer objects linked to the Olympic Games in Canada, such as souvenirs
and official coins and stamps. However, by addressing all the sites on the model, I avoid
narrowly framing my analysis of these commodities. Recognizing that situating artifacts
within their socio-historical context is just as important as studying the objects
themselves, I contextualize them within the commercialism of the Olympic Games, the
educational and cultural elements of the Games, and relevant political events in Canada.
Moreover, I examine ads, the labour required to produce products and the pleasure some
Canadians derived from consuming these objects.
I once attended a history conference where the presenter advised the audience: “look,
don’t think.” His point was that rigorous scholarship emerges from strong archival
research. However, I look hard and think hard about my archival material. To this end,
the archival documents I have collected guide the direction of my project and my
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theoretical framework, based on fetish and haunting theory, shapes my analysis of this
material. Paul Rutherford articulates the importance of theory to historians when he
argues that it “enables the practicing historian to put his work in the broader context of
culture” and that theory “offers explanations. It serves as a kind of lingua franca to link
otherwise disparate projects...it can provide a frame which makes all the archival work
meaningful.”175 Indeed, without haunting and fetish theory, my work would be
incomplete, as I would be unable to examine the full significance of Olympic
commodities in relation to citizenship, national identity, consumption, social justice,
Indigenous rights and collective memory.
Gordon’s approach to studying ghostly haunting also shapes my analysis of archival
material. Gordon argues that identifying examples of hauntings draws “attention to a
whole realm of experiences and social practices that can barely be approached without a
method attentive to what is elusive, fantastic, contingent, and often barely there.”176
Similarly, I identify what relevant information is included and missing from the archival
material. Gordon encourages scholars to reckon with the ghost but, as Rosenberg et al.
point out, she “does not fully conceptualize what she means by reckoning” and they build
on Gordon’s work by developing a methodology of “thinking in relation.”177 This
approach uses juxtaposition to identify how documents and narratives “are haunted by
what they cannot contain.”178 Instead of simply identifying the “contours and limits”179 of
narratives, this method considers narratives in relation to relevant but unacknowledged
events or information. For example, Rosenberg et al. juxtapose the discovery of the
bodies of three women on the outskirts of Edmonton in 2005 (the same year the
province’s centenary celebrations took place) with the celebratory narratives of
Indigenous cultures articulated during the centenary celebrations. This juxtaposition, they
argue, reveals how the ghosts of colonial sexual violence haunt the centenary
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celebrations.180 This approach encourages scholars to embrace the complexity and
ambiguity that emerges when seemingly incompatible pieces of information are
considered in relation to each other.
A central focus of this thesis is how narratives about national identity, history, and
citizenship popularized during the Olympic relate to contemporary social and political
issues facing Indigenous peoples in Canada. To this end, I draw heavily on scholarship
about Indigenous peoples’ history and rights in Canada. Taiaiake Alfred, for example,
shaped my understanding of the meaning of colonialism. He makes the convincing
argument that the “invasion and eventual domination of North America by European
empires that we know as colonization is best understood as the culmination of thousands
of years of differential societal developments under specific environmental
conditions.”181 For Alfred, colonialism in Canada involves, but is not limited to, actions
and institutions like the exploitation and appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ land, the
Indian Residential School system, racism, and the eradication of Indigenous peoples’
rights. Alfred emphasizes the fact that Indigenous peoples experience colonialism as
“causes of harm to them as people and as communities, limitations placed on their
freedom, and disturbing mentalities, psychologies, and behaviours.”182 Like Alfred, I
recognize that colonialism has dramatically impacted, and continues to impact,
Indigenous peoples’ lives in Canada and this project examines a number of specific
examples of colonialism’s enduring effects on Indigenous communities in the country.
In keeping with Alfred and others, I use the term “Settlers” to describe the nonIndigenous people who first arrived in Canada and contemporary non-Indigenous
Canadians. As Paulette Regan makes clear, the term, “Settler” “refers not only to EuroCanadians whose ancestors came to Canada during the colonial period but also to more
recent immigrants from a variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds who are part of
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[contemporary Canadian] Settler society.”183 I use the term Indigenous peoples rather
than Aboriginal peoples to describe the original inhabitants of Canada because, as Alfred
argues, the label “aboriginal” “is a legal and social construction of the state, and it is
disciplined by racialized violence”184 Additionally, O’Bonsawin uses the term
“Indigenous” in her work because “it represents an identity that is not geographically or
socially defined.”185

Chapter Outline
The chapters in this study address the Olympic Games chronologically, starting with the
1976 Montreal Summer Olympics and ending with the 2010 Vancouver Winter
Olympics. I dedicate two chapters to each of the Olympic Games held in Canada. One
chapter focuses on the economic details of the Games and the regional context in which
they were held. The other chapter pays greater attention to critical issues related to the
narratives about national identity and history promoted during the Games.
Chapter Two examines the programs that helped finance the 1976 Montreal Summer
Olympic Games. Two of these programs -- the sponsorship, licensing and supplier
program, and coin and stamp programs -- raised far less money than expected. I identify
two interrelated factors to explain why sales of Olympic commodities were low. First, the
Organizing Committee for the Montreal Olympic Games’ (COJO)186self-financing model
offered Canadians the opportunity to support the Olympics by purchasing commodities.
However, consumers were not yet familiar with cause-related marketing campaigns.
Second, COJO could not draw a link between the Games and national pride because
French and English Canada were divided over linguistic and cultural differences.
Moreover, I argue that the eventual success of the Olympic lottery had less to do with the
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Olympics and more to do with the fact that it was the first legal national lottery in
Canada.
In Chapter Three, I analyze the symbolic meanings of commodities sold during the
Montreal Olympics like objects bearing the Games’ emblem, mascot, and
commemorative coins. I argue that some of these objects represented the idea that the
Olympics were Quebec’s Games, rather than Canada’s Games. Other objects, like plush
toys of the mascot and certain coins, represented the history of the fur trade in Canada
and were haunted by past efforts to assimilate Indigenous peoples into Settler society. By
applying Gordon and Derrida’s work on haunting to Olympic commodities, I illustrate
that important information about the nation’s history can be obscured, but not completely
expunged from public memory. Additionally, I argue that many Olympic commodities
symbolized irreconcilable ideas about Canada and highlighted, rather than resolved,
conflicts between English- and French- Canadians.
Chapter Four discusses city and region branding practices of the 1988 Calgary Winter
Olympics. I show that these practices overlapped and complemented the oil industry’s
sponsorship of the Games, arguing that the rise of neo-liberalism and market
fundamentalism in Canada during the 1980s made this overlap possible. Collectively, the
city, region, and corporate branding campaigns in the Olympics depicted Calgary and
Western Canadian cultures as rooted in, but not constrained by, the region’s pioneer
history and positioned the petroleum industry as central to Alberta’s modern prosperity
and growth. Many Olympic commodities represented these ideas, but the Cree Lubicon’s
highly publicized opposition to the Calgary Olympics undermined the coherency of the
region and corporate branding messages of the Games, thus undermining the intended
symbolism of Olympic commodities.
In Chapter Five, I analyze how organizers of the Calgary Olympics used the terms
“Olympic spirit” and “Canadian spirit” to describe Olympic and Canadian values. I argue
that the spirit of the Olympics was linked to the contractualization of citizenship because
Canadians could only share in the spirit if they increased the Games’ commercial value.
Significantly, buying Olympic commodities was one way in which Canadians could
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fulfill their contractual obligations as citizens. Anti-Olympic protestors who did not share
the spirit were excluded from the Games. Despite this exclusion, their protests drew
attention to the fact that the Lubicon Cree did not have, in Hannah Arendt’s words, the
“right to have rights.”187
Chapter Six explores the partnership between the Bid Corporation/Organizing Committee
of the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games and four First Nations in B.C., known
collectively as the Four Host First Nations (FHFN). I show that the FHFN played a
central role in Vancouver’s successful Olympic bid and helped make the Games
profitable for organizers, the IOC and sponsors. Additionally, the FHFN’s involvement in
the Olympics was part of a broader set of practices within B.C. aimed at mitigating the
risk that Indigenous peoples’ land claims would weaken the economy. Ultimately, the
Games did not leave a positive impact on most Indigenous communities in B.C.
In Chapter Seven, I identify narratives about national identity and history that were
promoted in the commercial and non-commercial activities of the Vancouver Olympics. I
argue that the ideas about Canadian identity represented in the Games obscured the
history and legacy of colonialism in Canada.188 By contrast, anti-Olympic protests
brought pressing political and social issues to the fore and made it difficult to ignore the
colonial practices and policies in Canada’s past. Olympic commodities, I argue, were
fetish objects that were haunted by the history and legacy of colonialism in Canada.
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Chapter 2
Marketing Avery Brundage’s Apoplexy: The 1976
Montreal Olympics Self-Financing Model
In May 1970, Montreal’s Mayor Jean Drapeau was in Amsterdam bidding against Los
Angeles and Moscow for the 1976 Summer Olympic Games. Hours before the final vote,
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asked the mayors to provide them with
financing guarantees. The Americans and Russians quickly obtained funding pledges
from their federal governments, but Drapeau knew that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
would not do likewise. The federal government had financed much of the 1967 Montreal
Exposition and many Canadians did not want their tax dollars going to another largescale cultural event in Montreal.1 When he addressed the IOC the following day, Drapeau
said that he did not need to give any financial guarantees because he was staking
Montreal’s reputation on the Olympics. Moreover, Drapeau promised something that the
other Mayors had not: he vowed to preserve the amateur nature of the Games and avoid
extravagant costs.2 This promise impressed the IOC and Montreal won the bid on the
second round of voting, after Los Angeles was eliminated and all the IOC members who
voted for Los Angeles transferred their votes to Montreal.3
Upon returning to Canada, Drapeau faced tough questions from the press about how he
planned to fund the Olympics. The Organizing Committee for the Montreal Olympic
Games (COJO)4 designed a self-financing model, which was intended to raise all the
money required to finance the Olympics through private fund-raising projects. The
Mayor famously declared that the Olympics could “no more have a deficit than a man
can have a baby.”5 The Montreal Gazette ran a cartoon by Aislin (Terry Mosher) in 1974
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in response to Drapeau’s statement that showed a pregnant Mayor calling Dr.
Morgentaler, a well-known Canadian abortion provider.6 The cartoon was prophetic, as
COJO’s self-financing model did not raise close to enough money to cover the cost of the
Games. They ultimately left Montreal and Quebec with a joint debt of approximately $1
billion.7
COJO’s self-financing model is an under-studied but significant component of the
Montreal Olympics. Existing scholarship on the financial dimensions of these Games
mostly focuses on the enormous costs of building Olympic infrastructure, especially the
Montreal Olympic stadium.8 Thus, by analyzing COJO’s self-financing model in-depth, I
address a gap in the academic literature on the Montreal Olympics. I focus on three
COJO fundraising programs: its sponsorship, licensing and supplier program; the coin
and stamp programs; and the lottery program. Profits from the sale of Olympic
commodities fell far below COJO’s expectations while, conversely, the Olympic lottery
raised far more money than expected. This result is significant considering that later, in
Calgary and Vancouver, sales of Olympic goods, most notably Petro Canada glassware
and Hudson’s Bay Company mittens, were unexpectedly high.
Two interrelated factors influenced sales of Montreal Olympic commodities. First,
COJO’s self-financing model offered Canadians the opportunity to support the Olympics
by purchasing commodities. However, consumers were not yet familiar with the idea that
they could contribute to a social cause through consumption and they did not widely
embrace this idea. Second, COJO could not draw a link between the Games and national
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pride because French and English Canada remained divided over linguistic and cultural
differences. Moreover, I argue that the popularity of the Olympic lottery had less to do
with the Olympics and more to do with the fact that it was the first legal national lottery
in Canada. This chapter lays out the foundation for my analysis of the fusion of
commercialism and nationalism in the Olympics. I show that Olympic commodities only
became popular symbols of Canadian identity within a particular socio-economic context
and that the conditions required to create this context were missing in the Montreal
Olympics. Thus, in this chapter, I identify the absence, rather than presence, of the social
and economic factors needed to fuse commercialism and nationalism.

The “Golden Rule:” The Self-Financing Games
After Montreal won the bid to host the 1976 Olympics, Trudeau stood firm on his refusal
to give the city any direct financial assistance. In 1972, the Liberals were gearing up for a
federal election and facing low ratings in political polls. Brian McKenna and Susan
Purcell write that, given the “continued unpopularity of Montreal’s plan to stage the
Olympics, Trudeau had no choice but to maintain a firm position toward Montreal and
the financing of the games.”9 The 1972 election left Trudeau’s Liberals with a minority
government and, in July 1973, he introduced legislation authorizing the Olympic coin and
stamp programs, along with the Olympic lottery. 10 COJO would receive no direct federal
funding.
The City of Montreal was responsible for the construction and installation of Olympicrelated infrastructure, while COJO was responsible for organizing and staging the
Olympics.11 This division, however, was far from rigid, as Mayor Drapeau sat on
COJO’s board of directors and handpicked many of its members. These included: Louis
Chantigny, a sports writer and civil servant in the Quebec provincial government; Pierre
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M. Charbonneau, a Sun Life insurance executive and the president of the Quebec Sports
Federation; and Gerry M. Snyder, an entrepreneur and Montreal City Council member.12
After consulting with the Prime Minister and Ministry of External Affairs, Drapeau asked
Roger Rousseau, a career diplomat who at the time was serving as the Canadian
ambassador to Cameroon, to be COJO’s President and Commissioner.13
Drapeau created the initial budget for the Montreal Games in 1972, estimating the total
cost would be $310 million.14 The projected revenue from sales of Olympic coins and
stamps was $250 million and $10 million respectfully, which would cover all
construction costs.15 Other projected sources of revenue were: the Olympic lottery ($32
million), ticket sales ($9.5 million), TV rights ($3 million), souvenirs ($2 million),
brochures, posters, photographs, slides, films and official guides ($1.5 million), the
Olympic village ($1 million), interest on investment ($1 million), donations ($100, 000),
and “other expenses” ($800, 000).16 Paul Howell, COJO’s planning advisor, wrote that
Drapeau presented his budget “far too early for the cost estimates to be reliable, given the
time and effort required to acquire data and make rigorous computations.”17 Howell
claims that if he or his colleagues had challenged Drapeau’s numbers, they “would surely
[have] been seeking other work.”18
Drapeau’s budget proved wildly inaccurate. In the end, according to the Official Report
of the Montreal Olympics, COJO’s self-financing model only covered about one third of
all Olympic costs. The coin program raised about $100 million in profits, “less than half
the return originally estimated.”19 The stamp program raised approximately $7 million
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compared to the forecasted $10 million.20 In contrast, Drapeau’s initial estimate of $32
million for the lottery was too cautious, which in fact, raised $235 million. Other sources
of income were: $32 million in TV rights, $27 million in admission ticket sales, $9
million in interest on investments, $9 million from the revenue division, which included
COJO’s official sponsorship, licensing and supplier program, $2 million from athletes’
accommodation and $1 million in program sales.21 Even with the unexpected surplus
from lottery revenue, the Montreal Olympics ultimately left Quebec with close to $1
billion of debt.22 Montreal gave $8 million to cover the cost of the Olympics and took on
$200 million in debt. The Quebec government gave $25 million to the Games and took
on $790 million in debt. The province instituted a special tax on tobacco products and
used the proceeds from this tax, as well as from the Olympic lottery, which the Canadian
parliament extended until 1979, to help repay this debt.23 Quebec only settled all its
outstanding Olympic debt in 2006.24
Rousseau described self-financing as “the Golden Rule of the Olympic Games of
1976.”25 Moreover, the guidebook COJO provided to Olympic hostesses and guides,
which contained information they had to memorize and were tested on, stated: the “great
innovation that characterizes the organization of the 1976 Olympic Games is the selffinancing project that COJO established in collaboration with the federal, provincial, and
municipal governments.”26 COJO’s sponsorship, licensing and supplier program was a
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key part of its self-financing program. In his 1973 marketing plan, Alfred Warkentin
proposed that “everything and anything is potentially sponsorable. We should, on this
basis, be theoretically able to obtain a supplier or sponsor for all the goods, services and
facilities required at the 1976 Olympics.”27
Neil Asselin, COJO’s Director-General of Marketing, celebrated the fact that COJO’s
sponsorship, licensing and supplier program was pushing the Olympics in a more
commercial direction: “We’re breaking new ground in areas of financing the Games.
Traditionally the approach has been very amateur. Commercialism was not encouraged.
Governments put up most of the money. But there’s a realization now that there are other
ways to finance them.”28 It is ironic that Asselin depicted amateurism, a value the IOC
has consistently and proudly associated with Olympic athletes, as antiquated.
Commenting on COJO’s sponsorship and marketing program, journalist Jim Kearney
wrote: “It’s a good thing [former IOC President, Avery] Brundage, the last of the
unreconstructed amateurs, has retired. The way Montreal is going, even Avery’s
apoplexy would have wound up being copyrighted. And marketed.”29 Bruce Kidd
supports this view when he writes: “COJO’s innovative approach to sponsorships paved
the way for the heady commercialization of the 1980s.”30 Julian Boykoff concurs, writing
that “Montreal should be viewed as a key step toward the corporate commercialization of
the Games.”31
The ambitious nature of COJO’s sponsorship and licensing program is evident in its
impact on the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games. Their marketing division
developed an official sponsor and licensing program modeled on COJO’s program.
According to a report by the division, “one of the most productive sources of
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information” on licensing came from COJO.32 However, few companies were interested
in affiliating themselves with the Edmonton Commonwealth Games and organizers were
unable to match the scale of COJO’s marketing program. One Commonwealth Games
report noted: the Olympics “have had the effect of reducing the stature of the
Commonwealth Games by the inevitable comparisons that are made.”33
In July 1973, the federal government passed the Olympic Act (1976), establishing the
Olympic stamp and coin programs and the Olympic lottery. That same year, Canada Post
launched its fund-raising program, concentrating on four areas: Olympic action stamps,
stamp sculptures, commemorative stamps, and stamp souvenirs.34 It added a surcharge to
the cost of action stamps, the first time in history it added such a charge, and issued one
series of action stamps every year for four years.35 The first series bore the emblem of the
Montreal Games and subsequent series depicted Olympic water sports, body-contact
sports and team sports. Also available for sale were eight series of commemorative
stamps but, unlike the action stamps, these ones did not come with a surcharge.
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Figure 4: Montreal Olympics action stamps, COJO, Official Report, 69-72.

The Royal Canadian Mint issued seven series of commemorative coins between 1973 and
1976, adding a surcharge to the face value of each coin. Every series contained two coins
with a face value of $10 and two with a face value of $5.36 Each series was based on one
of the following themes: geography, Olympic symbols, early Canadian sports, track and
field sports, water sports, team and body-contact sports and Olympic souvenirs.37 In
addition, Ottawa granted the Mint the authority to issue a gold coin with a $100 face
value.38 Individuals could purchase the coins and related commodities at chartered banks,
financial institutions, post offices, coin dealers, and major department stores.39
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Figure 5: Montreal Olympics coins, COJO, Official Report, 69-70.

The Olympic lottery was the most profitable part of its self-financing program. When
compared to the initial estimate of $32 million, the lottery’s ultimate net profit of $235
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million marks a 750% increase in expected vs. received profit.40 “Returns were so high,”
the Official Report concluded, “that the Olympic lottery became the keystone of the
overall financing scheme.”41 The Olympic Lottery Corporation, a federally chartered
corporation, held nine draws between April 1974 and August 1976. 42 The price per ticket
was $10 and winners received $1 million.43 Participating provinces, which had to
formally agree to operate the lottery, received 50 cents on every ticket sold in their
province. In total, provinces received more than $25 million, which they used to fund
amateur sport.44 Quebec was permitted to use its share of the lottery proceeds to pay for
Olympic-related construction, but COJO was not permitted to transfer its lottery earnings
to the city to help pay construction costs.45

“Help It Happen:” Self-Financing and Consumption
COJO believed, unrealistically, that its self-financing model would entirely eliminate its
dependence on public funding. It hoped to replace its reliance on Canadians’ tax dollars
with their consumer dollars and framed consuming Olympic-related goods as a way for
individuals to contribute to a charitable cause. The official report noted that the selffinancing model allowed Canadians to “make voluntary contributions toward the cost of
organizing the Games.”46 The writers of COJO’s 1973 marketing plan observed: “In
conversation with several persons it has been suggested to us that we should not neglect
the probability of individuals contributing to the success of the Olympic Games much the
way they would contribute to a charity of their choice.”47 That same year, Drapeau wrote
a letter to Trudeau, anticipating that COJO’s self-financing program would offset its need
for federal funding: “the self-financing formulas and programs and programs already
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presented to the federal government’s analysts...permit us to state that the City of
Montreal will not have to ask the federal government to contribute to the Olympic Games
out of federal funds.”48
In addition, Drapeau believed that the income from sales of coins and stamps would raise
enough money to cover the entire cost of constructing Olympic infrastructure, thus
eliminating the need for public funding. He was of course incorrect, as revenues proved
far lower than construction costs.49 Yet this belief contributed to the fetishization of the
stamps and coins. Sut Jhally argues that “to make a fetish out of something is to invest it
with powers that it doesn’t have.”50 Moreover, Russell Belk argues that many
commodities, including collector objects (like coins and stamps) “are invested with
special meanings that remove them and set them apart from the everyday items thought to
typify marketplace exchanges.”51 In the case of the Olympic coins and stamps, COJO
invested them with a special meaning and power: the ability to make the Olympic Games
possible or, in Canada Post’s words, to “help it happen.”
COJO, Canada Post and the Mint consistently promoted this message about Olympic
stamps and coins. Canada Post used the theme of civic participation in its Olympic stamp
marketing campaign. It ran ads in all major Canadian newspapers and magazines and
aired ads on TV and radio using the theme: “Make it Happen.”52 Companies publicized
their support of the Olympics by buying special postal meters that stamped envelopes
with the Games emblem and the slogan, “We Help It Happen,” or, “Official Supplier of
the 1976 Olympic Games.” The Postmaster General argued that purchasing Olympic
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action stamps “allows every citizen to participate, on a purely voluntary basis, in
defraying the total cost of the Games.”53 A pamphlet issued by Canada Post about the
action stamps echoed this sentiment, noting: “The purpose of the surcharge [on the
stamps] is to give the public a convenient opportunity to support the Games on a
voluntary and personal basis.”54 Asselin discussed the coin program in similar terms. He
argued: “The Olympic Coin Program has been conceived as a means of encouraging
international and individual participation in the financing of the Olympic Games.”55

Figure 6: Montreal Olympics postal meters, Canadian Design Resource website
http://www.canadiandesignresource.ca/olympics/1976-olympic-postal-meter/.

COJO also fetishized the coins and stamps by obscuring an important fact: it depended on
the profits from its self-financing program to replace direct federal funding of the
Olympics. To be clear, COJO did not obscure the fact that it needed these profits. Rather,
it obscured the reason why it needed the money – it was not receiving direct funding from
the federal government and hoped that income from consumer purchases of coins and
stamps would replace this funding. Two letters that Rousseau and Drapeau wrote to
Trudeau in February 1973 show their reliance on the coin and stamp programs. Both
politicians wrote to the Prime Minister guaranteeing that COJO would not need money
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from the federal government provided it received all the net profits from the sale of coins
and stamps.56 Rousseau wrote:
Provided that the federal government agrees to remit to COJO the net
proceeds of the sale of special Olympic coins and stamps, the COJO also
agrees that the federal government will not be called upon to make any
special contribution towards the payment of any or all expenses incurred
in connection with the Olympic Games of 1976.57
Drapeau used almost identical language in his letter to Trudeau58 and the Prime
Minister’s refusal to give any direct financial support to COJO meant that the main
responsibility of funding the Olympics was shifted from federal taxpayers to Quebec
taxpayers. (Montreal municipal taxes and provincial taxes helped pay the Olympic debt.)
However, COJO’s coin and stamp programs, along with COJO’s other fundraising
projects, helped reduce the money taxpayers had to contribute to the Olympics.
Approximately $369 million from consumers, along with $1 billion from Quebec
taxpayers, helped fund the Games. 59
COJO’s efforts to minimize its reliance on public funding foreshadowed the reliance on
consumers’ dollars to fund social causes and public services in the late 1970s and 1980s.
However, in the early and mid 1970s, Canadians were unfamiliar with the idea that they
could support a cause (the Olympics) by collecting stamps and coins. Although many
foreign governments have imposed surcharges on stamps to fund charitable causes, the
Olympic Action Stamps were the first stamps in Canada to have such a charge.60 The
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first postage stamp in the U.S. to raise funds for charity was a stamp for breast cancer
research. First Lady Hillary Clinton unveiled the stamp on July 29, 1998 and, by June
2005, revenues had reached $45.6 million.61 As Samantha King observes, American
politicians argued that the Stamp Out Breast Cancer Act (the legislation that made the
stamp possible) opened up “new ethical and political possibilities for the buying of a
stamp, for what was previously conceived as a straightforward act of consumption.”62
King’s research on strategic philanthropy (discussed in Chapter 1) reveals that, by the
time the breast cancer stamp was unveiled, corporate social responsibility campaigns
were widespread in the U.S. Unlike the Montreal Olympics, the breast cancer cause was
one of the most popular causes championed by companies. Corporations, ranging from
BMW to KitchenAid, created cause-related marketing campaigns to raise money for the
Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation; and marketing experts described breast
cancer as a “dream cause.”63
Avid coin collectors are not, in general, motivated to purchase coins out of a sense of
national loyalty or social consciousness. Their top reasons for collecting are: to become
an active part of the coin collecting community; to enhance their social standing and selfimage within this community; and to make sound financial investments.64 The Royal
Canadian Mint could have addressed consumers’ reticence through clever marketing
campaigns. However, the Mint had little experience with marketing coins to consumers,
as seen in a 1982 meeting between Mint officials and organizers of the 1988 Calgary
Olympics:
When the Montreal Olympic Coin Program was initiated in 1971, there
was no formal marketing structure in place; the Mint was a manufacturing
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organization. A Vice President Marketing by the name of Garth McKye
(now VP Marketing for VIA Rail) was installed, but not in time to change
the Mint’s focus. The Montreal coins were ‘marketed on a crash basis
through bad distribution.’ 65
At this meeting, Mint representatives identified key mistakes they made with the
Montreal program: “The coins were advertised as an investment rather than a
commemorative collectable, they were manufactured according to the numbers legally
authorized rather than to demand, and the Mint realizes there were far too many multiples
made available.”66 In this meeting, Mint officials also revealed that its overproduction of
Olympic coins had damaged its reputation and that it took the Mint at least two years
after the 1976 Games to regain its credibility in the international coin market. This
program also caused a global decline in interest for Olympic coins.67
The findings of a 1974 consumer survey reveals that few individuals who purchased
Series Two of Olympic coins did so to support the Montreal Olympics. A survey showed
that only 21% of purchasers of a prestige set did so to support the Olympic Games. The
most cited reason for buying coins was to build a coin collection. For consumers who did
not buy a complete set, only 15% said that they had purchased the coins to support the
Olympic Games; the most cited reason for purchasing the coins was to keep them as
souvenirs.68
The coin program suffered from two additional problems: inflation and labour unrest.
Howell writes: “the oil crisis of 1973, half-hearted management of labour in Quebec, and
the beginning of burgeoning inflation all increased [Olympic related] costs and reduced
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scheduling options.”69 In 1973, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) implemented an oil embargo in response to the Arab-Israeli conflict. That same
year, Canada experienced a dramatic rise in inflation, which boosted the price of many
goods, including the steel used in the construction of Olympic facilities and the price of
silver used to make the coins.70 Writing in 1975, Austin Page, the Director General of the
Olympic Coin Program, argued that weak sales of Series Two coins were due, in part, to
“the change in attitude of investors who were buying when the price of silver was rising
but who have stopped buying as the price of silver stabilized [at a high price].”71 In
January 1975, the Marketing Advisory Committee on the Olympic Coin Program reduced
the number of Olympic silver coins the Mint produced by one third because sales were
lower than expected. It revised forecasted sales of the coins downward from $250 million
to $175 million, but even this forecast was optimistic as the coins would ultimately earn
less than $100 million in profit.72
In 1974, labour disputes between the government and unions representing construction
workers stalled work on various Olympic sites.73 Union leaders were in a powerful
position because work stoppages could delay construction of buildings that had to be
ready by fixed deadlines.74 Unions used work disruptions to press their demands and the
city compensated for lost time caused by these disruptions by increasing construction
work to 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The official report notes that the cost of
maintaining ceaseless labour was crippling: “overtime, the cost of heating sections of the
site during the bitter Canadian winters, extended equipment rentals and the consequent
effects on subcontractors, all pushed COJO's construction expenditure to record
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heights.”75 In addition, workers at the Royal Canadian Mint went on strike in January
1975, which delayed the release of the third series of Olympic coins. They wanted higher
salaries and a provision that employees in Winnipeg receive the same benefits as those in
Ontario and Quebec.76 In late January 1975, striking employees on Parliament Hill
burned effigies of Treasury Board Chairman Jean Chrétien and Chief Administrator of
the Royal Canadian Mint Geoffrey Ferguson.77 The strike lasted seven weeks and was
only settled in March 1975.78

“Quebec’s Olympics:” French Canadian Identity
Richard Gareau, COJO’s director of licensing and legal affairs, argued that Olympic
promotion and publicity must serve two roles. First, it must convince “Canada that our
Games are a truly Canadian event.”79 Second, COJO must channel its energies “into the
prime objective of translating the value of these Games into dollars.” 80 COJO was
unable to achieve either of these goals because most Canadians viewed the Olympics as a
regional project, not a national one. Howell writes: “When Montreal made its winning
bid...it was clear to Canadians that the Montreal Games would be the Quebec Games.”81
Ross MacNab, a Canadian who participated in the International Youth Camp, a program
that brought Canadian and international youth together to experience the Olympics,
echoed Howell’s sentiment. He wrote: “It appeared that it was not Canada’s Olympics,
but Quebec’s Olympics.”82 Moreover, Drapeau viewed the Montreal Olympics as an
opportunity to showcase the strength of French-Canadian culture. Discussing his plans
for the Olympic Stadium, the Mayor said: “As French Canadians....the only way we’re
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going to survive is to make our mark not only in this country, but on the entire continent.
We must never be poor copies of others.”83 Bruce Kidd writes that Drapeau wanted to
host the Games in order to dramatize “the will of French Canada to survive in the face of
two centuries of English-Canadian attempts at assimilation.”84
The Montreal Games were held after a series of dramatic events in Quebec. During the
1960s, the province underwent a period of political and social modernization known as
the “Quiet Revolution.”85 On June 22, 1960, the Liberals, led by Jean Lesage, won the
provincial election. They replaced the socially conservative Union Nationale government,
which had been in power from 1944 to 1960 and was led by Maurice Duplessis until his
death in 1959.86 Under Lesage’s leadership, the power and influence of the Catholic
Church in Quebec diminished and many Quebeckers moved from rural to urban areas. 87
The major goals of the Quiet Revolution were to politically modernize the province,
create new social and political opportunities for francophones, and give them control over
the province’s economy. Quebeckers began to view Quebec as a national state that could
spearhead the changes needed to achieve these goals.88 Under Lesage’s leadership, the
Quebec legislature became increasingly involved in the administration of social services,
including education and healthcare. Many Quebeckers supported this move, believing
that the province should take over the development, administration, and funding of every
key element of the Quebec society including its economy, education system, social
welfare programs, and healthcare provision.89 In 1963, Lesage opposed Prime Minister
Lester B. Pearson’s efforts to introduce a national pension plan. Lesage insisted that
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Quebec develop a plan that was separate from, but compatible with, the federal pension
plan.90 Pearson eventually acquiesced to Lesage’s demands and when Pearson left office
in 1968 he was said to be “worn out by the demands of office and unsatisfied by his
inability to strike a new balance within Canada between Canada and Quebec.”91
The Quiet Revolution also led to changes aimed at addressing the income disparity
between English and French Canadians. Beginning in the 1940s, French-Canadian
authors like Gabrielle Roy and Roger Lemelin published novels depicting Montreal as a
city divided into wealthy anglophone and poor francophone neighbourhoods. These
anglophones lived in luxurious areas with paid servants, while disadvantaged
francophones lived in slums and struggled to earn enough money to improve their living
conditions.92 Sean Mills writes: “It was in Montreal, with scarcity and wealth inscribed
upon the very geography of the city, that many French Canadians came to realize the
extent of the cultural and material oppression they faced.”93 The dominance of English in
professional environments was a major factor in the income disparity between
anglophones and francophones. The finding of the federal government’s 1969 Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism highlighted such disparities.94 In 1961,
56% of Montreal’s highest paid workers were anglophones, even though they comprised
only 24% of the workforce. Although francophones made up the majority of Quebec’s
population, they only controlled 20% of Quebec’s economy. Additionally, the infant
mortality rate for low-income French speakers was higher than the overall rate in
Canada.95 These findings illustrated that the linguistic and class disparities between
French and English Canadians were interrelated and lay at the heart of francophones’
dissatisfaction.96

90

Ibid., 111.
Ibid., 104.
92
William Johnson, qtd in Bothwell, Canada and Quebec, 87.
93
Mills, The Empire Within, 21.
94
Ibid., 20.
95
Ibid., 20-21.
96
Ibid., 21.
91

66

Many Quebeckers worried they would be forced to assimilate into English Canada and
lose their distinct language and culture. Some began calling for the creation of a separate
Quebec state.97 The nationalist movement in Quebec developed rapidly, seen first with
the establishment in 1967 of a separatist party, the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association,
led by René Lévesque.98 Quebeckers began organizing demonstrations around Frenchlanguage rights. For example, in 1969, students organized public demonstrations in
opposition to the destruction of a computer centre at Sir George Williams University in
Montreal. The Front de Libération du Québéc (FLQ), a militant Quebec separatist group
began small-scale bombing campaigns in 1963 and, in the summer of 1970, nine
members of the group held a meeting to discuss the possibility of escalating their
campaign.99
On October 5th, 1970, a group calling themselves the Liberation Cell of the FLQ
kidnapped James Richard Cross, a British diplomat living in Montreal.100 In exchange for
Cross’ release, the FLQ issued a list of demands, which included the release of political
prisoners, rehiring postal workers that were laid off, and money and a piloted plane to
Cuba or Algeria.101 The FLQ’s manifesto opposed the colonial and capitalistic elements
of Quebec society, stating: “The Front de Liberation du Quebec wants the total
independence of Quebeckers, united in a free society, purged forever of the clique of
voracious sharks, the patronizing ‘big bosses’ and their henchmen who have made
Quebec their hunting preserve for ‘cheap labour’ and unscrupulous exploitation.”102 On
October 8th, a Radio-Canada announcer read the manifesto on-air and newspapers
published it the next day.103 After hearing the manifesto, many Quebeckers supported the
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ideas it expressed, but most condemned the FLQ’s violence.104 More than fifty per cent
of callers to radio talk shows in Quebec endorsed the spirit of the FLQ’s manifesto.105
On October 10th, the Chenier Cell of the FLQ kidnapped Pierre Laporte, a Quebec
cabinet minister. As the crisis dragged on, support for the FLQ grew. Eight hundred
Université du Québéc à Montréal students went on strike, hoping to pressure the
government to negotiate seriously with the FLQ.106 Moreover, the situation drew
attention to the issue of Quebec’s independence from Canada. When the Premier of
Ontario commented on the FLQ crisis, sixteen influential Quebeckers issued a joint
statement opposing the Premier’s comments, insisting that the kidnappings were an
internal issue that “could only be resolved in Quebec, by Québécois.”107 On October 15th,
eight thousand Canadian troops entered Montreal and, the following day, Prime Minister
Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act.108 The act authorized the government to
conduct searches and seizures without warrants, to arrest and detain individuals without
charge for twenty-one days and to retroactively declare that the FLQ was an illegal
organization.109 The majority of Canadians supported Trudeau’s decision to invoke the
War Measures Act, but the act has subsequently been criticized for allowing the state to
violate civil liberties.110 On October 17, news emerged that Pierre Laporte had been
killed. Later, on December 3rd, approximately one thousand police and soldiers
surrounded an apartment in Montreal North where Cross was being held and successfully
negotiated his release by promising FLQ Liberation cell members safe passage to
Cuba.111 The army left Montreal on January 4, 1971, and the government repealed the
War Measures Act in April of that year.
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This tumultuous recent past was reflected in COJO’s plan for the Olympic torch relay.
The Olympic flame was transferred from Athens to Ottawa via an electronic signal on
July 15th 1976.112 COJO initially considered lighting the flame at the tip of Gaspé and retracing Jacques Cartier’s travels but reconsidered this plan. The torch relay of the 1968
Mexico City Olympics, which retraced Christopher Columbus’ steps, “only served to
reanimate long subdued ethno-cultural tensions” in Mexico113 and COJO did not want a
similar situation to happen in Canada.114 When COJO planned the flame’s path from
Ottawa to Montreal, it made sure that the flame stayed in Ontario for the longest time
possible before crossing over into Quebec. Daniel Latouche writes that the federal
authorities’ reaction to the idea of a Quebec-only torch relay “bordered on hysteria”
because it brought up the memory of French President Charles De Gaulle’s 1967 visit to
Quebec, when he declared “vive le Québec libre.” The President travelled across Quebec
and, when he arrived in Montreal, delivered a speech declaring his support for the
Quebec sovereignty movement.115
Kidd recounts that organizers of the arts and culture program of the Montreal Games
“had to contend with the politics of culture.”116 The Canada Council for the Arts agreed
to sponsor a set of Olympic posters, which would be distributed to schools, sports, clubs
and libraries in Canada and abroad, but insisted that they contain the heading “Canada”
rather than “Montreal.”117 The politics of culture also influenced Canadians’ perception
of the Games. Gay Kirpatrick, a Torontonian, wrote a letter to the editor of the Globe and
Mail complaining about the dominance of French in the Games’ opening ceremony:
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Pierre Trudeau’s dream of a bilingual Canada is quite obviously going to
be turned into a nightmare by the unilingual Québécois. I attended the
opening ceremonies of Canada’s Olympics on July 17...and was simply
astonished to hear each initial announcement in French, followed by an
English translation. And to add fuel to the fire, the large electronic
signboards flashed each country’s name during the walk-past, in French
only.118
In response to Kirpatrick’s letter, Peter Fletcher, writing from a suburb of Toronto,
observed:

“Surely Mr. Kirpatrick is aware of the fact that French is the official

language of the Province of Quebec....with the opinion of many Canadians that these
Games were Quebec’s and not Canada’s, it is surprising to see that with the opening
ceremonies [sic] on Saturday the Olympics are suddenly ‘ours’.”119
During the Olympics, Canadians were most united during the high jump final when a
Canadian, Greg Joy, competed against an American, Dwight Stones. Stones had
previously offended Canadians by stating that he detested French Canadians because
“they screwed up the whole Olympics.”120 This statement infuriated many Canadians and
at the high jump final, they loudly booed Stones and enthusiastically cheered Joy. Joy
won a silver medal, beating Stones who won the bronze medal.121 However, this small
show of unity occurred on the second last day of the Games. Earlier, a spokesperson for
COJO complained that Canadians were “getting out-cheered” and that the “Americans
are wiping us out.”122 Lawrence Martin observed in the Globe and Mail that hardly any
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Canadians at the Games brought flags to wave, lamenting that, although many souvenirs
were sold at the Games, “Nobody came up with an idea for [selling] a flag.”123

A “Voluntary Means of Public Participation:” The Olympic
Lottery
COJO viewed the lottery as another way to privately fundraise for the Olympics, writing
that the lottery “was conceived as a voluntary means of public participation” in the
Games.124 Indeed, the lottery was COJO’s most successful fundraising endeavour,
ultimately raising $235 million to fund the Games. The results of the lottery draws were
broadcast live on national television, which drew high ratings. A Nielsen TV Index
Measurement found that the televised Olympic lottery draw on September 28, 1975
attracted the largest number of CTV Television Network (CTV) viewers in that month
and the third largest number of Télévision Associée (TVA) viewers.125 (The average
network audience for the show was 3,485,000 on CTV and 1,803,000 on TVA.) 126
However, there is no evidence that the lottery’s popularity was due to its association with
the Montreal Games. Rather, it was the first national lottery scheme in Canada and it
played an important role in integrating popular gambling practices into Canadian society
and changing gambling from a criminal to a legal activity.127
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Figure 7: Keychain of the Montreal Olympics lottery ticket for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com.

Beginning in the 1960s, Quebec politicians had pressured the federal government to
legalize lotteries because the province needed money to fund the 1967 Montreal World’s
Fair and later the Montreal Olympics.128 The federal government was sensitive to
Quebec’s wishes in the wake of the Quiet Revolution and the Quebec separatist
movement; so in May 1969 the Liberals passed an omnibus bill, which legalized
gambling along with socially controversial practices like divorce, abortion, and the use of
contraception.129 The omnibus bill gave federal and provincial governments the authority
to manage and conduct “lottery schemes” and it allowed provinces to grant gambling
licenses to charitable and religious organizations.130
Through the Olympic lottery, COJO pioneered a practice that became increasingly
popular in Canada after 1976: governments’ use of gambling proceeds to supplement
income from taxation. In 1985, the Criminal Code of Canada was amended to give
provinces exclusive control over gambling.131 Campbell argues that provinces now
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depend heavily on revenues from gambling: “the Canadian public’s expectations of
government services – alongside a corresponding disdain for increased taxes – have made
lotteries and other forms of gambling an attractive alternate form of government
revenue.”132According to Statistics Canada, in 2005, government-run gambling practices
generated a net profit of $7.1 billion.133 Gambling constitutes 3.8% of provinces’
revenues.134 To be clear, the Montreal Olympic lottery is not analogous to post-1985
gambling programs. While COJO relied on lotteries to raise money, provincial
governments earn most of their money from electronic gambling machines like video
lottery terminals (VLT) and casinos. This difference is significant because individuals
who play lotteries and raffles have a lower chance of becoming addicted to gambling than
those who gamble on VLTs and other electronic devices.135

Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided detailed information about COJO’s self-financing program. I
showed that Olympic organizers, politicians, marketers, and consumers were not isolated
actors operating independently of each other. Rather, their combined efforts can blur the
line dividing the commercial and national dimensions of the Olympics and help invest
consumption practices with symbolic meanings linked to national pride and civic
engagement. However, the political, economic and socio-cultural conditions were not in
place at the time of the Montreal Olympics to facilitate such a co-operation. A neo-liberal
economic model that privileged private over public contributions to social endeavors was
not yet established and Canada was divided over French Canadians’ wish for more
cultural and political autonomy.
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Chapter 3
Haunted Beavers: The 1976 Montreal Olympics, FrenchCanadian Identity, and the Fur Trade
Official Olympic hostesses and guides who greeted visitors to the 1976 Montreal
Olympics were trained to answer questions about the Olympics, Quebec, and Canada. As
part of their preparation, they were given a handbook and quizzed on the material in it.
One group of questions reveal that the Organizing Committee for the Montreal Olympic
Games (COJO) emphasized Quebec’s unique position within Canada. Hostesses and
guides were asked: “If we consider Quebec in relation to the rest of Canada, one can
observe that it has unique qualities, can you list one?”; “In what year was French
proclaimed the official language in Quebec and by whom?;” and “Quebec is a region rich
in arts, name a Québécois artist you know that is a top Canadian artist and describe their
form of art.”1 The hostesses wore pins containing the Montreal Games’ emblems on their
lapels and Olympic commodities were all marked with the same emblem. This chapter
examines the symbolism of the Games’ emblem and related commodities, showing that,
like the hostesses and guides handbook, the emblem emphasized the idea that French
Canadian identity was distinct from English Canadian identity. In fact the emblem and,
by extension, commodities bearing the emblem, represented Montreal’s identity and
helped convey the idea that the Olympics were Quebec’s Games, rather than Canada’s
Games.
The Olympic handbook also contained information about the mascot of the Games, a
beaver named Amik. It noted that the beaver “occupies a distinctive place in Canadian

Centre D’Accueil, Manuel de base, 1-46, 1-47 Box 1981-06-009/1297, Fonds Comité organisateur des
Jeux Olympiques de 1976: E46 (FCOJO). Bibliothèque et Archives Nationales du Québec (BANQ); The
handbook was written in French and I translated the questions to English. The original French reads: “Si
l’on considère le Québec comparativement au reste du Canada, on remarque certaines particularités,
purriez-vous en spécifier une?”; “En quelle année le Français, fut-il proclamé langue officielle du Québec
et par qui?”; “Le Québec est une province très polifique dans le domaine des arts. Nommez un(e) artiste
québécois(e) connu(e) au delà des frontiers canadiennes et mentionnez quel est son mode d’espression?”
1
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history” and that the mascot’s name means beaver in the Algonquin language.2 Amik was
turned into numerous commodities, including stuffed animals and key chains. Thus, the
mascot symbolized ideas about collective national identity, such as the importance of the
fur trade to the Canadian economy in the 17th and 18th centuries, rather than focusing
exclusively on French Canadian identity. However, because most commodities of the
mascot contained the Montreal Olympics’ emblem, the idea that the mascot represented a
shared Canadian identity was contradicted by the emblem’s emphasis on the
distinctiveness of Québécois culture in relation to the rest of Canada. Thus, the mascot
commodities symbolized irreconcilable ideas about Canada and highlighted, rather than
resolved, conflicts between English- and French- Canadians.
The mascot commodities, along with two Olympic coins that showed a canoeist and
lacrosse players, represented a third less obvious idea about national identity: historically,
Settler Canadians have relied on, and at times appropriated, Indigenous peoples’
knowledge and cultures to further their nation-building enterprise. Knowledge of
historical facts, such as the indispensible role that Indigenous peoples played in
facilitating the fur trade, the history of European assimilation in Canada, and Settler
Canadians’ adaptation of Indigenous games like bagataway or tewaarathon to create a
unified Settler Canadian identity, haunted mascot and coin commodities. By haunting, I
mean that these ideas were not explicitly articulated or associated with the commodities;
equally importantly, however, the ideas were inextricably linked to the commodities. I
rely on Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida’s conceptualization of haunting to buttress my
analysis of representations of Indigenous peoples in the Games. Rather than simply
identifying how Indigenous peoples were stereotyped or excluded from the Games, I use
haunting theory to show how knowledge about Indigenous peoples’ cultures, that were

Ibid., 2-44. The original French reads: “Le castor, mascotte des Jeux olympiques 1976, occupe une place
toute particulière dans l’histoire du Canada”; “La mascotte a été baptisée ‘Amik,’ mot algonquin qui
signifie ‘castor’”. When translating “amik” into English/French, it is unclear if COJO understood the
difference between Algonquin and Algonquian. The official report of the Montreal Games included two
separate sections on the meaning of the word “amik”. On page 49, it notes that amik means beaver in
Algonquian while on page 354, it notes that amik comes from the Algonquin word for beaver. The
distinction between Algonquin and Algonquian is significant: Algonquin is an Indigenous language that
belongs to the Algonquian language family.
2
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formally excluded from official narratives, were not completely erased. Rather, the
absence of this information was a presence itself: a “seething absence.”3 Put another way,
haunting theory draws attention to the fact that important information about the nation’s
history can be obscured, but not completely expunged from public memory.
My analysis of the symbolic significance of Olympic commodities contributes to existing
literature on the relationship between commercialism and Canadian identity. This chapter
complicates Catherine Carstairs’ argument that one reason why branded nationalism
became prominent after 1980 is that events like the 1990 Oka-Mohawk Crisis, and the
1995 Quebec referendum fragmented Canadians’ sense of national identity. 4 Some
brands, like Roots, Tim Hortons, and Molson Canadian, capitalized on this fragmentation
to fill a need within the nation and link ideas about national pride and unity to the
consumption of everyday consumer goods like clothing, coffee and beer. Montreal
Olympic organizers, however, were not able to capitalize on the fragmentation of national
identity. Quite the opposite: commodities bearing the Montreal Games emblem and the
mascot served as a reminder that Canadians were far from being united. Thus, these
commodities are notable for their failure: unlike commodities like Roots clothing and
Molson Canadian beer, the commodities of the emblem were unpopular and not
embraced by consumers. Moreover, in contrast to commodities linked to the Calgary and
Vancouver Olympics, the commodities of Amik, the Montreal Olympics mascot, did not
help resolve a crisis in the meaning of Canadian identity. Rather, they reflected the
existence of this crisis by symbolizing the reality that, although they had a shared
relationship to the land, French and English Canadians had more cultural differences than
similarities.
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As noted in Chapter One, most scholarship on the relationship between Canadian identity
and commercialism focuses on the link between branding and national identity.5 A
central focus in this literature is how Canadian companies like Roots, Molson Canadian,
and Tim Hortons have successfully aligned their brand meanings with national identity
and pride. This focus on marketing and brand identity, I argue, overlooks the importance
of the symbolic meaning of commodities. In contrast, my analysis of Montreal Olympic
commodities demonstrates how rich insights into the relationship between Canadian
identity and commercialism are revealed when attention is paid to the design of
commodities. The Olympic mascot commodities and canoe and lacrosse coins illustrate
how recent and historical injustices facing Indigenous peoples haunt consumer objects. In
other words, the symbolism of these commodities influences the ways in which Settlers
remember the past. Thus, by applying the concept of ghostly hauntings to the meanings
of Montreal Olympic commodities, I highlight ideas that were obscured but not
completely invisible in the Montreal Games.
Applying haunting theory to Montreal Olympic commodities also illustrates how these
goods are not distinct from the cultural elements of the Olympics, such as the opening
and closing ceremonies. Like these cultural events, Olympic commodities represent
selective ideas about Indigenous peoples’ cultural and historical contribution to the
nation. In so doing, they avoid addressing the ghosts that haunt the history of Indigenous
-Settler relations in Canada. Moreover, considered in this light, the political implications
of the Kahanawake Mohawk’s decision to stage an alternative cultural Olympiad by
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inviting visitors to their reserve, located just outside of Montreal, becomes clear.
Residents of Kahnawake sought to take control over representations of their culture,
largely by selling locally made crafts not haunted by unacknowledged truths about
Indigenous - Settler relations.

“Living Together Is Not Easy:” French Canadian Identity
Richard Gareau wrote a memo in 1973 arguing that legal protection of COJO’s licensable
rights would allow it to “take advantage of the tremendous prestige associated with the
1976 Olympic Games in order to realize the self-financing of the same.”6 One of COJO’s
copyrighted images, the Games’ emblem, appeared on Olympic commodities, including
coins, stamps, letter openers, necklaces, coloured fans, candle holders, clothing patches,
glassware, ashtrays, thermoses, license plates, key rings, and cufflinks. However, the
emblem did not connote prestige or help COJO raise substantial amounts of money. The
emblem and, by extension, commodities bearing the emblem, represented Montreal’s
identity and helped to convey the idea that the Olympics were Quebec’s Games, rather
than Canada’s Games. Georges Huel, COJO’s Director General of Graphics and Design,
created the emblem, which extended the top of the Olympic rings to form an “M,”
representing Montreal. The extended rings also represented the Olympic podium.7 The
emblem design explicitly emphasized Montreal rather than Canada: “This emblem,”
noted the Official Report of the Games, “evoked the universal brotherhood of the
Olympic ideal, the triumph of the winners, the spirit of fair play in their struggles, and the
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elevation of Montréal to the rank of Olympic City.”8 Apart from sharing the colours of
the Canadian flag (red and white), the emblem did not connote national identity.

Figure 8: Souvenirs of the Montreal Olympics, COJO, Official Report, 60.

Figure 9: Souvenirs of the Montreal Olympics, COJO, Official Report, 353.

Comité d’Organisation des Jeux Olympique (COJO), The Official Report of the XXIst Olympiad Montréal
1976. (Ottawa: Comité d’Organisation des Jeux Olympique, 1978), 314.
8
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Figure 10: Souvenirs of the Montreal Olympics for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com.
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The fact that the emblem reflected the cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of French
Canada was particularly noticeable in the design of the stamps and coins; the “M” in the
emblem was juxtaposed against the word “Canada” that appeared on all national stamps
and coins. In addition, the design of these coins and stamps were reproduced on
numerous commodities. Canada Post produced Olympic stamps in precious metal as
collectable artwork, along with images of the opening ceremony, Olympic flame, and
medal ceremony. Its souvenir collection included companion stamp albums containing 21
Olympic stamps, an Olympic stamp souvenir case with twelve stamps mounted on the
lid, and a collection of colour posters of the stamps. The Royal Canadian Mint produced
coin albums, coin cabinets, coin jewellery, lucite coins, and a combined
philatelic/numismatic collection.9 One coin in particular, part of Series One, reinforced
the emblem’s emphasis on the “elevation of Montréal to the rank of Olympic City” by
depicting the city’s skyline. 10
The primacy of French-Canadian identity in the Montreal Olympics was highlighted most
dramatically by two clothing patches sold during the Games. One patch reproduced the
Montreal Games’ emblem and the Quebec flag, which is white with four blue squares,
each with a fleur de lis in the centre. The other patch reproduced a red flag with the
Games’ emblem on it and the Quebec flag. These commodities aligned the Olympic
emblem with prominent symbols of Québécois nationalism.
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Ibid., 68.
Ibid., 314.

10

81

Figure 11: Clothing patches from the Montreal Olympics, for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com.

The symbolism of Québécois nationalism, reflected through the Olympic emblem,
contrasted with the idea promoted by Queen Elizabeth II, Prime Minister Trudeau, and
COJO that English and French Canadians can co-exist harmoniously. The Queen and
Trudeau emphasized this idea in the speeches they delivered at a banquet dinner in July
1976 during the Games. The Queen praised Montrealers, saying:
The constant inter-action of two proud peoples living together in the
shadow of Mont Royal has made this city the site of one of the most
challenging, difficult, yet hopeful endeavours in human progress that the
world has seen. Montreal is a living act of faith in the ideal which Canada
represents to the world.11
Trudeau acknowledged that “living together is not easy and is not without its moments of
friction” but asserted that “Canada will continue to set an example for the whole world of
unity in diversity and harmony in plurality.”12
During the opening ceremony of the Games, two teenagers, Sandra Henderson, an
anglophone, and Stéphane Préfontaine, a francophone, entered the stadium jointly
carrying the Olympic Flame. The image of English and French Canadians sharing this
honour conveyed the ideal of peaceful co-existence of French and English Canadians.

11
12

N.a, "Entente Cordiale foundation of Canada's personality," Globe and Mail, July 26, 1976, 7.
Ibid.
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Writing in the Globe and Mail, James Christie observed: “The two languages together –
as they might exist in Canada – were a major part of the afternoon’s call for unity.13
Journalist Christie Blatchford similarly wrote that the two torch bearers represented “the
most poignant message of the Olympics – that the people of the world, with a little
caution and sensitivity, can learn to be tolerant of each other.”14 In contrast to these
sentiments, many of the Games’ commodities represented the fact that, for the time
being, Canadians were not a unified group.

“Emblematic of Canada:” The Olympic Mascot
The official mascot of the Montreal Games symbolized a shared feature of French and
English Canadian identity, the country’s settler colonial history and the early fur trade in
Canada. The mascot was a black beaver named Amik, which according to the official
report, is “a word meaning beaver in the Algonquin language, the most widespread
among the Amerindians of Canada.”15 Huel designed the mascot wearing a red sash with
the Games’ emblem.16 In contrast to the emblem’s emphasis on municipal and regional
identity, COJO representatives explicitly linked the beaver to Canadian identity and
history. On September 26, 1974, COJO held a press conference to announce that the
beaver would be the official mascot of the Games, even bringing a live one to the event.17
Roger Rousseau fed the animal apple pieces and described the beaver as “emblematic of
Canada.”18 As the official emblem of Canada, the beaver is on the front of the Canadian
nickel, and a beaver carved out of limestone sits atop an entrance to the Canadian
Parliament buildings. In the late 19th century, many companies incorporated images of
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beavers into their logos, including the Canadian National Railway, Canadian Illustrated
News, Sleeman’s Ale, Beaver Brand Chewing Tobacco and Crompton’s Corsets.19 More
recently, the logo for the clothing company Roots features a beaver. In a famous
nationalist ad by Molson in 2000, “Joe Canadian” describes the beaver as “a truly proud
and noble animal.”20
Even before COJO chose a beaver as the Games’ mascot, the organization focused on the
commercial potential of a mascot. Gareau wrote in 1973: “it goes without saying that we
could profit enormously from a mascot that could be easily adapted to all sorts of
merchandises (comic strips, general publications, toys, puzzles, jewellery, scarves, ties,
hats, etc.)”21 Similarly, Huel wrote in 1974: “We believe that the goal of creating a
mascot is to give an opportunity to official licensees to produce souvenirs of it.”22 Many
commodities bearing Amik’s image were sold during the Games: Gaby Pleau Inc.
produced the mascot in leather and fur. Joca Inc. produced beaver puzzles and beaver
banks (change holders similar to piggy banks) and Mighty Star Ltd. produced a plush
beaver.23 Other Amik commodities included iron-on clothing patches, key chains, pins,
and noise makers. Moreover, official Olympic supporters, donors who gave between
$5,000 and $25,000 received a gold, silver or bronze beaver depending on the amount.24
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$144,000 and official sponsors gave $3.5 million).

84

Figure 12: Amik commodities, COJO, Official Report, 354.

Figure 13: Amik commodities for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com.
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The graphic design of Amik was not particularly distinctive. Huel did not include much
detail in his design. In fact, he did not initially give Amik eyes or teeth, leading journalist
James Christie to observe wryly: “only recently has it come to anyone’s attention that
poor Amik was born with neither eyes nor the characteristic teeth. Needless to say, a
blind, toothless mascot does not reflect a flattering image of COJO.”25 Amik eventually
received eyes but remained toothless. Although Huel’s design did not create a symbolic
association between the beaver and the fur trade, this association was already established
in Canada. Margot Francis writes: “The beaver was the first article of trade upon which
European trade and exploration was based, and as such, it became a crucial medium
through which early Europeans articulated an imagined relationship with commercial
culture.”26 Two companies, the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), founded in 1670, and
the North West Company (NWC), founded in 1783, were central to the fur trade in
Canada.27 King Charles II of England created the HBC through a royal charter, which
gave it the authority to trade, make treaties, and defend the territory of Ruptersland.28 In
1783, independent Canadian fur traders founded the NWC, which competed with the
HBC until 1824, when it was absorbed into the HBC.29 When Canada was established in
1867, the beaver became a symbol of national identity and its ties to the HBC and NWC
meant that it was already associated with trade and commerce.30
The guidebook COJO gave to Olympic hostesses and guides explicitly linked the
symbolism of Amik to the fur trade and, by extension, the nation’s history. It noted that
the beaver “played an important role in the development of our country, demonstrating
the extent to which the Canadian economy was originally based on the fur trade.31 Using
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almost identical language to the handbook, the official report of the Montreal Olympics
reads:
Several reasons justified the choice of the beaver [as mascot]. Recognized
for its patience and hard work, this animal has occupied an important
place in the economic development of Canada from the time when the fur
trade was the major activity in North America. It has been honored as the
national symbol of Canadians and appears on coins and stamps.32
Moreover, Rousseau explicitly associated the beaver mascot with the fur trade: “Any
Canadian realizes that it was the beaver which opened up this country, which led several
large European companies to open up Canada and led to the settlement of our ancestors
here.”33
The mascot and related commodities thus symbolized two different ideas about Canada.
On one hand, by bearing the Games’ emblem, the mascot symbolized the regional
dimension of the Montreal Games and emphasized French-Canadian identity over a
unified national identity. On the other hand, because COJO members associated the
mascot with the history of the fur trade and European settlement in Canada, the mascot
symbolized Settler Canadians’ shared national identity and history. These competing
ideas sat uneasily, next to one another. The unresolved nature of the mascot’s symbolism
is significant in light of Anne McClintock’s theory of fetishism. According to
McClintock, fetish objects represent “a crisis in social meaning as the embodiment of an
impossible irresolution.”34 McClintock’s definition of fetish helps explain how objects
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have the capacity to hold together competing ideas, making it possible for irreconcilable
ideas to co-exist without collapsing under the weight of this contradiction. I argue in
future chapters that commodities from the Calgary and Vancouver Olympics were fetish
objects, according to McClintock’s understanding of the term. However, the Montreal
mascot and related commodities were not McClintock-esque fetishes because the
competing ideas about national identity that they represented were very obvious. As
opposed to the objects sold during the Calgary and Vancouver Games, which overtly
represented some information and obscured other facts, the Montreal commodities drew
attention to contradictions in meanings of national identity, exposing them for all too see.
Symbolically, the mascot collapsed under the weight of the contradictions it held.
To end an analysis of the mascot’s symbolism with a discussion of competing ideas of
French- and English-Canadian identity would be incomplete. The mascot represented a
third idea about national identity that was less obvious but not invisible. The mascot’s
name, Amik, symbolized the fact that the fur traders who helped to establish Canada as a
modern-day nation were early Canadian Settlers. Of course, the French and English
explorers who first arrived in Canada did not happen upon land empty of inhabitants; it
was already populated by Indigenous groups. In fact, the official report openly
acknowledges this fact by noting: Amik “means beaver in Algonquian, the basic
language spoken by the tribes who greeted the first Settlers in the country.”35
The official report’s interpretation about the meaning of “amik” is not entirely accurate.
Algonquian is not a language, but a language family, as Bill Janceqicz explains: “The
analysis of Algonquian languages proposes a ‘parent’ language from which the various
Algonquian languages and dialects are descended. Linguists refer to this parent language
as Proto-Algonquian.”36 Moreover, it is unclear whether the authors of the Games’
official report were aware of this distinction, as they appear to use the terms Algonquin
and Algonquian interchangeably. Another section of the report, about Montreal’s
Olympic image, noted that amik is “a word meaning beaver in the Algonquin language,
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the most widespread among the Amerindians of Canada.”37 Yet even this statement is
inaccurate, as the most widely spoken Indigenous languages in Canada are Cree
dialects.38
Perhaps even more troubling than the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the official
report about the word “amik” is the fact that when Rousseau discussed the significance of
the beaver to Canadian history he did not acknowledge the presence of Indigenous
peoples in Canada prior to European settlement or their essential contributions to the fur
trade. As noted earlier, Rousseau stated that “Any Canadian realizes that it was the
beaver which opened up this country, which led several large European companies to
open up Canada and led to the settlement of our ancestors here.”39 It is unclear if
Rousseau was referring to French-Canadian ancestors or all Canadian ancestors. In either
case, he excluded Indigenous peoples’ presence, and their corresponding involvement in
the fur trade, from his account of early European settlement in Canada. However, the
mascot’s name made two facts difficult to ignore. First, early European Settlers did not
happen upon an empty land when they first arrived in Canada but, rather, encountered
Indigenous peoples who have a rightful claim to the land. In other words, the mascot’s
name illustrated the inaccuracy of the terra nullius (“empty lands”) myth. Second,
Indigenous peoples’ contributions to the fur trade were essential to its success.
The history of Canada’s involvement in the fur trade dates back to the 17th century. At
that time, there was a high demand in Europe for Canadian beaver pelts, which were
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turned into the felt that milliners used to make fashionable broad-brimmed hats.40
European fur traders depended on Indigenous peoples’ labour to obtain and process
beaver pelts. Traders coveted the pelts that many Indigenous peoples wore as clothing
because, after about eighteen months of wear, the beavers’ long hairs fell off, leaving
only soft fur.41 J.R. Miller writes: “A trade in the beaver pelts that the furriers craved in
the seventeenth century Europe was simply impossible without the cooperation of the
Indigenous North Americans. Europeans who came in search of prime furs needed the
native population’s knowledge, skills, and cooperation.”42 The 1996 Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) similarly notes: “Although some European traders
obtained Aboriginal clothing, canoes, snowshoes and other items for themselves, the
most sought after goods were beaver pelts.”43 Moreover, Sylvia Van Kirk documents the
gendered dimension of the fur trade, noting that many European fur traders married
Indigenous women in order to benefit from their knowledge of local food sources and
clothing production.44
The relationship between French fur traders and the Innu and Wendat illustrates the interdependence of European traders and Indigenous peoples. Beginning in the early 17th
century, the traders established close ties to the Innu nation, Algonquian speakers who
lived north of the St. Lawrence and east of the Saguenay River. Many Innu trapped
beavers for French traders and acted as middlemen between the traders and other
trappers.45 Moreover, Samuel de Champlain established close ties with the Wendat
Nation, Iroquoian speakers living in the area between Georgian Bay and Lake Simcoe.
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Many Wendat exchanged beaver pelts for iron knives, awls, axes, brass kettles, and glass
beads.46
By trading with Europeans, Indigenous peoples gained access to valuable goods, but they
were also introduced to deadly new diseases including small pox.47 By the 1630s, these
diseases had caused a dramatic decline in the Innu population and were beginning to
impact the Wendat.48 An estimated one third to half of the entire Wendat population had
died from smallpox by 1640.49 Moreover, sustained efforts by European missionaries to
convert Indigenous peoples to Christianity posed a serious threat to their traditional
cultures. Missionaries tried to convert the Innu to Christianity and pressured them to start
farming, build European-style dwellings, and abandon their so-called “uncivilized
ways.”50 Moreover, by prohibiting Wendat converts from participating in their
community’s traditional rituals, missionaries separated converts from non-converts and
disrupted the community’s cohesiveness.51

“Ghost(ed)” Objects: Haunting and the Olympic Mascot
The fact that Indigenous peoples were central players in the fur trade in Canada haunted
Rousseau’s statement that the beaver opened up the country. I use the term “haunted”
deliberately, in accordance with Avery Gordon’s conceptualization of haunting as a
“seething absence,”52 one that can be perceived and felt.53 Rousseau’s failure to
acknowledge Indigenous peoples’ presence in Canada and their contribution to the fur
trade was present in its absence, ignored but not erased. The mascot was also haunted by
the federal government’s historical efforts to assimilate Indigenous peoples into Settler
society and the role that the Indian Residential School system played in this process. As
the 2015 report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Canada (TRC) notes, “It
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was in keeping with this intent to assimilate Aboriginal peoples and, in the process, to
eliminate its government-to-government relationship with First Nations that the federal
government dramatically increased its involvement in residential schooling in the
1880s.”54 Jointly run by the federal government and Christian churches, the architects of
residential schools promoted the now discredited idea that Indigenous children were
“savages” who needed to be “civilized.” For example, in 1883, Canada’s Public Works
Minister, Hector Lengevin, discussed residential schools in the House of Commons,
arguing: “if you wish to educate these [Indigenous ] children you must separate them
from their parents during the time they are being educated. If you leave them in the
family they may know how to read and write, but they still remain savages.”55 In fact, the
TRC report described Canada’s historical policy towards Indigenous peoples as cultural
genocide, defining the term as “the destruction of those structures and practices that allow
the group to continue as a group.”56
One feature of cultural genocide, according to the TRC, is the banning of a group’s
language or languages. The fact that the mascot of the Montreal Games was given an
Algonquin name (Amik) made the history of residential schooling in Canada, and its
emphasis on language, impossible to completely disavow. The government’s intention to
sever the bond between Indigenous children and their families through residential schools
was clear from the beginning and one way it achieved this goal was by mandating that
students only speak English or French.57 The Department of Indian Affairs’ “Program of
Studies for Indian Schools,” issued in 1896, stated: “Every effort must be made to induce
pupils to speak English and to teach them to understand it; unless they do, the whole
work of the teacher is likely to be wasted.”58 The RCAP report uses strong language to
describe the effect of this emphasis on English and French: “the entire residential school
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project was balanced on the proposition that the gate to assimilation was unlocked only
by the progressive destruction of Aboriginal languages. With that growing silence would
come the dying whisper of Aboriginal cultures.”59
Students were harshly punished for speaking their native languages. For example,
residential school survivor Raphael Ironstand recalled that teachers would discipline
students for speaking Cree by shaving their heads, a practice that made them feel
ashamed: “Even though they wore scarves and toques to hide their heads, the tears were
streaming down their faces. They were so embarrassed, they kept their heads bowed and
eyes looking at the floor.”60 Another student, Mary Carpenter, “was beaten, forced to go
hungry, stand in a corridor on one leg and walk in the snow with no shoes as punishment
for speaking Inuvialuktum.”61 Pierrette Benjamin, who attended the La Tuque school,
was forced to eat soap after she was caught speaking her native language.62 Agnes Mills,
who attended the All Saints residential school in Saskatchewan, told the TRC that losing
her language deeply affected her identity and relationship with her family: “one of things
that residential school did for me, I really regret, is that it made me ashamed of who I
was.”63 She added: “the worst thing I ever did was I was ashamed of my mother, that
honourable woman, because she couldn’t speak English. She never went to school, and
they told us that, when we used to go home to her on Saturdays, and they told us that we
couldn’t talk Gwinch’in to her, and she couldn’t, like couldn’t communicate.”64
The conditions in residential schools were appalling and many students died while
attending these schools. The TRC, which established a National Residential School
Student Death Register in order to uncover the exact number of deaths, recorded 3,201
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reported deaths of residential school students.65 The commission points out that the death
rates for Indigenous children enrolled in residential schools were much higher than those
for the general Canadian population. Tuberculosis cases in these schools, which peaked
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were responsible for many of these deaths.66
Residential school students were badly fed and were required to perform onerous tasks to
keep the schools running, including farming, cooking, and cleaning. Moreover, they
experienced cruel physical punishments and rarely received encouragement or affection.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of residential schools was the sexual and physical
abuse experienced by many students.67 Most residential schools were closed by the
1980s, but a few remained open until the mid-1990s.
The trauma of residential schools left an inter-generational impact on Indigenous
communities. The TRC report, which discusses this impact, is worth quoting at length:
The legacy of the [residential] schools remains. One can see the impact of
a system that disrupts families in the high number of Aboriginal children
who have been removed by their families by child-welfare agencies. An
education system that degraded Aboriginal culture and subjected students
to humiliating disciplines must bear a portion of responsibility for the
current gap between the educational success of Aboriginal and nonAboriginal Canadians…The over-incarceration and over-victimization of
Aboriginal people also have links to a system that subjected Aboriginal
children to punitive discipline and exposed them to physical and sexual
abuse.68
In 2008 Prime Minister Stephen Harper publicly apologized for residential schools in
Canada. He declared: “The government now recognizes that the consequences of the
Indian Residential Schools policy were profoundly negative and that this policy has had a
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lasting and damaging impact on Aboriginal culture, heritage and language.”69 It is
important to recognize, however, that the federal government did not ultimately succeed
in assimilating Indigenous peoples into Settler society. The TRC report tells readers:
“Although Aboriginal peoples and cultures have been badly damaged, they continue to
exist. Aboriginal people have refused to surrender their identity.”70
Amik was, to borrow a word from Sharon Rosenberg, Amber Dean, and Kara Granzow, a
“ghost(ed)” object. Rosenberg et al. argue that a photograph linked to Alberta’s 2005
Centenary Celebrations was a “ghost(ed) image.”71 The picture, included in a handbook
about the centenary celebrations ostensibly showed a single Indigenous settlement. The
authors discovered that it was actually a composite of four or five photographs. Their
description of the image applies equally to Amik. A “ghost(ed)” object, the mascot was
“a representation of a repressed yet haunting presence repeatedly disavowed” by COJO’s
narratives about the past.72 Characterizing Amik commodities as haunted illustrates that
certain consumer goods are animated by unacknowledged truths involving the federal
government’s colonial policy toward Indigenous peoples.73
Jennifer Henderson and Pauline Wakeham make the important point that residential
schools are not a “discrete historical problem of educational malpractice” but, rather,
“one devastating prong of an overarching and multifaceted system of colonial oppression
that persists in the present.”74 The 1969 “Statement of the Government of Canada on
Indian Policy” (commonly referred to as the White Paper) illustrates that federal
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government policies aimed at assimilating indigenous peoples into settler society were
proposed well into the mid-1900s. Thus, in addition to being haunted by the colonial
policies that led to the establishment of residential schools in Canada, the mascot was
haunted by a more recent, if equally troubling, proposed federal policy. The White Paper
argued that the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs and the Indian Act should be
abolished because Indigenous peoples’ rights were protected by federal multicultural
policies.75 Indigenous groups, most notably the Indian Association of Alberta (IAA) and
the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB), objected strongly to this proposal, asserting that,
as the country’s first inhabitants, they had unique status in Canada.76 Harold Cardinal, the
president of the IAA, described the White paper as “a thinly disguised programme of
extermination through assimilation.”77
In 1969, the IAA secured permission and funding from the federal government to study
the White Paper and offer a formal response. The NIB revised and adopted the IAA’s
report, which was called Citizens Plus. Laurie Meijer Drees describes the report as “a
blistering attack by Indian leaders on Ottawa’s lack of respect for, and interest in, Indian
peoples in Canada.” 78 The report successfully prevented the government from instituting
the White Paper’s recommendations and positioned treaty rights “as foundational to
Indian peoples’ participation in Canadian society.”79 The NIB made policy
recommendations about issues such as on-reserve educational programs and the
economic development of Indigenous communities.80
In 1920, the Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott told a
parliamentary committee that the government’s objective was to “continue until there is
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not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic.”81 As
noted in the TRC report: “These goals were reiterated in 1969 in the federal
government’s Statement on Indian Policy…which sought to end Indian status and
terminate the Treaties that the federal government had negotiated with First Nations.”82
Even though the government never implemented the White Paper’s recommendations, it
had a lasting impact on Indigenous-Settler relations. Christine O’Bonsawin argues that
this impact was still felt in 1976 when Montreal hosted the Olympics.83 I take this
argument even further, arguing that the mascot was haunted by the unacknowledged but
present fact that, in 1976, efforts to assimilate Indigenous peoples were not relegated to a
distant past but were relatively recent.

“We Now Claim Their Field Games:” Haunting and Olympic
Coins
The design of most of the Montreal Olympic coins was unrelated to national identity or
history. Rather, they depicted symbols of the ancient Olympic Games, sporting activities,
or geography. In contrast to the other coins, Series Three of COJO’s commemorative
coin program depicted the early Canadian sports of lacrosse, canoeing, rowing, and
cycling. The lacrosse and canoe coins showed muscular men wearing little clothing with
a stereotypical signifier of indigeneity, feathers in their hair. Like Amik, these two coins
were ghost(ed) objects marked by disavowed truths. While Amik was haunted by the
unacknowledged contributions of Indigenous peoples to the fur trade, the canoe coin was
haunted by the unacknowledged contributions Indigenous peoples made to European
Settlers’ exploration in Canada. Miller writes: “without the Indian, the canoe, maize, and
other products of the Indigenous society, none of the great exploratory trips [taken by
Europeans] would have got much further than Lachine.”84
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Figure 14: Montreal Olympic coins, COJO, Official Report, 69-70.

The lacrosse coin was haunted by the history of Settlers’ appropriation of Indigenous
peoples’ cultures in Canada. Specifically, Settler Canadians adapted Indigenous sporting
practices to create lacrosse as Canada’s national sport. Many Iroquoian-speaking
Indigenous nations, including the Mohawk, Cayuga, and Onondaga Nations, played ball
games similar to modern-day lacrosse. Some Indigenous nations called the game
baggataway while others called it tewaarathon. Lacrosse was a French word for any game
played by Indigenous peoples using a curved stick.85 These ball games had practical and
symbolic purposes: they helped groups prepare for military battle, engage in diplomatic
exchanges, and build social coherence and religious continuity.86 In the 1830s, Settlers
from Montreal began playing a version of the game against Mohawks living in the nearby
Caughnawaga which they later called lacrosse.
The Montreal Lacrosse Club was formed in 1856 and two lacrosse games were staged for
the Prince of Wales during his visit to Montreal in 1860. The first game was held
between Indigenous teams, while the second pitted an Indigenous team against a Settler
Canadian one.87 Following Confederation in 1867, William Beers, an Anglophone living
in Montreal, successfully campaigned for lacrosse to be named Canada’s national game,
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believing that the sport could help Settlers establish a unique national identity. He wrote a
pamphlet of rules and instructions on lacrosse, contributed articles about the game to
newspapers, and even published a book on the sport in 1869. 88
Between 1867 and 1883, Canada sent three separate groups of lacrosse players to the
British Isles.89 Gillian Poulter writes that the Indigenous teams participating in these
exhibition games “were present as colourful, nostalgic reminders of the pre-historic
existence of Indigenous peoples in Canada, an essential part of its myth of origin.”90 In
other words, the Indigenous athletes helped Settlers promote the problematic idea that
Canada was built upon, but ultimately supplanted, Indigenous peoples’ cultures and ways
of life. Indeed, Beers eliminated many aspects of the game that linked it to Indigenous
cultures. Indigenous versions of baggataway/tewaarathon did not have standardized
playing fields and the number of players on teams and the duration of games varied.91
Poulter notes that, by developing and publishing lacrosse rules, Beers “not only provided
the necessary elements of discipline and fair play, but also brought the game under
colonial control, and affirmed the importance of punctuality, standardization and private
property.”92
Beers explicitly linked his efforts to develop lacrosse as Canada’s national game to
Settlers appropriation of Indigenous peoples’ land. He said: “just as we claim as
Canadian the rivers and lakes and land once owned exclusively by Indians, so we now
claim their field games as the national field game of our dominion.”93 Moreover, he
viewed the Settlers version of the game as more “civilized” than that of Indigenous
peoples’ versions; he observed: “The white game differs from the red, in being restricted
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by that mark of civilization and respect, the fence.”94 The number of Settler Canadians
who began playing lacrosse was initially very small and they frequently played against
Indigenous teams. However, when the popularity of lacrosse grew, Indigenous
participation waned. In 1880, the National Lacrosse Association mandated that all
lacrosse players had to be amateurs. By the late 1800s, debates about the increasing
professionalism of lacrosse caused major divisions between players and coaches. These
divisions, in addition to the fact that few young people were taking up the sport, led to the
decline of lacrosse and subsequent rise of hockey as Canada’s most popular sport.95
The cultural and ceremonial elements of the Montreal Olympics were also haunted, this
time by the palpable absence of meaningful Indigenous participation in the Games.
Gordon’s haunting theory draws attention to the fact that ideas, knowledge and people do
not fully disappear, even if they are excluded from representational and commemorative
practices. Paradoxically, the existence of suppressed ideas, knowledge, and people
becomes evident through the practices that exclude them. The absence of meaningful
Indigenous participation in the Olympics was seen especially in the closing ceremony of
the Montreal Olympics. During the ceremony, 75 Indigenous persons dressed in colourful
outfits entered the stage to the sound of “a symphonic suite performed on traditional
instruments augmented by Amerindian folk instruments such as tom-toms, rattles, and
small bells.”96 They moved in an arrowhead formation and then escorted Olympic
athletes to the stage.97 Significantly, non-Indigenous members of the Fédération de Danse
du Québec accompanied the Indigenous dancers in the closing ceremony, wearing
costumes and make-up to blend in with them.98 COJO reported that all the “Indian tribes
of Canada” were represented in the closing ceremony and it provided the media with an
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official closing ceremony program guide, which contained the same information.99
However, this information was incorrect: not all Indigenous nations were represented in
the ceremony. In fact, only nine First Nations, all from Quebec, participated: the
Abenaki, Algonquin, Atikamekw, Cree, Huron, Mi’gmaq, Mohawk, Montagnais, and
Naskapi.100 The non-Indigenous dancers in the closing ceremony enacted a haunting:
they physically represented what was not present, namely, Indigenous dancers from
across Canada. The lack of meaningful Indigenous participation in the Games was also
reflected in COJO’s rejection of the proposal by the Indians of Quebec Association to
showcase their cultures through an Indian Days Celebration.101 Despite rejecting this
proposal, COJO approved an exhibit showcasing Inuit art. The Inuit Art collection,
displayed in the International Centre of the Olympic Village, featured 39 sculptures and 2
tapestries created by Inuit artists.102

Chief Poking Fire: Resistance
After COJO rejected the Indians of Quebec Association’s proposal, the Mohawk of
Kahnawake staged their own Indian Days Celebration, inviting Olympic visitors to learn
about Mohawk culture in their reserve, located across the St. Lawrence river from
Montreal.103 This event challenged the problematic representations and exclusions of
Indigenous peoples’ history and cultures in the Montreal Olympics. Forsyth writes:
“While the Olympics organizers drew on their own, white understanding of ‘the Indian’
to sell a particular version of Canada and the Olympic Games, the Mohawk of
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Kahnawake constructed their own symbols to show the richness and diversity of
Aboriginal lives in Canada.”104
The Kahnawake sold locally-made crafts including necklaces, medallions, bracelets, and
watchbands in order to raise funds for the construction of a new wing of the local
hospital.105 Unlike Amik, the canoe and lacrosse coins and related commodities, these
objects were not haunted by disavowed truths about Indigenous peoples’ culture and
history. These objects illustrate that consumer goods are not always, or inherently,
haunted by unacknowledged ideas about the past and served as a tangible representation
of the failure of assimilative practices in Canada, as they represented the continuation of
their distinct culture. However, some members of the community were concerned that
visitors would not buy these products but instead the spoof products sold by a member of
the community who went by the satirical name of “Chief Poking Fire.” He offered
visitors snake oil made in Pakistan, t-shirts made in India, and rubber arrowheads made in
Japan.106 As Forsyth writes, these commodities, and the debates within the Mohawk
community that they inspired, highlight “the varied and complex ways Kahnawake
residents understood themselves as twentieth century Indians.”107 Unfortunately,
community members were disappointed when far fewer than the expected 125, 000
people visited their reserve.108 Despite these low numbers, the Kahnawake’s Indian Days
Celebration and the issues they raised about the representation of Indigenous cultures in
contemporary Canada pioneered a practice that became more widespread in the Calgary
and Vancouver Olympics, namely, using the Games as a platform to confront crucial
questions about and issues related to Indigenous peoples’ interests and rights.

Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the symbolic meanings of Montreal Olympic
commodities are inextricably tied to the cultural and political dimensions of the Games.
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The commodities sold during the Montreal Olympics did not reflect the hopeful ideas that
COJO, the Queen, and Pierre Trudeau articulated about the potential for French and
English Canadians to co-exist harmoniously. They also did not symbolize positive ideas
about Canadian identity. Rather, they drew attention to pre-existing conflicts between
English- and French-Canadians and were haunted by traumatic events in Canada’s past
related to Indigenous -Settler relations in Canada. Moreover, the closing ceremony of the
Montreal Olympics was haunted by the fact that Indigenous peoples were not given the
opportunity to participate in a meaningful way in the cultural elements of the Games.
Thus, I demonstrated that the representational practices which occur in the commercial,
cultural, and ceremonial elements of the Olympics should not be treated as distinct
elements of the Olympics that exist independent of one another. In the case of the
Montreal Olympics, these aspects of the Olympics were, collectively, haunted by
disavowed information about historical and contemporary relations between Settler
Canadians and Indigenous peoples.

103

Chapter 4
“Our Unique Western Heritage is Interesting to People:”
City, Region, and Corporate Branding in the 1988
Calgary Olympics
In 1980, one year before leading Calgary’s bid for the 1988 Winter Olympics, Frank
King attended an International Olympic Committee (IOC) meeting in Moscow. As a gift,
he presented IOC members with containers filled with samples of Alberta tar sands.
King, who was the chair of the Calgary Olympic Development Association (CODA) and
the vice-president of the petroleum company Turbo Resources, wrote in his memoir: “I
will never forget the look of total surprise on [IOC Director] Madame Berlioux’s face
when these fresh-faced oilmen from Calgary presented her with a sample of Alberta tar
sands as we departed. This was literally a tacky gift.”1 In addition to the samples of tar
sands, King gave away cowboy hats and, as he described it, “an Indian tomahawk.” 2
When, in 1981, CODA members travelled to Baden-Baden to present Calgary’s bid for
the 1988 Games, they wore “dignified Western attire”: blue sports jackets with a western
cut, grey pants, white shirts, and navy striped ties.3 They were joined by two uniformed
Canadian Mounted Police officers (Mounties), the Chief of the Kainai (Blood) First
Nation Lambert Fox and his wife, Yvette. According to King, “when Chief Fox and his
wife danced to the beat of Native tomtoms, people crowded into our area, leaving the
other bid displays virtually empty.”4 Calgary won the bid after Cortina d’Ampezzo, Italy
was eliminated in the first round and Falun, Sweden lost in the second round.5
King wrote that the bid team “learned that our unique Western heritage is interesting to
people from other parts of the world.”6 His statement is perhaps misleading, as he
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anticipated and cultivated this interest by strategically using material goods and cultural
performances to create a favourable image of Alberta. In this chapter, I argue that King
and his colleagues ran the bid and, subsequently, the Calgary Olympics, the same way
they would run a business. In keeping with market fundamentalism, Olympic organizers
commodified regional identity and engaged in city/region branding by treating Calgary
and, more broadly, Western Canada as commodifiable resources. City/region branding
treats geographical locations “as ‘products’ to be marketed, through tourism development
and branding activities.”7 Understood in this way, the gifts that King gave to IOC
members represented Alberta’s material wealth and cultural value. Moreover, they
symbolized the drive of Olympic organizers to convert regional identity into a profitgenerating resource.
The practice of linking city, region or nation branding campaigns with the Olympics is
well documented, but scholars do not consider how these campaigns overlap with
corporate sponsorship of the Games.8 I argue that three factors made possible the
intersection of city, region, and corporate branding in the Calgary Olympics: the rise of
neo-liberalism and market fundamentalism in the 1980s; the increasing commercialism of
the Olympic movement; and the strong relationship between Alberta and the federal
government. Collectively, city/region and corporate branding practices depicted Calgary
and Western Canadian cultures as rooted in, but not constrained by, the region’s pioneer
history. They also positioned the petroleum industry as central to Alberta’s modern
prosperity and growth. Commodities of the Calgary Olympics, like cowboy hats, plush
toys of the Games’ mascots, and lapel pins with corporate logos, contributed to these
branding practices by showcasing prominent symbols of Alberta’s cultural identity and

Li Zhang and Simon Ziaobin Zhao, “City Branding and the Olympic effect: A case study of Beijing,”
Cities, 26 (2009): 246.
8
See: Graham Brown, Laurence Chalip, Leo Jago and Trevor Mules, “Developing Brand Australia:
examining the role of events,” in Destination Branding: Creating the Unique Destination Proposition,
second edition, eds. Nigel Morgan, Annette Pritchard and Roger Pride (Oxford: Elsevier, ButterworthHeinemann, 2004), 163-186; Roy Panagiotopoulou, ‘Hosting the Olympic Games: From promoting the
nation to nation-branding,’ in Sport and the Transformation of Modern Europe: States, Media and Markets
1950-2010, eds. Alan Tomlinson, Christopher Young and Richard Holt (New York: Routledge, 2012), 150170; Zhang and Zhao, ‘City Branding and the Olympic effect,” 245-254.
7

105

economic prosperity. Furthermore, Calgary Olympic Education Kits exposed Canadian
children and youth to these ideas and worked alongside commercial and cultural practices
to construct a coherent narrative about local and regional identity.
However, opposition to the Calgary Olympics by the Lubicon Cree undermined the
coherence of these region and corporate branding messages and, correspondingly, the
symbolism of Olympic commodities. An Indigenous community located in northern
Alberta, the Lubicon’s anti-Olympic campaign exposed the human cost of oil extraction
practices in Alberta, undermining the image of Western Canada as a friendly and
welcoming place. Moreover, their actions called into question the connection between
Canadian identity and the land, a connection that was central to the meaning of Olympic
commodities. Understood in this context, Olympic commodities were fetish objects that,
in Anne McClintock’s words, represented an “impossible irresolution”9 related to land,
belonging and identity in Canada. This chapter explores how commercial practices shape
narratives about who has the right to own, and profit from, an area’s natural and cultural
resources. What was at stake extended far beyond profits. The survival of the Lubicon
Cree as a distinct cultural group depended on the answer to the question: who has
jurisdiction over the petroleum found in Northern Alberta and, correspondingly, the land?

“Survival-of-the-Fittest:” Organizing and Financing the
Games
The Calgary Olympics occurred during the rise of neo-liberalism. David Harvey
identifies what he calls “the first experiment with neoliberal state formation” as occurring
in Chile in 1973, when Augusto Pinochet ousted the democratically elected Salvadore
Allende in a coup.10 Pinochet invited a group of American economists influenced by
Milton Friedman, a prominent economist and proponent of neo-liberalism, to help the
Chilean government re-structure its economy. Chile took out loans from the International
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Monetary Fund and brought its economy in line with neo-liberal policies.11 Around the
same time, many countries began experiencing “stagflation”: economic growth declined,
unemployment rates rose and inflation increased. Governments began implementing neoliberal policies in response to this economic crisis.12
In May 1979, Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party won the federal election in Britain
with a mandate to reform the country’s struggling economy. That October, Paul Volcker,
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, began reforming American monetary policy
by abandoning the Keynesian principles that underpinned the New Deal. Ronald Reagan,
who was elected President in the U.S. the following year, embraced Volcker’s neo-liberal
economic policies. As Harvey writes, “the dramatic consolidation of neoliberalism as a
new economic orthodoxy regulating public policy at the state level in the advanced
capitalist world occurred in the United States and Britain in 1979.”13
In Canada, Brian Mulroney, who served as Prime Minister from 1984 to 1993, was
sympathetic to Thatcher and Reagan’s conservative agenda. He sought to shift the
country away from social welfare and towards neo-liberalism.14 During his first mandate,
Mulroney cut back on inter-governmental fiscal transfers, partially de-indexed tax credits,
and reduced both family allowances and old age security benefits.15 However, he was
bound by his election promise to maintain the “sacred trust” of universal income benefits
for families with children and seniors, restricting his ability to impose broad-based
changes to the nation’s economy.16 After Mulroney was re-elected in November 1988, he
introduced more neo-liberal policies in Canada and restructured key elements of
Canada’s social security system. For example, his government restricted Canadians’
eligibility for family income and old age benefits and stopped directly financing
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unemployment insurance.17 Thus, the 1988 Calgary Olympics occurred at a time when
Canada was becoming more oriented towards neo-liberalism.
As the head of CODA and, later, Chairman of OCO’88,18 Frank King ran the Calgary
Olympics as a business venture and favoured minimal government involvement in the
Games. At a February 1979 press conference, King said:
Sports and businesses have to be combined if the Games are going to be
successful. I believe the people of Calgary want the Games but there will
be tremendous resistance to any additional tax burdens. For that reason
the Games will be organized by people with a business background
combined with a love of sport.19
King’s early relationship with the Canadian Olympic Association (COA) reflects his
market-oriented approach to organizing the Games. Calgary needed to secure the COA’s
endorsement in order to submit an Olympic bid to the IOC, but the COA was considering
endorsing Vancouver instead Calgary. In his book, Kings described COA members as
“customers” whose trust he had to earn.20 Moreover, King compared the Calgary Games
to the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, which were financed entirely through private funds
and commercialized to an unprecedented degree.21 King wrote: “Los Angeles and
Calgary had Games controlled by business people using a survival-of-the-fittest
management style. In our case, that style was adopted during the early bid years.”22
The board of directors for OCO’88 included businesspeople like King, IOC and COA
members, and representatives from the federal, provincial and municipal governments.
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King celebrated the highly commercial nature of the 1988 Calgary Olympics, arguing
that:
In a free-enterprise economy like Canada’s, the government isn’t needed
to act as a laundry service for revenues that are used for sport.
Businesses that want to support sport and the Olympic aims can do so
efficiently...the alternative is to fund Games by increasing taxation,
which affects everyone, including those who don’t want their money
spent on sport.23
Although this view is consistent with a neo-liberal economic model that supports the
privatization of public services and events, it is not entirely accurate. The federal and
provincial governments gave a total of $52 million to OCO’88, its third largest source of
revenue.24 Moreover, the federal government contributed an additional $200 million from
the sales of Olympic coins and stamps, along with contributions from the provinces taken
from their lottery proceeds.25
The way King and his colleagues managed TV rights negotiations exemplifies this drive
to run the Olympics as a profit-driven endeavour. After consulting with experts, they took
steps to make the Olympics more attractive to broadcasters.26 For example, OCO’88 rescheduled the dates of the Calgary Games to coincide with American broadcaster sweeps
(the yearly calculation of network ratings, which influence the value of a network’s
advertising rates).27 As King described: “For the first time the Winter Games were being
packaged as a marketable product. We developed clear specifications for what we were
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offering. We added every possible feature so that the networks would bid higher than
ever before.”28 A pin with the words “Calgary ‘88” and the Olympic rings, spelling out
the letters ABC (the eventual winner of the American broadcast rights to the Games),
symbolized OCO’88’s marketization of the Games. In fact, an article in the Globe and
Mail described ABC pins as the “hot items” for pin traders.29 When Dave Bellingham
tried to initiate a trade for an ABC pin, he was told by Trevor Pelachuk that it would take
“an arm and a leg and a pint of blood, plus your first born child” to get it.30

Figure 15: Calgary Olympics pin available on eBay, www.ebay.com.

Figure 16: ABC sign, OCO’88, Official Report, 86.
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The IOC, OCO’88, and a sports marketing firm, Trans World International ran the
American TV rights negotiations. Barney et al. argue that these negotiations marked the
first time that the IOC and a local organizing committee cooperated as equal partners.31
The joint team led the negotiations in rounds and networks had to submit their bids
confidentially, so they never knew if they had been outbid by their competition. The team
raised the minimum price that networks could bid on the rights in every round, until ABC
ultimately won the rights by agreeing to pay $326 million. This was the highest amount
any network had ever paid for broadcast rights to the Olympic Games. In fact, for ABC,
it proved too high since the network would later lose $40 million broadcasting the
Games.32
In addition to co-operating with OCO’88 to negotiate broadcast rights, the IOC had
recently implemented The Olympic Partner (TOP) Program in 1988. TOP gave
companies Olympic marketing rights, category exclusivity, and permission to use
licensed Olympic symbols and logos.33 At an IOC meeting in Lisbon in 1985, IOC
President Juan Antonio Samaranch underscored the importance of TOP, saying that “it
was extremely dangerous for the IOC and NOCs [National Olympic Committees] to be
reliant on television money alone.”34 Twenty-one companies, including Canada Safeway
Limited, General Motors of Canada, Labatt’s, and the Royal Bank of Canada, each gave a
minimum donation of $2 million to become official Olympic sponsors.35 TOP proved
attractive to companies because of its exclusivity: only one company within each
particular industry category could have this official Olympic sponsor designation.
However, OCO’88 members had deep ties to the petroleum industry and they did not
want to restrict companies within that industry from sponsoring the Games. As an
alternative, they permitted a group of 40 petroleum companies to sponsor, collectively,
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the Olympics for $4.8 million. Known as Team Petroleum ’88, it “served to unite the
petroleum community behind the Games.”36 In addition, some oil companies supported
specific Olympic events. Petro Canada sponsored and organized the Torch Relay. Shell
Canada sponsored the Glenbow Museum’s Olympic exhibit The Spirit Sings: Artistic
Traditions of Canada’s First People. Texaco sponsored the musical Porgy and Bess
(which was part of the Olympic art festival show).37

Figure 17: Team Petroleum symbol, OCO’88, Official Report, 650.

“Marketing for Success”: Olympic Education Resource Kits
Members of OCO’88’s Youth and Education Department created Olympic Education
Resource Kits, “designed to increase the awareness of young people about the aims and
ideals of the Olympic Movement and about the XV Olympic Winter Games.”38
Education resource kits were available for elementary (grades 1-6), junior high (grades 79) and senior high (grades 10-12) school students.39 OCO’88 distributed these kits to
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schools in Alberta and they proved so popular that the federal government paid for the
nationwide printing and distribution of the elementary school education kit.40
The goal of the Youth Committee was to create “opportunities for young people from all
walks of life, in Calgary, Alberta, across Canada and internationally (where possible) to
experience the magic and the spirit of the XV Olympic Winter Games.”41 The kits did
more than spread the Olympic spirit and promote Olympic sponsors. They also exposed
Canadian youth to market fundamentalist values, including the marketization of public
goods and services. For example, the elementary school resource kit included a statement
from OCO’88’s General Manager of Corporate Relations, David Shanks, who wrote:
“These Games will cost a lot of money to be the best-ever Winter Olympics. Many
companies can help us by providing money, goods and services as our official partners. It
is a good partnership because the Olympics are very special and being involved helps
companies promote their business.”42
One activity in the junior high education kit encouraged students to consider how
Olympic broadcasts are, in King’s words, “packaged as a marketable product.”43 In fact,
the activity was likely based on the fact that ABC had paid $326 million for the Games’
broadcast rights. Students were asked to imagine themselves as “the president of XYZ
Television Network. Your network has just spent $300 million for the right to broadcast
an Olympic Games. List the requests you intend to make of the Organizing Committee so
that your network gets maximum benefit from your investment.”44 Another activity
educated students on the importance of copyrighting original work. After creating their
own personal symbols, students were asked to consider the following scenario: “A
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student walks into the classroom wearing your symbol. Describe your feelings and what
you would say to that person. How would you decide who gets to keep it?” The next
question was: “Why would the Olympic Movement copyright its symbols?”45 Notably,
this activity coincided with the recent introduction of the TOP Program, a program that
increased the value of copyrighted Olympic symbols.
The information in the senior high school resource kit about the commercial aspects of
the Olympics was more nuanced than the information in the elementary and junior high
school kits. For example, one activity asked senior high school students to debate the
question: “Do the Olympic Games justify the money and effort spent to stage them and
produce athletes to compete in them?” The kit encouraged students to consider both sides
of the debate, including the statement: “Athletes become pawns in a game of corporate
and political Olympic one-upmanship.”46 However, another section, called “Marketing
For Success,” unabashedly celebrated the commercialism of the Calgary Olympics.
Teachers were encouraged to discuss “specific examples of a good marketing strategy”
with their students, such as “Calgary’s bid for the 1998 Olympic Games and OCO’88’s
ongoing sales strategy.”47 This activity taught students about the market fundamentalist
practices that underpinned OCO’88’s operations and introduced them to region branding,
a commercial practice I discuss in the proceeding section.

Adding to “the Prosperity of its People:” City and Region
Branding
City and region branding practices treat geographic locations like commodities whose
meanings can be shaped by marketing and promotional campaigns.48 They became linked
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to international sporting events in Canada as early as 1954, when Vancouver hosted the
British Empire and Commonwealth (BEC) Games. For example, Canadian cities and
corporations sponsored full page ads in the Vancouver BEC Games’ joint Souvenir
Book/Program of Events, highlighting the strength of Western Canada’s economy. A
message articulated in these ads was that the region’s natural resources and industries
greatly contributed to the country’s economic strength. Significantly, Canadian
industries, alongside municipal and provincial governments, promoted this message.
Sponsored pages contained images of wheat fields in Saskatchewan, skyscrapers in
Edmonton and Calgary, an oil refinery tower in Alberta, and an electricity generating
station in British Columbia.49 A number of pages in this program advertised Western
Canada’s thriving oil and gas industry. In February 1947, Imperial Oil discovered oil in
Leduc, Alberta, an area 13 miles southeast of Edmonton.50 Although petroleum and its
derivatives had already been discovered in Western Canada, the Leduc discovery made
an easily accessible source of carbon-based fuel available to Canadians for the first
time.51 Imperial Oil’s sponsored page in the Victoria BEC Games’ book characterized its
discovery of oil at Leduc as “Canada’s most important oil discovery.”52 The company
told readers that Canada produced almost half of its oil requirements and roughly half of
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the British Commonwealth’s total oil production.53 Edmonton presented itself as the
“centre of Canada’s vast multi-million dollar oil, gas and petrochemical development”54
while Calgary’s page noted that the city’s energy industry “adds to the prosperity of its
people.”55
Michael Dawson uses the example of the 1954 BEC Games to argue that “many of the
aims pursued by cities hosting sporting mega-events over the past 30 years were also
pursued by cities eager to host the Commonwealth Games as early as the 1950s.”56 For
example, Vancouverites hoped that hosting the Games would boost their city’s
reputation. Additionally, organizers of Vancouver’s bid predicted that the event would
put the city on the map (they did not specify whether this was a national or international
map).57 An article in the Vancouver Sun noted that the Games offered the city “a tangible
opportunity to show ‘Eastern’ Canadians what Vancouver could do.”58 However, the
1954 BEC Games boosted more than the city’s reputation. Taken collectively, the
sponsored pages in the souvenir book/program of events helped to improve Western
Canada’s reputation by advertising the region’s economic growth and social
development. Moreover, the pages helped convey the message that Western Canada’s
natural resources significantly contributed to Canada’s economic strength. The nation’s
economy had grown significantly following the Second World War. During the war,
Canadians found themselves unable to rely on Britain or the US for economic support. As
Donald Creighton writes, the “leaders of the Canadian economy were compelled to
cultivate the virtues of self-reliance, initiative, and daring more than they had ever done
in the past.”59 The government supported industrial production by granting large
contracts and capital cost allowances (tax benefits) to national and international
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companies.60 After the war, these changes had lasting effects on the economy. For
example, American direct investment in Canadian petroleum and natural gas resources
rose from $141 million in 1945 to $635 million in 1951.61

Cagliari or Calgary?: Branding Western Canada
The mayor of Cagliari, Italy received several messages from well-wishers who, confusing
his city with Calgary, congratulated him for winning the 1988 Winter Olympics bid.62
This mix-up reveals that Calgary was not a globally recognized city in 1981 when it won
the bid to host the Olympics. However, the Games helped the city remedy this situation.
In fact, in their foreword to the Official Report of the Calgary Olympics, Frank King and
Bill Pratt wrote that cities around the world want to host the Games because they “are a
huge media event” that attracts a large audience and promotes “the host city in large
population areas.”63 Similarly, Calgary Mayor Ralph Klein remarked in 1988 that hosting
the Olympics offered Calgarians a chance tell a global audience that Calgary is “a major
player in North America.”64 A section on the legacy of the Olympic Games in the senior
school education kit described the “intangible spinoffs” from the Olympic Games, which
included a “widened public exposure to sport and western Canada as a result of media
coverage. The perceptions of Calgary and Western Canada will be altered
significantly.”65
Olympic organizers and municipal politicians used the Games to improve Calgary’s
global image and to brand Western Canada as a place that honoured its frontier history,
while not being stuck in the past. Kevin Wamsley and Michael Heine argue that
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Calgary’s Olympic bid highlighted both modern facilities in Calgary and “the images of
Western hospitality projected as historical tradition.”66 CODA and OCO’88 members
used white cowboy hats to symbolize the region’s historical ties to ranching and farming.
These hats underscored how OCO’88 members commodified local identity and culture.
King made white cowboy hats a part of CODA’s signature look, handing them out as
gifts to IOC members.67 During the opening ceremony of the Games, the Canadian
Olympians marching in the Parade of Nations wore red and white coats with Westernstyle leather fringe and white cowboy hats.68 Smithbilt Hats, a Calgary company said to
have created the first white cowboy hat, was an official licensee of the Calgary
Olympics.69 It produced and sold white cowboy hats branded with the Calgary Olympic
Games’ emblem.

Figure 18: Smithbilt hat with the Calgary Olympics emblem available on eBay, www.ebay.com.

The fact that these hats connoted Western Canadian culture and identity was made
explicit in OCO’88’s description of the Games’ mascots, two polar bears named Hidy
and Howdy. Hidy donned a blue dress while Howdy wore a blue vest,. Both mascots
sported red scarves around their necks which matched the red band on their white
cowboy hats. The official report of the Calgary Games noted that the mascots’ “colorful
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costumes portrayed the Western hospitality of Calgary.”70 Their names, chosen by public
contest, also reflected “Calgary’s Western heritage.”71 An exercise in the junior school
education kit highlighted the mascots’ Western attire by asking students: “What symbols
did the artist include in her drawing of Hidy and Howdy?”72 Although Hidy and Howdy
were meant to symbolize friendliness, OCO’88 member Van Wheeler, dressed as Hidy,
accidentally hit IOC President Samaranch with the mascot’s protruding nose.73

Figure 19: Hidy and Howdy, OCO’88, XV Olympic Winter Games, 57.

These mascots exemplify organizers’ attempts to appeal to and profit from regional and
national identity, as seen in OCO’88’s general guidelines for choosing a mascot:
A mascot is selected by an Olympic Organizing Committee for two
key purposes – promotion and marketing...The mascot is an integral
part of any advertising or promotional activity. A mascot is also an
invaluable marketing tool. For the 1988 Olympic Winter Games,
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the sponsorship and licensing programs are essential to our
financial operations.74
Before deciding on the design of the mascots, OCO’88 asked experts from four major
department stores in Canada to provide input. The group suggested that the mascot
should be a bear.75 OCO’88 members also identified desirable characteristics of a
commercially appealing mascot. These included: wide appeal, especially with children,
being non-political, unique, identifiable with winter and Canada, easy to reproduce in
print, and the ability to be turned into souvenir merchandise.76 Hasbro Canada produced
plush toys of Hidy and Howdy and the mascots appeared on Olympic pins, license plates,
and spoons.77
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Figure 20: Hidy and Howdy commodities available on eBay, www.ebay.com.

Some 9,000 volunteers with the Calgary Olympics were also trained to convey Western
Canadian friendliness. The Volunteer Training Manual noted that “Calgary is famous for
its hospitality and true western warmth.” It instructed volunteers to “smile and be
friendly” while on duty.78 They were also told to be “well groomed and aware of overall
appearance” and “have a genuine interest in people from diverse cultures.”79 This
training, I argue, taught Calgarians how to “live the brand.” Aronczyk uses this term to
describe “a concerted and comprehensive strategy by national citizens of all strata of
society to assimilate and communicate” a nation branding message.80 Thus, the
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information in the Volunteer Training Manual helped construct the brand image of
Western Canada that Olympic volunteers were expected to embody.
Olympic organizers represented Western Canada as a place that was rooted in tradition,
but not stuck in the past. For example, the information book produced by International
Sports and Leisure Marketing to attract Olympic corporate sponsors described Calgary as
a “centre for traditional grain and livestock production” that recently “added a vast petrochemical industry to that ‘rodeo’ heritage.”81 Similarly, the Volunteer Training Manual
depicted Calgary’s corporate and ranching cultures as complementary:
Calgary is a Western city, unique in Canada. It was founded by rugged
pioneers who valued the warmth and friendliness of humans meeting in
the wide and vast expanses of the west. Our city grew, fuelled by
industries that thrived on risk and vitality. Today we are a modern city,
culturally rich, technologically fruitful, and future oriented. But in our best
tradition we still retain the qualities that distinguished the pioneers.82
This idea was also represented visually through a hot air balloon festival that coincided
with the Calgary Games. Kodak sponsored the festival, which included balloons in the
shape of propane tanks, gasoline pumps, and cowboys.83 Likewise, an ad for the Calgary
Tourist and Convention Bureau showed a man in a cowboy hat extending his hand to the
viewer, as if to shake that person’s hand. He was surrounded by images of mountains,
skiers, grazing cows, and horses pulling a cart. The same man appeared in another frame
of the poster, also extending his hand to the viewer. This time, he was dressed in a suit
and stood next to a woman wearing a fur coat. OCO’88’s Youth Committee included this
ad in a section of the senior school education kit, called “Selling Calgary.” Students were
asked to identify the audience for this poster and draw a parallel between the way
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Calgary sells itself and the way OCO’88 sells the Olympic Games.84 Thus, the Calgary
Tourist and Convention Bureau used the ad to brand Calgary while the Olympic Youth
Committee used it to teach Canadian students that cities and Olympic Games are just like
any other commodity whose meaning can be shaped through branding practices.
The Volunteer Training Manual also advised that, “in spite of its reputation,” Calgary
was not “a cowboy town.”85 For Wamsley and Heine, this point underscores the fact that
OCO’88 instructed volunteers to represent Calgary as a modern and advanced city.86
David Whitson supports this interpretation, noting: “Burdened, in some ways, by the
city’s history as a ‘cowboy town’, civic and provincial leaders (like [Alberta Premier
Peter] Lougheed) saw the Olympics as a perfect stage on which to demonstrate that
Calgary was a vibrant and forward-looking metropolis, and not stuck in its agricultural
past.”87 OCO’88 certainly depicted Calgary as modern and business-friendly, but
Whitson’s argument that the city was burdened by its history as a frontier town is
unsubstantiated. OCO’88 did not hide Calgary’s identity as a “cowboy town.” Rather, it
asserted that the city’s more recent petroleum wealth complemented its traditional
cowboy identity.
Championed in the Volunteer Training Manual was the view that Calgary was no longer
just a cowboy town; it had also become a vibrant oil and gas town. This emphasis on
Calgary’s energy economy added value to that industry’s sponsorship of the 1988
Olympics. As well, through Team Petroleum, the oil and gas industry reinforced the
brand association between Calgary and oil and gas wealth established by OCO’88. John
Fisher, Senior Vice President and General Manager of the Canadian Western Natural Gas
Company, affirmed how the industry benefitted from sponsoring the Olympics along with
Calgary when he said: “The flame on the Calgary Tower and flames at the venue sites
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will do Calgary proud before the eyes of the world. As well as being a showcase for
Calgary and the Olympics, the flame will remind everyone of the central role of the
energy industry in Alberta’s development.”88

“Let the Eastern Bastards Freeze in the Dark:” ProvincialFederal Relations
The region branding practices of the Calgary Olympics, in conjunction with the energy
industry’s sponsorship of the Games, helped shape public perceptions of Alberta’s
relationship with the federal government. They also highlighted the fact that, although
Ottawa had tried to retain control over the province’s petroleum resources in the past,
Alberta now maintained jurisdiction over these resources. Significantly, Olympic
commodities reflected the fact that Alberta was the country’s centre of petroleum
production and that its relationship with the federal government was no longer
antagonistic. Most significantly, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney had dismantled the
controversial National Energy Policy. When Peter Lougheed was elected Premier of
Alberta in 1971, he argued that the province, not Ottawa, had jurisdiction over the
region’s natural resources. Lougheed resisted Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s efforts to
regulate the petroleum industry and energy companies based in Alberta became caught in
the middle of this conflict. Paul Chastko argues that “with the possible exception of
Trudeau’s struggle to patriate Canada’s constitution, no issue received more attention, or
was waged as ruthlessly, as the energy battles between Edmonton and Ottawa.”89
On the night he was elected premier, Lougheed told his wife Jeanne that he was
determined to “take control of our [Alberta’s] own resources.” 90 David Wood writes
that, once oil was discovered in Alberta, many Albertans realized that “they had
something the rest of the family [Canada] wanted...‘Now,’ felt Albertans, ‘you need
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something we have, we control, and damn it, you’re going to acknowledge, at the least,
that we’re an important part of Canada.’ It would be hard to exaggerate the intensity and
extent of this largely unspoken feeling.”91 As Premier, Lougheed depicted the
relationship between Alberta and other Canadian provinces in adversarial terms, arguing
in 1973: “We have to try to protect Alberta’s public interest – not from the public interest
of Canada as a whole – but from central and eastern Canadian domination of the West.”92
The first serious disagreement between Lougheed and Trudeau occurred in September
1973 when Trudeau asserted control over the price of Canadian oil in response to rising
global oil prices.93 He froze the price of domestic petroleum products, reduced the
depletion allowance companies could claim by 8%, and, most troubling to Lougheed,
announced an export tax of 40¢ per barrel of oil.94 In a speech to the Canadian Club in
Calgary on September 14 1973, Lougheed said that the tax:
appears to be the most discriminatory action taken by a federal
government against a particular province in the entire history of
Confederation. The natural resources of the provinces are owned by
the provinces under the terms of Confederation. The action taken
by Ottawa strikes at the very roots of confederation.95
On October 4 1973, Lougheed responded to the export tax by announcing plans to
eliminate the cap the province had previously placed on the amount of money oil
companies must pay the province for the right to extract oil from the land (known as
royalties).96
Shortly after Lougheed’s announcement, in November 1973, the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), placed an embargo on oil supplies in response to
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the Yom Kippur War, shutting out countries (including Canada) that had pro-Israeli
foreign policies.97 In response to the embargo, Trudeau developed a new energy policy
aiming to increase Canada’s oil self-sufficiency. John Erik Fossum argues that this policy
reflected Ottawa’s belief that Canada’s oil was a strategic, rather than ordinary,
commodity.98 Trudeau announced plans to create a national oil company, Petro Canada,
construct a pipeline to Montreal, and decrease exports of crude oil to the United States by
10%.99
In March 1974, Alberta announced that it would increase the amount of money petroleum
companies had to pay the province in royalties. 100 That November, the Liberals
announced that petroleum companies could no longer consider these provincial royalties
a business expense and would therefore have to start paying more federal taxes.101 Wood
argues that this policy “put a barrier between the citizens of Alberta and their primary
industry.”102 Lougheed called it “probably the biggest ripoff of any province that’s ever
occurred in Confederation’s history.”103 The biggest conflict between Trudeau and
Lougheed came in October 1980 when the Liberals released their federal budget. The
budget focused heavily on Canada’s energy policy and introduced the National Energy
Policy (NEP), which signalled Ottawa’s intention to increase its control over the
country’s petroleum resources. The NEP introduced new taxes on the petrochemical
industry, including a Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax, which took the form of a wellhead
tax on petroleum products.104 Lougheed reacted to the policy by saying: “I think what’s
happened is that the Ottawa government has, without negotiation, without agreement,
simply walked into our home and occupied the living room.”105
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Chastko argues that the NEP “inaugurated a new era in federal-provincial relations and
made a comprehensive energy policy that aimed a dagger right at the heart of the oil
industry.”106 After the federal policy was announced, the TSE oil and gas index dropped
more than eight hundred points and stock owners sold so many shares of Canadian
petroleum companies that the TSE temporarily suspended trading on these stocks.107 The
Canadian Petroleum Association (CPA) claimed that the NEP caused drilling activity in
Canada to decline by 22% and led to the loss of fifteen thousand jobs.108 Some Albertans
who opposed the NEP brandished bumper stickers with the phrase: “Let the Eastern
Bastards Freeze in the Dark!” 109 In response to the NEP, Lougheed “turned down the
taps” and reduced crude oil production by 15%, or about 180,000 barrels a day. 110
Relations between Edmonton and Ottawa improved in 1984 when Brian Mulroney’s
Progressive Conservative Party came to power. In his first term as Prime Minister,
Mulroney dismantled the NEP in a series of accords reached with oil producing
provinces, in effect decreasing federal involvement in the industry.111 Even before Petro
Canada was privatized in 1991, Mulroney directed it to operate like any other private
sector oil company, rather than as an instrument of public policy (which was Trudeau’s
approach to Petro Canada).112
The fact that the Calgary Olympics occurred at a time when relations between the
Alberta and federal government were improving helps, in part, to explain why the
symbols of regional and national identity complemented rather than clashed with one
another. The most prominent example of these complementary symbols was the Calgary
Games’ emblem. Designed entirely in red, it featured five interlocking “c”s that
combined to create a snowflake and maple leaf. The official report described the
symbolism of the emblem in their words: “The small C’s were designed to represent
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Calgary and the large C’s to represent Canada. The five interlocking C’s represented the
theme ‘Coming Together in Calgary,’ the stylized Maple Leaf represented Canada and
the snowflake design represented the Olympic Winter Games.”113 The official report
noted that the snowflake emblem, when used in conjunction with the five ring Olympic
emblem, “became the cornerstone of marketing and communications programs.”114

Figure 21: Calgary Olympics emblem, OCO’88, XV Olympic Winter Games, 5.

Figure 22: Calgary Olympics emblem pins available on eBay, www.ebay.com
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I discussed earlier in this chapter that Hidy and Howdy represented Western Canadian
hospitality, but that these mascots were also “chosen as uniquely Canadian
representatives of the Organizing Committee.”115 COA member Bruce Kidd wrote a
report for OCO’88 arguing that the committee could attract Canadians’ interest and
involvement in the Calgary Games by drawing on the theme of “winter.” He wrote:
“Canada, and the Canadians, are defined by their winter. Its joys – and its terrors – are
shared by the native peoples, the two founding peoples, and inhabitants in every
province, territory and region.” 116 Because polar bears thrive in northern Canada, they
helped promote this message. Furthermore, by using the Calgary Games to increase
Canadians’ participation in winter sports, OCO’88 could “reinforce national unity by
focusing on activities common to all peoples and regions and which culturally distinguish
Canadians from Americans.”117
Pins containing the Games’ emblem alongside prominent symbols of Western Canadian
identity were available for sale. The easy co-existence of symbols of regional and
national identity of these commodities contrasts with the Montreal Games’ commodities,
where symbols of local and national identity drew attention to pre-existing conflicts
between French and English Canadians. For example, a pin in the shape of a white
cowboy hat branded with the Calgary Games’ emblem was for sale. Other pins for sale
contained symbols of national and regional identity alongside corporate brands, like
Coca-Cola and Team Petroleum’88’s logos. These logos did not eclipse the symbols of
regional and national identity, but instead complemented one another.
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Figure 23: Calgary Olympics pins available on eBay, www.ebay.com.

“Forget Not My World:” The Lubicon Cree’s Anti-Olympic
Campaign
Thus far, I have shown how the regional and corporate branding practices in the Calgary
Olympics mutually informed and reinforced one another. The alignment of these
messages takes on greater significance when considered in relation to the Lubicon Cree’s
boycott of the Games. An Indigenous community living in northwestern Alberta, the
Lubicon used the Games to draw attention to the devastating impact oil extraction
practices were having on their community. By highlighting this fact, the Lubicon made it
difficult to ignore the human cost of the commoditization of the land by the province and
petroleum companies. Thus, the political dimensions of region and corporate branding in
the Calgary Olympics takes on a different meaning when contextualized within the
Lubicon’s anti-Olympic campaign. Specifically, these practices helped the province and
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energy companies to promote their interests over Lubicon interests. This argument
illustrates that Melissa Aronczyk’s claim that nation branding affects the “moral basis of
national citizenship”118 also applies to region branding. She argues that these branding
campaigns come “at the cost of recognizing internal differentiation, resistance or
conflict.”119 Indeed, the Calgary Games celebrated Western Canada’s oil wealth and
sidelined the Lubicon’s opposition to oil and gas drilling. These practices downplayed
but did not silence the Lubicon’s concerns, illustrating that Olympic commodities did not
perfectly represent region and corporate branding messages. Rather, they were fetish
objects that symbolized conflicting ideas about the meaning of Alberta’s land and the
resources contained within it.
In 1986, the Chief of the Lubicon Cree, Bernard Ominayak, called for an international
boycott of the Games. “The Calgary Olympic Games are being organized by basically
the same interests that are committing genocide against the Lubicon Lake Indian people,”
he announced in a news release.120 Companies had been extracting oil in Lubicon
territory since the 1950s, but these practices had accelerated in the late 1970s. By 1984,
more than 400 oil and gas wells existed within a fifteen mile radius of Little Buffalo, the
main Lubicon town; more than 100 oil and gas companies operated in the area.121 These
practices impeded the Lubicon community’s ability to hunt and trap animals, which were
its primary sources of food and income. Company bulldozers pushed snow and debris
into piles that blocked animal trails and buried traps and snares. The Lubicon accused oil
workers of intentionally destroying trapping lines. The environmental damage of oil and
gas extraction caused wildlife population numbers to decline dramatically. 122 In the
winter of 1979-1980, the average Lubicon family earned more than $5, 000 from
trapping. A year later, earnings dropped to $4,000. By the winter of 1983-84, earnings
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had sunk to $400 and more than 90% of Lubicon people were on social assistance
compared to 10% in 1978.123
The Mohawk anthropologist Dawn Martin-Hill conducted interviews with members of
the Lubicon community which revealed the extent to which their cultural identity and
material livelihood were tied to the land. “We survived off this land for many years, and
everything that we do surrounds the land. For example, through our prayers and the
ceremonies that we have, everything is tied back to the land,”124 said Bernard Ominayak.
“Our ways are disappearing fast.... once we lose that connection with the earth and the
animals, this land around us, whatever we have survived off of for these many years, it’s
weakening us.” The first suicide in memory in Little Buffalo occurred in 1985 when a
father of six, who could no longer hunt and trap, fell into a depression and took his own
life.125 Six months before Calgary hosted the Olympics, the Lubicon community
experienced an outbreak of tuberculosis. A total of 27 people had active tuberculosis and
107 were infected and at risk of developing symptoms. John Goddard argues that the
tuberculosis outbreak reflected the declining socio-economic conditions in the
community caused by oil company activity in the region: “Tuberculosis is a lung disease
that usually spreads through coughing and thrives among people whose physical
resistance is low from substandard living conditions, poor diet and stress.”126
A museum exhibit affiliated with the Calgary Olympics, The Spirit Sings: Artistic
Traditions of Canada’s First People, became the focal point for the Lubicon’s antiOlympic campaign. The flagship cultural event of the Games, this exhibit at the Glenbow
Museum in Calgary showcased artifacts from Indigenous cultures that had been taken
from Canada and were exhibited in museums around the world. A 1986 press release
from Glenbow Museum described the exhibit as having:
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an estimated 500 of the rarest and most revealing artifacts of
early Canadian Indian and Inuit culture. What is surprising is
that almost all of these works of art and artifacts will be
borrowed from more than forty institutions and private
collectors in twenty-one countries. Few are in Canadian
collections. They left Canada from the 17th to 19th centuries as
souvenirs or gifts from native peoples to explorers, traders,
missionaries, and colonial officials.127
Shell Canada paid $1.1 million to become the exclusive sponsor of the exhibit. The
Glenbow Museum also had deep ties to the petroleum industry. Eric Harvie, a Calgarybased millionaire who earned his fortune in the oil industry, founded the museum.
Executives from Gulf Oil, Rozsa Petroleum, British Petroleum Canada and Wellore
Resources sat on the museum’s Board of Governors.128 Fred Lennarson, a close advisor
to Ominayak, wrote that the irony of The Spirit Sings exhibit was obvious: “A display of
North American Indian artifacts to attract people to the Winter Olympics is being
organized by interests who are still actively seeking to destroy Indian people: namely, the
Alberta Government and its oil-company allies.”129
The original title of the exhibit, Forget Not My World, was a strong, if unintentional,
reminder of the struggles the Lubicon were facing. Their opposition to the exhibit
challenged the veracity of Shell Canada President Jack M. MacLeod’s statement that the
exhibit “will give us all a chance to expand our understanding of Canadian native
heritage, and will add an exciting dimension to the Olympic Arts Festival...Shell’s
participation in this project is consistent with our commitment to Canada.”130 Glenbow
Museum Director Duncan Cameron was initially reluctant to change the name of the
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exhibit; but in 1986, he met with the exhibit’s curators, who argued that the title “would
be offensive to native people” because it gave the appearance that they no longer existed
in Canada. 131 The committee urged Cameron “in the strongest possible terms” to change
the title.132 He ultimately agreed to ask OCO’88 and Shell Canada to approve a new title
as long as it was one Cameral felt “would be marketable.”133 Cameron’s emphasis on
marketability contradicts a statement by Julia Harrison, one of the curators of The Spirit
Sings, about Shell’s sponsorship of the exhibit. In an article in Anthropology Today
defending the exhibit, she wrote:
In this era of declining government support, cultural institutions
(including universities) have no option but to seek outside support
for projects they undertake. This does not mean that corporate
sponsors play editorial roles in the theme and focus of the projects
they fund. Nor is there any evidence that the public confuses
corporate support for a museum’s support for corporate policy.134
Harrison further wrote that the campaign had attracted a great deal of media attention that
depicted the federal and provincial governments, the energy industry, Glenbow Museum
and the Olympics in a negative light.135 In 1986, Ominayak travelled to Europe to request
that museums withhold artifacts requested for The Spirit Sings exhibit. Many curators
agreed to his request, but the exact number of museums which refused to lend material to
the Glenbow Museum is disputed (Cameron claimed 12 museums boycotted the exhibit
but Lennarson said there were 23).136 James Smith, Curator of the Museum of the
American Indian, was the first curator to express support for the exhibition boycott,
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noting: “To cover up injustices with an art exhibit I think is inadequate.”137 Felix Valk, of
the Museum voor Volkenkunde in Rotterdam, articulating a similar criticism, observing
that The Spirit Sings risked being seen “as a kind of cover-up, a nice facade hiding the
real world of today’s native peoples.”138
Considered in light of the Lubicon’s opposition to the Olympics, the commodities sold
during the Olympics such as cowboy hats, stuffed animals, and pins, contained
ambivalent meanings. These commodities were, I argue, fetish objects embodying an
“impossible irresolution.”139 As discussed in Chapter One, McClintock argues that
fetishes are “the displacement onto an object (or person) of contradictions that the
individual cannot resolve at a personal level.”140 Olympic commodities represented
competing ideas about land and resource ownership in Alberta. On one hand, they
symbolized the wealth of the region’s petroleum reserves, largely under the province’s
jurisdiction. On the other hand, they symbolized the threat petroleum extraction in
northern Alberta posed to the Lubicon’s cultural and physical survival.

Conclusion
This chapter has contextualized the Calgary Olympics within the following historical
developments: the emergence of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, the increasing
commercialization of the Olympic movement, the end of energy politics between
Edmonton and Ottawa, and the rise of oil extraction practices in northern Alberta.
Ultimately, this chapter has highlighted the extent to which region and corporate
branding campaigns shaped the meaning and significance of natural and cultural
resources. Cultural identity was treated as a resource that is subject to market forces
while material goods symbolized contradictory ideas about regional identity and
belonging.
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Chapter 5
Haunted Spirits: the 1988 Calgary Olympics and the
Contractualization of Citizenship
In the lead up to the 1988 Calgary Winter Games, the official sponsor and organizer of
the Olympic torch relay, Petro Canada, released an ad showing Canadians waiting on a
snow-covered sidewalk to watch the Olympic torch relay pass through their city. The
narrator observed: “There’s something special happening in Canada, in big cities and
small towns all across this country of ours.”1 As the crowd of people grew, the narrator
continued: “People are getting ready to share in the experience of a lifetime. As the
Olympic torch is passed from hand to hand on its glorious 18, 000 kilometre route to
Calgary for the Olympic Winter Games, don’t miss the opportunity to be part of this.
Because this is ours, and it’s ours to share.”2 When a smiling blonde woman holding the
torch came into view, a man in the audience who was wearing a stylish coat over a suit
became teary-eyed. He was initially reluctant to leave his house to join the group that had
gathered along the relay route, but once he saw the torch, his eyes filled with tears. The
man shared a meaningful look with a person in a plaid flannel shirt and the pair was
clearly moved by the emotional intensity of the event. The message of the ad was clear:
the torch relay unites all Canadians, regardless of age, class or gender. As the ad ended, a
song with the following lyrics played: “Share the spirit, share the glory, share the moment
in this never ending story, come together heart to heart, everybody has a part, share the
flame Canada, share the flame, share the flame.”3
Protestors opposing Petro Canada’s sponsorship of the torch relay lined the route in every
province except Prince Edward Island, promoting ideas that contrasted sharply with those
in the ad. Protestors held up signs that changed Petro Canada’s slogan from “share the
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flame” to “share the blame.”4 They did this to highlight the plight of the Lubicon Cree, an
Indigenous group in northern Alberta whose unresolved land claim was discussed briefly
in Chapter Four. Many Canadians criticized the activists for dampening the joy of the
torch relay and, in Calgary, Olympic supporters threw snowballs at protestors. This
confrontation highlights the fact that the torch relay united some Canadians while
excluding others.
I begin this chapter by analyzing prominent narratives about the spirit of the Calgary
Games. Olympic organizers and sponsors used the phrase “Olympic spirit” to describe
how the values of the Olympic movement were represented in the Calgary Olympics.
Additionally, they used the phrase “Canadian spirit” to describe how Canadians’
activities during the Games reflected national values. Representations of the Olympic
torch relay brought these two ideas together and, for many Canadians, the torch
symbolized the Olympic and Canadian spirits. However, anti-Olympic protestors rejected
these narratives and argued that the reality of the Lubicon Cree’s unresolved land claim
contradicted the positive traits associated with the torch relay and the Calgary Olympics
more generally. I rely on Margaret Somers’ theory of the contractualization of citizenship
to examine the significance of these competing narratives. Somers argues that, under
market fundamentalism, only individuals who contribute to the nation in economically
profitable ways receive full rights as citizens.5 The spirit of the Olympics was linked to
the contractualization of citizens because Canadians could share in the spirit by making
them more profitable. Thus, the Olympic/Canadian spirit was created, in part, by
individuals who were in the process of fulfilling their contractual obligations as citizens.
Arguments that the actions of anti-Olympic protestors ran counter to the spirit of the
Games helped establish a division between those who did and did not increase the
profitability of the Games. By excluding the protestors’ message from official
representations of the Olympics, Olympic organizers and sponsors hid the fact that the
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Lubicon did not have the same rights as other people in Canada. This argument draws on
Somers’ claim that individuals who do not fulfil their contractual obligations as citizens
lack the “right to have rights”6. In the language of Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida,
the Lubicon’s rightlessness haunted the Canadian and Olympic spirits, creating spirited
Canadian/Olympic spirits. Commodities that symbolized the Olympic/Canadian spirit,
like replica Olympic torches, were fetish objects. In keeping with Anne McClintock’s
understanding of fetish as an embodiment of an unresolved contradiction, I argue that
Olympic objects embodied a contradiction about the meaning of citizenship in Canada.
Specifically, they represented and repudiated the idea that Canadians were united through
a shared sense of national pride and civic duty. Openly acknowledging this contradiction
would have created an uncanny experience because, as Sigmund Freud argues, the
uncanny emerges when something that was meant to be hidden becomes visible.7
This chapter contributes to existing scholarship on the political implications of the
commercial dimensions of the Calgary Olympics by focusing on the relationship between
commercialism and citizenship rights in Canada. Kevin Wamsley and Michael Heine
argue that when individuals criticized anti-Olympic protestors they relied on the idea that
the Olympics are not political.8 Oil companies’ sponsorship of the Games, Wamsley and
Heine contend, was inherently political.9 However, Wamsley and Heine do not examine
the political implications of these sponsorship practices. I show that, when citizenship
becomes contractualized, support for corporate sponsored events and the consumption of
material goods become ways to earn citizenship rights. Importantly, the individuals who
have been denied these rights are not completely invisible and consumer goods are
haunted by the social exclusion of rightless citizens.
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“Catch the Spirit:” Canadian Spirits in the Games
Olympic organizers and sponsors used the word spirit to discuss two distinct, but
interrelated, ideas. First, they used it to describe how the Calgary Games represented the
values of the Olympic movement. The authors of an education kit for high school
students defined Olympism as “an overall philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a
balanced whole the qualities of body, will and mind. Olympism sets out to create a way
of life based on the joy of effort, the educational values of good examples and a respect
for universal fundamental ethical principles.” 10 They further noted: “the spirit and
excitement of Olympism, as represented by the celebration in Calgary of the 1988
Olympic Winter Games, will remain as memories.”11 James C. Corkery, President and
Master of the Royal Canadian Mint, said that the slogan for coins commemorating the
Calgary Olympics, “The Pursuit of Excellence,” encapsulated Olympic ideals by
capturing “both the exceptional realism of the Olympic coins and the essence of the
Olympic spirit.”12
According to OCO’88, the Olympic torch relay spread the Olympic spirit. The relay
began on November 17, 1987, 88 days prior to the opening ceremony. The torch travelled
across Canada, coming within a two hour drive of 90% of the Canadian population.13 The
official report of the Games stated that the Olympic flame spread the Games’ message to
800 villages, towns and cities.”14 James Davidson shared this sentiment in December
1987, describing in the Globe and Mail how the torch relay brought the Olympic spirit to
eastern Canada. He wrote: “Maritimers have responded to its [the torch’s] mystique,
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braving the month’s bluster in impressive numbers to feel the storied Olympic spirit as it
visits their village or town or city.”15 According to some reports, the flame had “magical”
qualities. OCO’88 Chairman Frank King wrote: “The Olympic flame had a magical
effect on people of all ages. All along the roadside people reached out seeking to touch
the handle of the torch, as if to receive some form of spiritual nourishment. It was like a
blessing.”16 Davidson also described the flame as magical: “On the back roads of New
Brunswick, people are responding to the magic of the flame.”17
In Share the Flame, the official retrospective book of the Olympic torch relay, Calgary
resident Michael Farber wrote that torch bearers internalized the Olympic spirit. He
observed: all of the torch bearers “had their own kilometer of Canada and six or seven
proud minutes when the Olympic flame and the Olympic spirit rested with them.”18
Similar to Farber, the official report described Canadians embodying the Olympic spirit:
“like the huge flame burning atop the landmark Calgary Tower, the Olympic spirit burned
brightly in the hearts of people everywhere.”19 King, whose memoir about the Games is
filled with metaphors about the Olympic spirit, compared the spirit to a flame that
Canadians could catch and spread, writing: “The Olympic spirit chooses sport as its
model, but it really applies to all of life. When you catch the spirit, you know you’ve got
it. And once you’ve got it, others catch it from you. It’s contagious.”20
Canadians experienced the Olympic spirit by participating in and supporting the torch
relay. Alan Hobson, author of Share the Flame, wrote that the residents of Airdrie,
Alberta “showed the Olympic spirit” by hosting relay staff in their homes. Staff usually
stayed in hotels, but their hotel reservations in Airdrie fell through at the last minute.21
According to King, Canadians made the Olympic Spirit come alive in Canada: “The
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Calgary Olympic Winter Games will be remembered for the spirit of the people, a true
reflection of Olympic spirit. There were many who participated, and there were no losers.
That spirit is still alive and well and living in Calgary, looking for a chance to show itself
again”22 In fact, King argued that the level of support that Canadians showed for the
Olympics enhanced the existing Olympic spirit. He wrote: “The people of Calgary,
Alberta, and Canada felt excited, proud, and grateful for the opportunity they received to
host the ‘best-ever’ Olympic Winter Games. The spirit of Calgary will become part of the
new Olympic spirit and the next Games will benefit from that.”23
King and other OCO’88 members also used the word spirit to describe how Canadians
reflected local and national (rather than Olympic) values through their support of the
Games. Upon learning that Glenbow Museum Director Duncan Cameron had secured a
sponsor for the Spirit Sings exhibit in 1986, King wrote him an appreciative letter: “Your
tireless energy and positive attitude over the past 39 months of developing this project is
exemplary of the Calgary community spirit in helping make the XV Olympic Winter
Games the success they are going to be.”24 David Ting, an Ottawa resident, sent a letter
to OCO’88 praising the community spirit that Calgarians demonstrated during the
Games:
I, for one, was deeply touched by the spirit of Calgary – the
western hospitality, volunteerism, and the way they
welcomed the world. The pictures of ubiquitous volunteers,
the cheers at Saddledome and the enthusiastic crowds at
Olympic Plaza which was like Times Square on New Year’s
Eve, form a kaleidoscope that revolves before me.25
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In a section entitled “After the Games the Spirit Lives On,” the senior high school
education kit noted that the dedication to volunteer work by Calgarians during the
Olympics will have a lasting impact on the city: “the policy of OCO’88, to make these
Games the ‘Volunteer Games’ will contribute to a growing spirit of volunteerism in the
city.”26
Petro Canada representatives described the Olympic torch relay as a conduit for the
expression of Olympic and Canadian spirits. The joint statement that Petro Canada
executives W.H. Hopper and E.M. Lakusta provided in Share the Flame reflects this
perspective: “The Olympic torch symbolizes the Games’ objectives: peace, friendship
and sportsmanship.”27 Moreover, the Canadians who participated in the relay
demonstrated distinctly Canadian traits, like dedication and persistence: “For those who
struggled against the bitter wind, whether you carried the torch in your hands or in your
hearts, you have been part of a journey that showed that the Canadian spirit is as eternal
as the Olympic flame.”28 Similarly, Hobson wrote: “On its journey across the country,
the torch had ignited the Canadian spirit, and on that Saturday in February [when the
torch arrived in Calgary], it was joined with that of the Olympics.”29 The narrator of a
Petro Canada ad that aired after the completion of the torch relay told viewers: “For
eighty eight days the Olympic torch relay brought us together in a celebration of the
Canadian spirit.”30

“Won’t you feel it?” The Contractualization of Citizenship
The lyrics of the official song of the Calgary Games, “Can’t You Feel It,” written by
David Foster and Tommy Banks implored Canadians to feel the spirit of the Games. The
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song went: “Can’t you feel it? The spirit surrounds you!/Don’t you feel it? And now that
it’s found in you/ Won’t you feel it? The feeling’s everywhere/Can’t you feel it here?”31
The lyrics of this song are significant because Canadians, I argue, had to make material
contributions to the Games in order to “feel” the spirit. Making these contributions, in
turn, helped Canadians earn the privilege of citizenship. This argument relies on Somers’
concept of the contractualization of citizenship. She argues that the relationship between
the state and citizens under market fundamentalism has been reorganized and “the right
of recognition, inclusion, and membership in both political and civil society”32 has
become a privilege that citizens must earn by contributing to the nation in economically
profitable ways. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s work on the right to have rights (discussed
in greater detail later in this chapter), Somers asserts that citizens cannot exercise their
citizenship rights (i.e. right to vote, right to free speech) without first being guaranteed a
basic right: the right of recognition, inclusion and membership into society.33 The ways
in which Canadians “felt” the spirit provide salient examples of how individuals earn
citizenship rights. To be clear, I am not arguing that participation in the Games was the
only in which Canadians earned such rights; they must be consistently and continuously
earned.

One way Canadians added value to the Calgary Olympics was by volunteering for the
Games, and the unpaid labour they invested in the Games allowed OCO’88 to save
money on employees’ salaries. OCO’88 relied primarily on volunteers: a total of 11, 680
volunteers, comprising 97% of the organizations’ total “workforce.” Paid staff members
co-ordinated various projects and managed the Games’ budget. 34 By contrast,
approximately 10% of the Montreal Olympics’ workforce were volunteers.35 An article in
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the Globe and Mail drew attention to the unpaid labour of Olympic volunteers, noting
with amazement that, in Calgary, “20, 000 people will work for nothing to host the world
for 16 days.”36 The demands that OCO’88 placed on Olympic volunteers were similar to
those that employers place on employees. Volunteers were required to commit to a
minimum of 120 hours during the Games and had to attend training sessions for at least
one year.37 If performers in the opening and closing ceremonies missed a practice
session, they were let go. Additionally, OCO’88 member Brian Murphy resigned when
the executive board refused his request for funds to pay senior volunteers a salary of $50,
000 a year.38
Many volunteers added value to companies’ sponsorship of the Calgary Olympics by
strengthening the affiliation between their brands and the Olympics. For example, 140
volunteer high school students performed the roles of Games’ mascots Hidy and Howdy
in public appearances.39 The mascots made frequent appearances at corporate functions
hosted by such Olympic sponsors as Petro Canada, Kodak, General Motors, Royal Bank
and Coca-Cola.40 Organizers bought numerous Hidy and Howdy costumes, which
allowed the mascots to attend multiple functions at the same time.41 In the fourteen
months leading up to the Olympics, Hidy and Howdy made 2, 800 appearances.42 In the
book Share the Flame, Hobson celebrated the “commitment to the public and to the
Olympics” displayed by the student volunteers.43 Another Olympic sponsor, Labatt’s,
wrote favourably about the Canadians who participated in its Olympic Parent’s Program.
Labatt’s provided free plane fare and Olympic tickets to parents of Canadian Olympians
and locals hosted these parents in Calgary. More than one thousand Calgarians offered to
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be hosts, though only three hundred houses were needed.44 The Labatt’s Olympic Parents
Program application form told parents that, by participating in the program, they would
get the “opportunity to sample true western-style hospitality,” because Calgarians were
“generously opening their homes to parents of Canada’s Olympic Winter Team
members.”45 Using language that was very similar to Petro Canada’s “Share the Flame!”
mantra, Labatt’s representatives encouraged Olympian parents to “Share The Pride!” by
participating in the program.46
The involvement of Canadians in the Olympic torch relay exemplified how Canadians
enhanced the value of an Olympic sponsors’ brands. The torch relay aligned the Petro
Canada brand with national identity and contributed to branded nationalism, a type of
Canadian nationalism linked to consumption and branding, rather than cultural or
economic factors.47 During the torch relay, the Petro Canada brand became integrated
into the way that Canadians experienced and expressed national pride, resulting in “Petro
Canada nationalism.” Petro Canada executive Ed Lakusta expressed this idea when he
said: “We’re a Canadian company, and Canadians expect us to do things which enrich
our national life. The enthusiasm the Relay has generated in communities across the
country is simply amazing. We’re proud to be associated with an event that is creating
memories that will last a lifetime for so many Canadians.”48 Petro Canada conducted
consumer research prior to the start of the relay that found that 79% of Canadians were
aware that Petro Canada was its sponsor.49
Canadians’ participation in the torch relay helped make it a nationally significant and
emotionally resonant event. Canadians sent seven million entries to the nationwide lottery

King, It’s How You Play the Game, 251.
Labatt’s, Olympic Parents Program Application form, Box 23, Folder: Labatt’s, 1986-1987,
Communications Group, Series XV, Box 23, Folder: Labatt’s, 1986-1987, XVWGI, CCA.
46
Ibid.
47
Catherine Carstairs, "Roots Nationalism: Branding English Canada Cool in the 1980s and 1990s,"
Histoire sociale/Social History 39, no. 77 (2006): 235-255.
48
The Olympic Torch Relay Media Guide, Box 4, File: Petro Canada, 1987, Communications Group, XIII.
XVWGI, CCA.
49
Letter from Jim Hunter to Jerry Joynt, subject: Positive position of OCO on O.T.R. [Olympic Torch
Relay], Aug. 27, 1987, Box 2, File: Petro Canada, 1986-1987, Communications Group I, Sub-Series II,
Vice President Jared Joynt, Correspondence and Reference Material 1984-1988, XVWGI, CCA.
44
45

145

used to select torch bearers. (Many people submitted multiple entries).50 Canadians’
response to the torch relay was, in King’s words, “overwhelming. Thousands of people
had stood in the bitter cold for hours just to get a chance to see the flame, to hold it, to
take a little bit of it away with them.”51 He conceptualized this response in material
terms, saying: “You can’t invent ways to bring people together like this [torch] relay. You
can’t buy the pride it has unleashed. It gives all Canadians a chance to participate in
some way.”52 Shawna Richer later wrote that “the 1988 Calgary Olympics set a new
standard for a Winter Games.”53 According to King, Canadians along the route
spontaneously sang O Canada,54 as Richer also noted: “Spontaneous roadside cheers,
tears and outbursts of the national anthem, even on the darkest, most frigid nights, were
routine occurrences [along the torch relay route].”55 Hobson described Canadians running
out of their houses to shout “We love you Canada” as the torch relay passed through their
area and standing in public spaces singing the national anthem “with newly glowing
hearts.”56
While there is no evidence suggesting that the national pride Canadians expressed was
insincere, Petro Canada told Canadians what to expect and how to act during the torch
relay. For example, a Petro Canada ad that showed Canadians coming together to watch
the torch pass through their community anticipated the national unity and pride the event
would inspire in these spectators. The narrator described the relay as an “experience of a
lifetime” and advised viewers: “Don’t miss the opportunity to be part of this.”57 Another
ad told viewers: “When the Olympic torch is proudly carried through your community,
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it’s an experience you won’t want to miss.”58 Some torch bearers and spectators even
sang the lyrics of the jingle, “Share the Flame,” that played during these ads while a
young woman, Elsa Hon, from Fort McMurray held a home-made sign with the words,
“Share the Flame Canada.”59 Donalda Garner, who lived in Regina, raised the money to
travel to Quebec, where she had been selected to run as a torch bearer, by selling seven
goats. While in Quebec, Garner and her parents stayed at the home of Pierre Fafard,
another torch bearer. Hobson wrote that the Garners and Fafard “forged bonds that will
endure long after the flame has reached its destination. For Garner it epitomized the true
meaning of ‘share the flame.’”60
In addition to volunteering for the Games and supporting the torch relay, Canadians could
fulfill their metaphorical contracts as citizens by purchasing Olympic goods and
supporting Petro Canada’s cause-related marketing campaign. A portion of the profits
from sales of commemorative torch relay glassware and Olympic coins helped fund
Canadian athletes. Petro Canada and OCO’88 fetishized these products by suggesting that
when Canadians bought Olympic glassware they received a material good (the object) but
also something immaterial: the chance to support Canadian athletes and create the legacy
of the Games in Canada. The narrator in an ad about the Torch Relay Legacy Fund told
viewers:
Every time you bought an Olympic torch relay glass, you
contributed to this awards program, which allow our promising
athletes and coaches to continue their education and training. The
Petro Canada Olympic Torch Relay Legacy Fund: the pride we
shared leaves a promise for the future.61
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The final scene of the ad showed the torch relay emblem, a torch with a maple leaf
emerging from its flame, and the slogan: “Olympic Torch Relay Legacy Fund: Sustaining
the Olympic Spirit.”62 Similarly, the senior high education kit told students that buying
Olympic commodities contributed to the legacy of the Olympics: “As an integral part of
the Torch Relay, a legacy for amateur sport organizations will be provided through the
sale of limited-edition products licensed by OCO’88’s Marketing Department.”63 By
purchasing the glassware, Canadians were fulfilling their contractual obligations as
citizens by showing support for the torch relay. However, they were also fulfilling this
obligation by contributing money to a nationally significant endeavour: the training of
future Canadian Olympians.
Otto Jelinek, the Federal Minister of State, Fitness and Amateur Sport and
Multiculturalism, said in 1986 that Canadians who purchased Olympic coins supported
Olympic athletes in symbolic and material ways: “Every time a Canadian buys an
Olympic coin, they are making a positive statement of support for Canada’s Olympic
athletes and ideals. With three percent of the face value of each coin going to the
Canadian Olympic Association, the purchase is also making a positive financial statement
of support” for Canadian athletes.64 At the launch of the Olympic coin series in
September 1985, King said: OCO’88 is confident that Canadians will “embrace this
vehicle for supporting the Games.”65 Thus, the coin program is an example of a causerelated marketing (CRM) campaign. However, unlike other CRM-related purchases,
buying Petro Canada mugs helped Canadians earn citizenship rights.
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“Share the Blame:” Anti-Olympic Protests
The Lubicon and their allies rejected the dominant narrative of OCO’88 and Petro
Canada about the Canadian and Olympic spirits. The torch relay was a focal point for the
Lubicon’s anti-Olympic campaign because Petro Canada was actively drilling for oil in
Lubicon territory in the 1980s. Chief Bernard Ominayak asked Canadians to protest
along the torch relay route and people in every province except Prince Edward Island
obliged him.66 The Canadian Alliance in Solidarity with Native Peoples published a flyer
rejecting the idea that the Olympic torch symbolized values like friendship, harmony, and
national unity. The authors re-interpreted Petro Canada’s jingle “Share the Flame,”
writing that share the flame does not “mean watching while forest fire incinerates the
animals, birds, fish and plant life of the land.” The flyer continued: “Everybody has a part
- What part can Natives have when their artifacts and culture from the past are being
exploited by the very forces who are annihilating that way of life – today?”67 A number
of protestors lining the torch relay held up signs that changed Petro Canada’s slogan
“Share the Flame” to “Share the Blame.”68 Matthew Coon-Come, Grand Chief of the
Quebec Cree, articulated this sentiment at a protest: “I say if we share the flame, we
should share the blame, and we should share the shame.”69 A protestor in Fredericton
held up a sign that read: “Don’t share the nightmare of the genocide of Indians.”70 A
couple from Red Deer, Alberta, wrote a letter to the Globe and Mail, criticizing the
federal and provincial governments’ treatment of the Lubicon: “it is our shame that we
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care more for the grand Olympic show glorifying the human spirit than we do for real
suffering human beings.”71
City officials in Calgary prohibited Lubicon supporters from handing out leaflets on
Stephen Avenue Mall, where Olympic supporters gathered each night of the Games. The
Calgary Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) criticized the city’s action and journalist
Michael Valpy noted: “The CCLA suggested aloud to anyone wanting to listen that
freedom of expression was thought not to be compatible in Calgary with the Olympic
spirit.”72 In Toronto in December 1987, policed forced more than one hundred protestors
who had gathered in Nathan Phillips Square prior to the flame’s arrival, to disperse. The
protestors left the square and gathered at a nearby intersection, but police made them
leave that area too, because they were blocking pedestrian crosswalks.73 John Duncanson
conveyed the protestors’ perspective: they “said they feel the spirit of the Olympics is
being doused by the ugly reality of what the oil companies and governments are doing to
the Lubicon Cree.”74
Wamsley and Heine argue that OCO’88 developed a “Native participation plan” in order
to divert attention away from the Lubicon’s anti-Olympic campaign: “The program was
structured to channel Native involvement into less controversial areas, and it was
explicitly designed to counter the international publicity generated by the boycott of The
Spirit Sings.”75 In 1985, OCO’88 partnered with the federal government to establish a
“Natives and the Olympics Committee,” which was led by Sykes F. Powderface, an
Indigenous activists and the official representative of Treaty 7 Nations.76 The committee
organized a cultural exhibition, a Pow Wow, a fashion show and a National Youth
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Conference in connection with the Calgary Olympics.77 During the opening ceremony of
the Games, a 10-story Teepee surrounded the Olympic Cauldron and David Tlen sang the
national anthem in Cree.78

Figure 24: Calgary Olympics opening ceremony, OCO’88, Official Report, 14.

In addition to diverting attention from the anti-Olympic boycott, the inclusion of
Indigenous peoples in the Calgary Games enhanced its spirit. In fact, organizers planned
to involve Indigenous peoples in the Games years before Ominayak called for an antiOlympic boycott. In 1982, OCO’88 members concluded that the cultural events
associated with the Games offered them a “way to bring our native people and ethnic
groups into the ‘spirit’ of the Games.”79 Olympic supporters dismissed anti-Olympic
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protestors because their actions were inconsistent with the spirit of the Games and did not
add value to the Games. A 1988 article by Kevin Cox praised the celebration of the
Olympic spirit during the Games. 80 He argued that a ceremony in the Olympic Plaza
where OCO’88 thanked 3,500 oil industry workers who volunteered for the Games
brought the Olympic spirit to life. Amid this atmosphere, “The threat of the Lubicon
Indian band disrupting the Games to publicize their land claims is generally scoffed at.”81
Like Cox, King compared anti-Olympic activists unfavourably with Canadians who
embraced the Olympic spirit, writing: “the negative placards of Lubicon supporters along
the torch relay route seemed out of place and ineffective...Under the glow from the
ubiquitous Olympic-torch candles, people hugged and shook hands in friendship. There
was no room for defiance or confrontation here, and the protesters’ message was
overwhelmed.”82

“Man With No Land:” The Right to Have Rights
Gordon argues that there is a double haunting in Toni Morrison’s book Beloved because
Beloved the ghost, who haunts her family, is haunted by traumatic experiences and
memories.83 Similarly, the Olympic and Canadian spirits were haunted by accounts of the
Lubcon’s plight which anti-Olympic protestors sought to publicize, becoming spirited
spirits. In 1899 and 1900, federal government representatives travelled to northern
Alberta to negotiate a treaty, Treaty 8, with Indigenous peoples living in the area.
Representatives tried to make contact with all the Indigenous groups living on the land
covered by the treaty, but they did not penetrate the wilderness far enough to reach the
Lubicons.84 In August 1933, the Lubicons petitioned the federal government to establish
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a reserve for them and Ottawa approved the request in 1939. However, the outbreak of
World War II preoccupied the government’s attention and the reserve was never formally
created. In 1942, Malcolm McCrimmon, a senior accountant at Indian Affairs, changed
the criteria used to decide Indigenous peoples’ eligibility for treaty status. This change
reduced the number of official Lubicon members so dramatically that, one year later,
McCrimmon concluded: “the number of Indians remaining on the membership list at
Lubicon Lake would hardly warrant the establishment of a Reserve.”85 However, the
Lubicon disagree with the government’s eligibility requirements and asserted that, in
Ominayak’s words,” To be a Lubicon member, a person must be of Aboriginal ancestry
linked by historic and family ties to the traditional Lubicon area.”86 The fact that the
federal government did not recognize that individuals with kinship ties to the Lubicon
were part of the Lubicon community exemplifies the fact that many Lubicon were
excluded from their political and social community. Moreover, by not establishing a
reserve for the Lubicon, the federal government made it difficult for the Lubicon to
preserve this community.
The Lubicon were also excluded from mainstream Canadian society, a fact that became
clear in 1977, when the Alberta government passed a bill changing the wording of the
Alberta Land Titles Act to prohibit caveats on unpatented Crown land.87 At that time, the
Lubicon were members of the Isolated Communities Board, a group that had filed a legal
caveat asserting their ownership over land in northern Alberta. By changing the Alberta
Land Titles Act midway through the Isolated Community Board’s legal proceedings, the
Alberta legislature placed the Lubicon outside the protection of the law. In January 1981,
the province changed the official status of Little Buffalo from “unorganized Indian
settlement” to “provincial hamlet,” transforming it into a legally occupied provincial
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municipality.88 Subsequently, officials began describing the Lubicons as trespassers and
squatters on Crown land.
A 1982 legal case that the Lubicon mounted against companies drilling for oil in their
area also demonstrated that the Lubicon’s interests were not protected by the law. In fact,
this case exemplifies the contractualization of citizenship in Canada because the judge,
Gregory Forsyth, privileged the financial interests of oil companies over the social
interests of the Lubicon. The Lubicon’s lawyer, James O’Reilly, asked the court to order
an injunction prohibiting companies from extracting oil from Lubicon territory until the
Lubicon’s land claim was settled.89 Justice Forsyth did not accept O’Reilly’s argument
that the Lubicon’s way of life was being destroyed by the oil company’s activities.90
Furthermore, he concluded that preventing companies from drilling for oil in Northern
Alberta would weaken their position in the oil industry. He wrote: “I am more than
satisfied that the respondents [oil companies] would suffer large and significant damages
if injunctive relief in any of the forms sought by the applicants were granted.
Additionally, the respondents would suffer a loss of competitive positions in the industry
vis a vis the position of other companies not parties to this action.”91 Perhaps the clearest
example of the judge’s adherence to the logic that underpins the contractualization of
citizenship is reflected in his argument that, if the Lubicon’s land claim was
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unsuccessful, they would not be able to compensate oil companies for their financial
losses.92
The federal government re-visited the possibility of establishing a Lubicon reserve in
1983 when Indian Affairs Minister John Munro urged Alberta Native Affairs Minister
Milton Pahl to establish a reserve and a wildlife conservation regime on Lubicon
territory. He made this suggestion after Prime Minister Trudeau received a letter from
Anwar Barker, the head of the Global Assembly of the World Council of Churches.
Barker wrote that “The situation of the [Lubicon] Band and Band members is thus
desperate...Those who try to pursue a different lifestyle will both deny their heritage and
break their traditional bonds with the land, an essential legal requirement of their
Aboriginal claim.”93 When Pahl did not accept Munro’s recommendations to establish a
reserve, the federal minister wrote to him in February 1984 urging him to reconsider.
Like Barker, Munro asserted that the Lubicon’s cultural survival was tied to their land:
“If this Band is to survive as a group and is to preserve its identity, a reserve is urgently
needed.”94 When the Tories were elected, David Crombie became Minister of Indian
Affairs and assigned David Fulton, a former federal Justice Minister, as a special envoy
to the Lubicon.95
In 1985, the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld Justice Forsyth’s ruling on the Lubicon’s
injunction request. Like Justice Forsyth, Justice J.A. Kerans believed that citizens’
interests could be measured and expressed in economic terms. The judge compared the
damages oil companies would suffer if they could no longer drill for oil on Lubicon land
with the damages the Lubicon would suffer if drilling continued unabated. He concluded:
“the balance of convenience favours the defendants, because to abandon the area to the
animals would require abandoning producing fields.”96 Justice Kerans also concluded
that, if the Lubicon’s land claim was successful, oil companies could financially
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compensate them for damages. He wrote: “the time-span here is sufficiently short that the
plaintiffs could, if successful at trial, gain through damages sufficient moneys to restore
the wilderness and compensate themselves any interim losses.”97 The rulings by Justices
Forsyth and Kerans illustrate that the Lubicon’s cultural survival was not protected by
Canadian law.
In 1986, after consulting extensively with the Lubicon and provincial officials, Fulton
recommended that the federal government establish a Lubicon reserve based on the
current number of community members.98 Because they were not signatories of Treaty 8,
the Lubicon’s land rights, Fulton argues, were never extinguished. Moreover, the losses
the Lubicon suffered were profound and irreversible. He wrote: the land “upon which
they have depended for their livelihood, has been seriously diminished by the
unrestricted development which has been allowed to take place without their consent and
before they have had time to adjust.”99 In contrast to Justices Forsyth and Kerans, Fulton
recognized the importance of the Lubicon’s right to maintain a distinct social and
economic community, arguing that they should be given “the widest powers of selfdetermination and self-government to enable its members to realize the concept of the
preservation and continuance of their way of life as an Indian community in a manner
that is compatible with a balance between their rights and interests and those of others
whom they must live in harmony.”100 The federal government, however, did not act upon
any of Fulton’s recommendations.
Dawn Martin-Hill writes that the Lubicon’s experience “reveals the Canadian
government’s hollow commitment to human rights and democracy.”101 Her argument is
supported by a 1987 United Nations Human Rights Commission ruling that Canada had
violated article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by putting
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the Lubicon’s culture and way of life in jeopardy.102 In response, the Canadian
government informed the Commission that it was prepared to settle the Lubicon’s land
claims. But, even today, the Lubicon still do not have a reserve. In 2010, Amnesty
International released a report expressing concern “that 20 years after the Committee
adopted its views on the case, the Lubicon Cree continue to suffer serious human rights
violations. Canada’s failure to act in a timely and just manner to address these violations
is unacceptable.”103 In light of this situation, the honorary name Ominayak received
when he visited the Blood reserve southeast of Calgary is apt. The name, Gadayskoughkh-omee, means “man with no land.’”104
Wamsley and Heine argue that by criticizing anti-Olympic protesters for politicizing the
Olympics, supporters of the Olympics turned a blind eye to the political ramifications of
Shell and Petro Canada’s sponsorship of the Games.105 For Wamsley and Heine, at issue
was “the discursive delimitation of the ‘proper’ politics in the context of the 1988
Olympics.”106 The substance of the protestors’ message, and the fact that many
Canadians tried to sideline this message, have political implications not addressed by
Wamsley and Heine. Protestors drew attention to the fact that the Lubicon no longer had
rights as citizens in Canada because they opposed the profit-generating activities of oil
companies in northern Alberta. Thus, protestors exposed the fact that a practice occurring
during the Games, the inclusion and exclusion of citizens based on their contributions to
the nation, was occurring on a much larger scale outside of the Olympics. The negative
effects of the Lubicon’s social exclusion were more serious than the protestors’ exclusion
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from the Olympics; the Lubicon were not included in civic and political communities in
Canada.
The argument that the Lubicon were socially excluded relies on Hanna Arendt’s
conceptualization of human rights and statelessness. Arendt wrote that, in the interwar
years, European Jews and other groups who were expelled from their home countries
became stateless. When these groups sought asylum in new countries, they became
unwanted refugees who could not be deported (no country would take them) or
naturalized (there were too many of them). In other words, they lost their homes and
could not find new ones. Once they became stateless, they also became rightless.107
These individuals lost government protection, both in their country of origin and
elsewhere. International treaties and agreements guarantee the rights of citizens even
outside their own country, but stateless individuals were not citizens of any country.108
Arendt wrote: once individuals who had been expelled from their country “had left their
homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless;
once they had become deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the
earth.”109 When the rights of stateless individuals were no longer guaranteed by an
authority or institution, these rights disappeared altogether. This situation illustrated that
the concept of the Rights of Man, the notion that all individuals possess inalienable
human rights, was a fallacy. The “loss of national rights,” Arendt observed, “was
identical with the loss of human rights.”110
Arendt used the term the “right to have rights” to describe the fact that, in order to
exercise any civil or juridical right, individuals must first belong to a community that
recognizes them as rights bearing individuals. She wrote: “Not the loss of specific rights,
then, but the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever,
has been the calamity which has befallen ever-increasing numbers of people.”111
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Drawing on Arendt’s work, Somers argues that citizenship rights and human rights are
inextricably linked because they both rely on a prior guarantee, the guarantee of inclusion
in a social and political community.112 However, Somers departs from Arendt when she
argues that individuals become internally stateless when they are excluded from their
national community. These individuals still reside in their country of origin and are,
nominally, citizens of that country. However, they have lost the rights that their fellow
citizens possess. Somers uses the metaphor of interior borders to describe this situation:
“the borders and boundaries once used solely as external demarcations designed to
exclude people from nation-state entry are increasingly expanding to the center of our
politics, creating sharp interior borders of internal social and political exclusion.”113
Somers argues that the contractualization of citizenship creates internally stateless people
because, in a society governed by market fundamentalism, individuals must earn the right
to have rights. For example, when Hurricane Katrina hit in 2005, many inhabitants of
New Orleans were trapped in the city. These individuals could have been evacuated by
the federal government if it had invested in and harnessed sufficient manpower and
resources. For Somers, the fact that certain members of society, including the elderly,
infirm, disabled and unemployed, were not evacuated reflected the extent of their social
exclusion. After the hurricane, these individuals were described as refugees or
immigrants seeking asylum in their own country. Somers argues that they were internally
stateless even before the hurricane. Hurricane Katrina, Somers writes, exposed “what is
entailed when an entire segment of civil society has so disintegrated that its people have
been robbed of their ontological rights to membership and inclusion, and with it their
recognizable humanity – without which no other rights are possible.”114 The people left
behind in New Orleans were excluded from American society because they had not
contributed to the nation in economically profitable ways. In the language of the
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contractualization of citizenship, they had not fulfilled their contractual obligations as
citizens.115
In Canada, the Lubicon were already internally stateless, and lacked citizenship rights,
when Calgary hosted the Olympics in 1988. Of course, any discussion of the Lubicon’s
status as Canadian citizens must acknowledge that, historically, Indigenous peoples could
only become citizens by assimilating into Settler society. After 1867, public officials
argued that Indigenous peoples had to be “civilized” in order to obtain Canadian
citizenship and could not keep their official status as Indians if they wanted to vote.116 In
1960, changes to the Canadian Elections Act gave all status Indians the right to vote in
federal elections, but Indigenous peoples still maintain a different relationship to
Canadian citizenship than non-Indigenous Canadians. Section 35(1) of the 1983
Constitution Act recognizes that, as self-governing peoples who lived on the land before
Europeans settled in Canada, Indigenous peoples have a unique set of rights. These
include the right to access and occupy their own land and to preserve their language,
economy and culture.117 Indigenous peoples, therefore, are distinguished from other
Canadians by their right to self-determination, illustrating that not all Canadian citizens
have equal rights.118 Rather, Indigenous peoples belong to nations that have the
additional right to exercise political autonomy within Canada.119
The Lubicon were denied the “right to have rights” when their ability to maintain their
sovereignty, preserve their culture, and practice their traditional way of life became
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jeopardized. They literally lost their land, becoming internally stateless people. Dwight
Gladue, a Lubicon living in Little Buffalo, said in 1991: “We have no rights up here,
nothing. They can come up here, take our land, destroy us, our lives, and get rich doing
it.”120 John Goddard writes that the Lubicon band did not understand “how the
government could sell exploration and drilling rights to people newly arrived in Lubicon
territory while granting no rights at all to the people who had used and occupied the land
since recorded time.”121 The Lubicon’s rightless status was based, in part, on the fact that
they did not have jurisdiction over their land. Like stateless Europeans who lost their
homes, the loss of the Lubicon’s land meant the loss of “the entire social texture into
which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the
world.”122 The Lubicon developed plans for a reserve in 1985 and, although they were
never put in place, these plans illustrate that having a reserve would have made it possible
for the Lubicon to maintain a distinctive social and political community within Canada.
They intended to build a school, band office and other public buildings on the reserve and
establish homes spread out along the lakeshore. Additionally, the Lubicon would have set
aside land to cultivate agricultural crops and herd cattle. In fact, some individuals took
courses on how to start and run small businesses, anticipating that they would be able to
start their own businesses once the reserve was built.123

“Uncanny Experiences:” Fetish Objects
The Olympic torch and related commodities were fetish objects in McClintock’s
understanding of fetish as “the embodiment of an impossible irresolution.”124 These
objects embodied an impossible irresolution in the meaning of citizenship and belonging
in Canada. On one hand, they represented the idea that Canadian citizens are included
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within the nation’s civil and political community. On the other hand, they represented the
fact that Canadians must earn their citizenship rights and that some Canadians, like the
Lubicon, are excluded from local and national communities. In other words, these objects
represented and repudiated the idea that internal borders of inclusion and exclusion exist
within Canada. Significantly, these fetish objects were often used as symbols of national
unity and pride. Prime Minister Mulroney said in 1988 that the torch relay was “a great
unifying strand across this country. Unity requires a lot more than political speeches. It
requires symbols, and the Olympic torch relay is a symbol and reality of unity.”125 Many
Canadians standing along the relay route held candles that looked like replica torches.
These long, white candles had red covers that protected the flame from wind and were
marked with the torch relay emblem, the Olympic rings and the Petro Canada logo. By
purchasing and holding replica torches, Canadians conspicuously demonstrated their
identity as Canadians who, having fulfilled their contractual obligations as citizens, were
now full members of a national community.

Figure 25: Replica Calgary Olympics torches, www.calgaryisawesome.com.

Anti-Olympic protestors holding signs with messages like “Share the Shame” made the
plight of the Lubicon difficult to ignore. As such, they drew attention to the ghosts that
haunted the Olympic/Canadian spirit and, in doing so, produced an uncanny effect. For
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Freud, the uncanny describes something that was meant to be hidden but has become
visible.126 Gordon argues that “uncanny experiences are haunting experiences”127
because to confront a ghostly haunting is to come face to face with things or information
that have been hidden from view. In the case of the Calgary Olympics, the haunting
experience would involve acknowledging the fact that the Lubicon are excluded from
Canadian society. Freud wrote: “an uncanny effect often arises when....a symbol takes on
the full function and significance of what is symbolizes.”128 In the case of the Calgary
Olympics, the uncanny effect arises when the full meaning of the Olympic torch, as a
symbol of a haunted Olympic/Canadian spirit, became overt. In other words, the uncanny
emerges in the face of the reality that some citizens have been denied the rights and
privileges of citizenship. In this context, statements like King’s argument that there was
no room for anti-Olympic protestors in the torch relay helped to keep the uncanny out of
the Olympics. Likewise, the Olympic supporters who threw snowballs at anti-Olympic
protestors in Calgary helped ensure that the protestors, and their message, hovered at the
margins of the Games, neither fully recognized nor fully hidden.
Like the Olympic torch, the glassware that Petro Canada sold as souvenirs of the torch
relay were fetish objects. Petro Canada sold 50 million glasses, more than double the
population of Canada at the time, and the company marketed these objects as
commemorative items.129 For example, the narrator of a Petro Canada ad said: “Each
purchase of a glass secures you a lasting memento of the relay and helps build a legacy
for our future Olympians.” 130 Petro Canada intended for the glassware to commemorate
the positive memories that Canadians associated with the torch relay, but these memories
are fractured and incomplete. As a lasting symbol of the torch relay, the glassware
represented and repudiated the memory of anti-Olympic protestors lining the torch relay
trying to publicize the Lubicon’s unresolved land claim. Thus, the prevalence and
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permanence of these objects in Canada made the ghosts that haunted the Calgary
Olympics live on, lingering in the rooms where Canadians placed the glassware. In fact,
Petro Canada released an ad in the lead up to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics that depicted
the glasses as lasting symbols of the Calgary Games. The narrator said: “It was 1988, the
Calgary Winter Games, when the country came together to support Olympic athletes with
glasses from Petro Canada. Isn’t it time to do it again? Buy the glass. Support Canadian
athletes. Only at Petro Canada.”131 The ad showed the objects in unremarkable places in
a home: on a shelf in the kitchen, on a table holding paint brushes, on a ledge filled with
loose change, etc. These places, I argue, are haunted by the memory of the anti-Olympic
protests staged during the Calgary Olympics and by the fact that the Lubicon’s land claim
remains unsettled.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued that commodities linked to the Calgary Olympics were haunted
by the rightless status of the Lubicon in Canada. I illustrated the significance of official
narratives about the Olympic and Canadian spirits by showing that these narratives
encouraged Canadians to engage in practices that added value to the Games. As such,
participating in the Olympics offered Canadians the opportunity to earn their citizenship
rights. Moreover, a key criticism of anti-Olympic protestors focused on the fact that their
actions were incompatible with the spirit of the Games. What was at stake in these
narratives about spirit was the visibility of the protestors and the open acknowledgment
that the Lubicon Cree no longer had the “right to have rights” in Canada. Thus, in this
chapter, I related the concepts of fetish and haunting to the contractualization of
citizenship, showing that Olympic commodities represented competing ideas about
Canadian citizenship and inclusion. I also discussed Freud’s work on the uncanny by
arguing that an open acknowledgment of the Lubicon’s rightlessness in Canada would

“2010 Olympic Glassware.” Petro Canada advertisement. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4yx7aXrcKr0&list=PLWMRezgdS5q50fZzQU2_uM82ltVSbJdx4
131

164

have caused an uncanny experience for Canadians who viewed Olympic commodities as
symbols of national pride and unity.
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Chapter 6
“A Living Embodiment of the Olympic Ideal:” The
Four Host First Nations, Sustainable Legacies, and
Aboriginal Title in the 2010 Vancouver Olympics

In December 2009, a few months before the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games,
the Crying Room gallery installed an outdoor mural by the artist Jesse Corcoran.
Depicting the Olympic rings as four sad faces and one happy face, the mural was placed
outside the gallery for the public to view. It reflected Corcoran’s belief that the Olympics
benefit a small group of people and, conversely, disadvantage many more. The artist
worked at a homeless shelter in Vancouver’s downtown eastside neighborhood and held
that the coming Games would not benefit the marginalized people living in the area. He
was particularly grieved that public spaces where homeless people often gathered, such
as Oppenheimer Park, had been shut down for Olympic-related renovations. Corcoran
told the Globe and Mail: “The oppressive nature of the Games is what I wanted to
capture and how the majority is suffering for the minority.”1 Vancouver city officials
demanded that the gallery take down the mural, claiming that it was graffiti. Although it
was painted on wood in an unpolished style, Corcoran argued that his work was not
graffiti and that that the city really wanted the mural gone because it reflected an antiOlympic sentiment.2 After the Crying Room took down Corcoran’s mural, the public
outcry was so great that the city relented and allowed the gallery to reinstall it.

Marsha Lederman, “Vancouver orders removal of anti-Olympic mural,” Globe and Mail, Dec. 11, 2009,
A4.
2
Ibid; the controversy over the mural occurred after Vancouver City Council passed a bylaw making it
illegal for people to put up Olympic-related signage that did not celebrate the 2010 Winter Games or create
a festive environment. The British Columbia (B.C.) Civil Liberties Association successfully pressured City
Council to amend the law so that it only applied to commercial signs that impinged on Olympic sponsors’
exclusive advertising rights.
1
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Figure 26: Mural by Jessie Corcoran, The Globe and Mail, Dec. 11 2009, A4.

In contrast to Corcoran, the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and
Paralympic Games (VANOC)3 argued that the Games would benefit the broader public.
VANOC was committed to sustainability, a practice it defined as “striving to manage the
social, environmental, and economic impact and opportunities of the Games in ways that
would create lasting benefits, locally and globally.”4 The organization’s sustainability
plan included a partnership with the First Nations upon whose land the Games were held,
the Lil’wat, Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh Nations. Known collectively as
the Four Host First Nations (FHFN), they were the first Indigenous groups to officially
partner with an Olympic organizing committee.5 Debates about how much, if at all, the
2010 Games benefitted Indigenous communities reflected the central question Corcoran’s

3

Unlike other Olympic Games held in Canada, the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Games were organized
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4
VANOC. Vancouver 2010: Sustainability Report 2009-10 (Vancouver: VANOC, 2010), 5.
5
VANOC. Vancouver 2010: Staging the Olympic Winter Games Knowledge Report (Vancouver: VANOC,
September 2010), 35.
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mural raised: who benefitted from the Games? Shawn Atleo, Chief of the Assembly of
First Nations, argued: “The [Vancouver] Winter Olympics demonstrated that the
principles of recognition and respect create the right foundation for real partnerships that
produce innovation and shared benefits for everyone involved.”6 However, Seislom, a
Lil’wat Elder, said: “An overwhelming number of Indigenous people in these territories
and in the interior are opposed to the Olympics because of the long-term impact including
destruction of the land, [and] commodification of Native art and culture.”7
In this chapter, I argue that the Vancouver Bid Corporation (VBC) and VANOC’s
partnerships with the FHFN were primarily profit-generating endeavours. These
partnerships helped the VBC and VANOC demonstrate their commitment to the
sustainable development goals of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). This, in
turn, strengthened Vancouver’s Olympic bid and enhanced the value of the Olympic and
corporate sponsors’ brands. The FHFN’s involvement in the Games contributed to the
B.C. government’s effort to restore economic stability to the province. Few First Nations
in B.C. have signed treaties with the Crown and Indigenous peoples argue they have
jurisdiction over the land (and its subsurface minerals) not covered by treaties. When
Indigenous nations began asserting their land rights, foreign companies became wary of
investing in B.C.’s natural resources. Some public officials used the term “economic
uncertainty” to describe the threat these land claims posed to the economy and the
government tried to contain this threat through various means. Because the 2010 Games
were held on the FHFN land, there was a risk the nations would challenge the province’s
authority to host the Games in Vancouver and surrounding areas. Partnering with the
FHFN offered the VBC and VANOC a way to mitigate this risk. While the organizations
promised the Games would positively impact Indigenous communities throughout the
province, this promise went largely unfulfilled.

6

VANOC, Sustainability Report, 78.
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Valuable scholarship has been written about representations of Indigenous peoples in the
modern Olympic Games. A recurring theme in these works is that Olympic organizers
often appropriate or exploit Indigenous peoples’ cultures.8 I contribute to this literature
by showing how the inclusion of the FHFN in the Vancouver Olympics was part of a
broader set of political and marketing practices aimed at strengthening the economy of
British Columbia and making the Olympics a profitable endeavour. Further, I discuss and
analyze how, similar to Calgary in 1988, jurisdiction over land emerged as a key issue in
Vancouver during the Games.

“Creating a Larger Economic Pie:” The Olympic Bid
After Vancouver won its bid to host the 2010 Olympic Games in July 2003, VBC
Chairman Jack Poole declared: “If it hadn’t been for the full support of the Four Host
First Nations in our bid, we likely wouldn’t be talking about Vancouver 2010 today.”9
The VBC established an “Aboriginal Participation Strategy and Secretariat” and gave a
representative from each of the FHFN a seat on its board of directors.10 A letter of
support from the Squamish National Council was included in Vancouver’s Olympic Bid
Book. The book noted: “planning is underway for extensive involvement of Aboriginal
people in the 2010 Games.”11 Furthermore, the VBC wrote that the strong relationship
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians reflected Olympic values: “Canada
brings together the cultures of the world, as well as an ancient and rich First Nations

8

See: Janice Forsyth, and Kevin Wamsley, "Symbols without substance: Aboriginal peoples and the
illusion of Olympic ceremonies," in Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern
Games, eds. Kevin Young and Kevin Wamsley (Oxford: Elsevier Press, 2005): 227-248; Darren J.
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Peoples,”, in The Olympics at the Millennium: Power, Politics and the Games, eds Kay Schaffer and
Sidonie Smith (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000): 243-257; Christine O’Bonsawin,
“Indigenous Peoples and Canadian-Hosted Olympic Games”, in Aboriginal Peoples & Sport in Canada:
Historical Foundations and Contemporary Challenges, eds. Janice Forsyth and Audrey Giles (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2013), 35-63; Kevin Wamsley, and Mike Heine, "‘Don't mess with the relay - it's bad
medicine’: Aboriginal culture and the 1988 Winter Olympics," in Olympic Perspectives: Third
International Symposium for Olympic Research, ed. Robert Barney (London: Centre for Olympic Studies,
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culture, in one harmonious society: a living embodiment of the Olympic ideal.”12 The
VBC also highlighted Canada’s official policy on Indigenous rights, noting that, “in
1982, Canada became the first country in the world to constitutionally entrench the rights
of Aboriginal peoples” through Section 35 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.13
The VBC’s partnership with the FHFN enhanced Vancouver’s Olympic bid by affirming
its commitment to the IOC’s sustainable development goals.14 In 1999, the IOC adopted
Agenda 21: Sport for Sustainable Development, which included the following statement:
The starting point of sustainable development is the idea that the
long-term preservation of our environment, our habitat as well as
its biodiversity and natural resources and the environment will
only be possible if combined simultaneously with economic, social
and political development particularly geared to the benefit of the
poorest members of society.15
Although Agenda 21 is primarily concerned with environmental preservation, it also
contains sections about strengthening the involvement of women, youth, and Indigenous
peoples in sport. The document affirmed Indigenous peoples’ “strong historical ties to
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Ibid., 3.
Ibid., 3.
14
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their environment” and “important role in ecological preservation.” 16 Further, it called
for Indigenous peoples to play a greater role in the Olympic Movement.
When Vancouver was first considering an Olympic bid, the value that the IOC placed on
sustainability was very high. In April 2000, an unnamed VBC member wrote a discussion
paper about changes to the bid procedure, which is worth quoting at length:
The format for Olympic Bids is changing dramatically, as the
IOC moves to an evaluation approach that is more focused on the
substance of the Bid, rather than the relationships developed
through the bidding process. At the same time, the IOC has taken
a far more active role in promoting societal issues in conjunction
with sport, including the environment, anti-doping, inclusiveness,
etc. While the need to have a technically flawless bid is apparent,
it is also evident that bids must appeal to the priorities of the
decision makers even more than before.17
The changes to the bid process were likely influenced by the fact that, in 1998, the IOC
had become embroiled in a bribery scandal over Salt Lake City’s bid for the 2002 Winter
Olympics. In November 1998, news broke that the Salt Lake Olympic Organizing
Committee had paid for Sonia Essomba, daughter of IOC member René Essomba, to
attend American University in Washington (they paid her tuition and living expenses).18
Further investigation found that Salt Lake City bid officials had bribed numerous IOC
members in exchange for awarding them the 2002 Games.19 IOC member Dick Pound led
an investigation into the matter, later recommending the organization expel six members
and adopt a Code of Ethics.
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As well, the VBC was preparing its Olympic bid at a time when the IOC was increasing
its emphasis on the legacy of Olympic Games. In 2003, the organization amended its
charter and introduced the requirement that all Olympic Games leave a positive legacy on
the host city and country.20 As John and Margaret Gold point out, the IOC defines this
concept loosely, which makes it easy for host nations to align their priorities with
Olympic legacies. They argue that, for the IOC, legacy is “something passed down from
one generation to the next although not necessarily purposefully (as with a bequest in a
will).”21 In 1999, even before the IOC amended its charter, the VBC launched its
“Legacies Now” initiative, which funds sport and physical activity programs in Canada.
The VBC even committed to carrying out its legacy program regardless of the outcome of
its Olympic bid. It was the first Olympic bid organization to make such a commitment.22
The FHFN’s involvement in the Vancouver Olympic bid also helped to elevate public
support for the bid. Gaining this support was especially important because, previously,
the Bread Not Circuses Coalition (BNCC) in Toronto had mounted strong opposition to
that city’s 2008 Olympic bid. The BNCC, which was endorsed by about 50 community
groups, argued that the city should use public resources to address social issues like
poverty and not spend them on the Olympics.23 As early as 1998, VBC members raised
concerns about anti-Olympic organizations developing in Vancouver. The minutes of a
1998 board of directors meeting mention the BNCC by name: “To date we have not
received any correspondence from any groups opposing the games i.e. the ‘Bread not
Circuses’ group that is actively opposing the Toronto 2008 bid.”24 However, organizers
believed that this silence would not last and decided to “develop a strategy to handle the
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potential opposition groups.”25 In 2002, Poole identified another reason why public
support was essential: the IOC required it. He said: “The importance of broad-based
support for our Bid cannot be over-estimated. This is a very important factor to the IOC
when they make their decision about the city selected to host the Games. The support that
British Columbians are prepared to show can make the difference for our Canadian
Bid.”26
In 2002, the VBC hired Ipsos Reid to conduct focus groups with Vancouver area
residents who supported and opposed the city’s Olympic bid. The survey research firm
concluded that the VBC should develop ad campaigns that would “appeal to the hearts as
well as the minds of residents in Lower Mainland.”27 Significantly, a potential ad for the
Olympic bid that Ipsos Reid showed focus groups included the Indigenous artist Roy
Vickers. This ad resonated emotionally with participants, with one person saying: “I have
a passion for First Nations culture and I got goose bumps watching the ad with Roy
Vickers. It really appeals to me.”28 Ipsos Reid also advised the VBC to target opponents
with advertorials that addressed “the social concerns among this group (i.e. the perception
that money is diverted away from healthcare and education to support the Olympics, as
well as the environment and social housing aspects of the Bid).”29
The VBC partnered with CIBC to establish an official youth ambassador program, which
enlisted 20 youths (aged 14 to 17) to build awareness and enthusiasm for the bid.30 The
program included ambassadors from the Musqueam and Squamish Nations. Fourteenyear-old Rebecca Campbell said: “I think it is very exciting that Vancouver is making a
bid for the Olympics due to the fact that Vancouver sits on the traditional territory of the
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Musqueam First Nation. What a great way to represent my people and city by being a
CIBC 20 for 10 Youth Bid Ambassador!”31 In 2002, five B.C. athletes travelled across
the province with the Alcan Spirit of 2010 Tour. The athletes, all of whom were
sponsored by RBC, gave presentations in schools, shopping malls, seniors’ residences
and Indigenous communities across the country to raise support for the bid.32
Despite the above efforts, many B.C. citizens did not want the Olympics to come to
Vancouver. During the city’s 2002 mayoral election, Larry Campbell promised to hold a
vote on Vancouver’s upcoming Olympic bid if he was elected. As mayor, he delivered on
his promise and held a non-binding plebiscite on February 22, 2003. Residents voted on
the following question: “Do you support or do you oppose the City of Vancouver’s
participation in hosting the 2010 Olympic Winter Games and Paralympic Games?”33
Opponents of the bid argued that the Olympics would divert public funds from important
social services. The “No Games 2010 Coalition,” endorsed by community groups like the
Anti Poverty Coalition, Lower Mainland Social Justice Coalition and Vancouver Status
of Women, encouraged citizens to vote “No.” Activist Chris Shaw, for example, argued
that instead of devoting money to the Olympics, governments should invest in areas like
forestry renewal, sustainable fisheries, health care, education and alterative energy
resources.34 The B.C. chapter of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives argued that
British Columbians should ask themselves how much public spending on hospitals,
schools, or other services they were willing to sacrifice in order to host the Games.35
Finally, the B.C. Green Party distributed a flyer that reversed the conventional
association between the Olympics and nationalism. The party argued that it was “patriotic

31

CIBC 20 For 10 Youth Bid Ambassadors Biographies, Series 2: Athlete and Sport, Subseries 1: Legacies
Now, File: General, VBCF, CVA.
32
Alcan Spirit of 2010 Tour Final Report, Prepared by Optimum PR, Nov. 1 2002, Series 6:
Communications and Media Relations, Subseries 1: Advertising and Awareness Campaign, File: ALCAN
Spirit of 2010 tour, VBCF, CVA.
33
VANOC, Bid Report, 22.
34
Games 2010 Coalition, Chris Shaw, Vancouver, Olympics, Fantasies and Facts , Series 7: Community
Relations, Subseries 4: Stakeholders Relations, File: No Games Coalition, VBCF, CVA.
35
Marvin Shaffer, Alan Greer and Celine Mauboules, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, B.C. Office,
“Olympic Costs and Benefits: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Proposed Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics
and Paralympic Games,” Feb. 2003, Series S11: Government Support and Services, Subseries 1: Economic
Studies, File: General, VBCF, CVA. 17.

174

and smart” to oppose the Games since public money “spent on Olympics is money not
spent on essential services like hospitals, schools and seniors’ care homes.”36
The VBC addressed opposition to the Olympics by emphasizing their economic benefits.
Whereas anti-Olympic activists argued that the Games would economically advantage a
select group of individuals and socially disadvantage many more, the bid corporation
argued that economic growth benefits all of society. The VBC promised that the Games
would “result in a significant investment of federal funds into the BC economy. This is
what the investment is all about: creating a healthier economy that will allow government
to support the programs its citizens choose. It is about creating a larger economic pie,
permanently.”37 Articulating conventional arguments about the merits of region branding,
the bid corporation asserted that, as hosts of the Olympic Games, “international attention
will be riveted on British Columbia in the years leading up to 2010 and beyond. Business
and travel media from around the world will focus on B.C. as never before.”38 Postcards
and posters featured working class people (like construction workers and hotel
employees) who would benefit economically from the Games. They all held signs saying:
“I’ll be voting YES on February 22nd.”39 One poster told readers that, by voting in favour
of the Olympic bid, citizens were saying “Yes” to “strengthening our economy so we can
support world-class social programs and public services.” They were also supporting
“social equity through economic and employment opportunities which will be actively
targeted to youth, women, Aboriginal and low-income groups.”40
This poster also advertised the value of Olympic-related sustainability and legacy
projects. It promised that the Games would provide a “better future for our children and
for generations to come” and that the facilities built or upgraded for the Games would

36

Ibid.
“Answering the NO side,” Series 7: Community Relations, Subseries 4: Stakeholders Relations, File: No
Games Coalition, VBCF, CVA.
38
Ibid.
39
“Let’s invite the World, 2010 vote YES, February 22,” Series 7: Community Relations, Subseries 1:
Cooperation and Liaison, File: Business and Professional Groups, VBCF, CVA.
40
“Yes! Vancouver 2010,” Series 7: Community Relations, Subseries 1: Cooperation and Liaison, File:
General, VBCF, CVA.
37

175

remain in Vancouver “as lasting legacies to families, students and competitive athletes.”41
Additionally, the Olympic host city would showcase “world-leading environmental
innovation through a Games that achieve zero net emissions, zero net waste, and
minimum energy use.”42 For bid supporters, the Shared Legacies Agreement between
local First Nations, the VBC, and the province was “an excellent example of the
Olympics helping to improve the economic and social sustainability of the affected First
Nations.”43 On February 22, 2003, 64% of Vancouver citizens voted in favour of the city
hosting the 2010 Olympics.44

The “Most Important Issue Facing the Province:” Aboriginal
Title in B.C.
The VBC’s partnership with the FHFN helped foster what some government officials
described as “economic certainty” to the region. Unlike other parts of Canada, few
treaties were signed between First Nations in B.C. and the Crown. In the early 1850s, the
Governor of Vancouver Island, James Douglas, signed 14 purchase treaties with
participating First Nations. However, when Joseph Trutch took over from Douglas as
governor in 1867, he refused to recognize Indigenous peoples’ right to land, arguing that
all of B.C. belonged to the Crown and no further treaties were negotiated. In 1973, the
Supreme Court of Canada, in Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, ruled
on a landmark case about Aboriginal title. This is a legal term that describes Indigenous
peoples’ inherent right to land in Canada. In this case, the Nisga’a Nation (located in the
Nass Valley of B.C.) asserted that they still had Aboriginal title because they never
signed a treaty with the Crown. The Justices agreed that the Nisga’a had Aboriginal title
prior to European settlement in the province, but were divided over the following
question: do the Nisga’a still possess this title?45 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau was
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surprised by the ruling, commenting that the Nisga’a may have more rights than the
government had previously thought.46 In 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on
another Aboriginal title case, this time concerning the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Nations
(in northern B.C.). In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the court clarified the definition
of Aboriginal title and the ways it could (and could not) be extinguished.47 The Justices
argued that Indigenous nations who possessed Aboriginal title have exclusive authority
over their ancestral land. They made it clear that, at the very least, Indigenous nations
which hold Aboriginal title must be consulted about any resource extraction practices on
their land.48
The Supreme Court rulings raised questions about the province’s authority over natural
resources in B.C. Many foreign companies who invested in these resources became
concerned that the government would not be able to protect their investments. Thus, the
uncertain status of Indigenous peoples’ Aboriginal title affected the region’s economy. In
1998, Premier Glen Clark argued that the uncertainty over Indigenous peoples’ land
rights was the most important issue facing the province because of its far-reaching
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economic implications.49 Additionally, anti-logging protests by environmentalists and
First Nations that took place in the 1990s, known as the “wars in the woods,” disrupted
on-going economic projects in the province and made companies wary of starting new
projects.50
Earlier, in 1990, the B.C. government began exploring treaty options with First Nations
by establishing a B.C. Claims Task Force and subsequently creating the B.C. Treaty
Commission in 1992.51 Andrew Woolford argues: “It was the economic consequences of
uncertainty, as much as anything else, that at least brought the provincial government to
the treaty table in the early 1990s.”52 Carole Blackburn uses the example of treaty
negotiations with the Nisga’a to make a similar point. She argues that the province
wanted to transform Indigenous peoples’ rights “from unknown Aboriginal rights to a set
of concrete treaty rights. Their knowability is essential for certainty; it is their
transformation to known rights that eliminates them as threats.”53 Blackburn interviewed
a member of the provincial treaty negotiation team who argued that “the wars in the
woods create economic uncertainty” in B.C. He noted that financial markets in Toronto,
New York and Asia responded negatively “to the uncertainties about Aboriginal title in
British Columbia.”54
The B.C. treaty process has been widely criticized for requiring First Nations to give up
their Aboriginal title. Activist Arthur Manuel argues that the provincial and federal
governments must abandon their existing policy of Aboriginal title extinguishment.
Taiaiake Alfred encourages First Nations to withdraw from treaty negotiations until
governments makes this change.55 However, extinguishing Aboriginal title is central to

Blackburn, “Searching for Guarantees in the Midst of Uncertainty,” 590.
Andrew Woolford, “Negotiating Affirmative Repair: Symbolic Violence in the British Columbia Treaty
Process,” Canadian Journal of Sociology, 29 no. 1, (2004): 113; Blackburn, “Searching for Guarantees in
the Midst of Uncertainty,” 588-89.
51
Penikett, Reconciliation, 89.
52
Woolford, “Negotiating Affirmative Repair,” 113.
53
Blackburn, “Searching for Guarantees in the Midst of Uncertainty,” 593.
54
Ibid., 589.
55
Arthur Manuel, “Land and Rights in Canada: Don’t let Harper play hockey with human rights,” The
Dominion, Special Issue 2009: Issue #64: Olympics, 18, PC, CVA; Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous
Pathways of Action and Freedom (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005), 25.
49
50

178

the government’s goal of restoring economic certainty to B.C. As Christina Godlewska
and Jeremy Weber write, Aboriginal title interferes with provincial resource policies and
“if Aboriginal title is removed, the benefit accrues to the province.”56 Tony Penikett
makes the same argument, only more succinctly: “For government, ‘certainty’ required
extinguishment [of Aboriginal title].”57
The 2010 Games were held on FHFN land and securing their support for the Olympic bid
was essential to its success. If these nations challenged the province’s authority to host
the Olympic Games, they could put the bid in jeopardy. The government had an
economic incentive to host the Games: impact reports estimated that they could add
between $2.9 billion and $4.2 billion to Canada’s Gross Domestic Product.58 If the B.C.
government tried to contain the threat that Aboriginal title posed to the economy by
establishing a treaty process, the VBC managed the risk the FHFN posed to its Olympic
bid by including these Nations in its bid process. The corporation promised the IOC that
it would do everything possible to minimize anti-Olympic protests and planned to
involve “all community-based groups and agencies representing special interests to
ensure that the benefits of an Olympic Games are inclusive of all citizens.”59 Partnering
with the FHFN was central to this community involvement plan.
The FHFN’s partnership with the VBC did not automatically guarantee its leaders
influence within the bid corporation. Chief Ernest Campbell of the Musqueam Nation
requested a seat on the organization’s board of directors, writing to Poole in February
2002: “it is respectfully suggested that the Bid Corporation is remiss for not having
solicited Musqueam’s participation [on the board of directors] earlier” and reminded
Poole that nearly two-thirds of the events planned for the 2010 Games were scheduled to
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take place on Musqueam “traditional territory.”60 In November 2002, the Squamish and
Lil’wat Nations signed an agreement with the province and VBC which included 300
acres of land for economic development, $2.3 million for skills training, $6.5 million for
legacy housing, and $3 million to the Aboriginal Youth Legacy Fund, an organization
that runs sport-related programs for Indigenous youth in B.C.61 The Musqueam and
Tsleil-Waututh Nations signed memoranda of understanding with the Bid Committee
much later, on July 1, 2003, the day before Vancouver won the Olympic bid.62 The
memoranda guaranteed the nations $500,000 (to be shared) from VANOC and $20
million (to each nation) in “legacy contributions” from the federal government.63
Taiaiake Alfred describes the partnership between First Nations and the VBC as a
“blatant pay-off” and “a sell-out designed to benefit elite politicians on both sides of the
colonial divide.”64 For Alfred, the partnership exemplifies the weakened state of
Indigenous peoples. He argues that instead of becoming involved in the Games,
Indigenous peoples should focus on regenerating their cultures.65 The anti-Olympic group
No2010.com66 also criticized the partnership, arguing that it gave the false impression
that the FHFN were “the only legitimate Indigenous voice” on land issues related to the
Games. They also pointed out that the financial gains the FHFN received did not directly
benefit the majority of Indigenous peoples in B.C.67 No2010.com noted that the FHFN’s
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population (5,000 to 6,000) was relatively small compared to the total Indigenous
population in Vancouver (60,000) and argued that the “extent of corporate invasion
associated with the Olympic industry” would negatively impact many Indigenous peoples
in the province.68

Setting “New Standards of Achievement:” Sustainability,
Legacy and Profits
Vancouver won its bid for the 2010 Winter Olympics on July 2, 2003.69 John Furlong
became VANOC’s CEO in February 2004 and the organization’s board of directors
included representatives from the federal, provincial and municipal governments
(Vancouver and Whistler), the Canadian Olympic and Paralympic Committees, local
First Nations, and the IOC.70 VANOC’s $1.9 billion operating budget and its $600
million program for venue construction (which was distinct from its operating budget)
were funded by a mix of public and private sources.71 The organization raised $756.8
million from its domestic corporate sponsorship program, which was separate from the
IOC’s international sponsorship program.72 The IOC described the latter as one of
VANOC’s “major success stories” and celebrated the fact that it exceeded expectations
(the VBC anticipated $253 million in profits).73 The program included three tiers: each
national partner contributed between $50 million and $200 million; each official
supporter contributed between $15 million and $49 million; and each official supplier
contributed between $3 million and $14 million.74 Sales of Olympic licensed
merchandise were also higher than expected. The $57 million in royalties was more than
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double the anticipated $22.6 million in profits.75 The program included 45 licensees and
1,600 retail stores, which stocked Olympic merchandise.76 VANOC and raised in excess
of $230 million through ticket sales. 77
The IOC also argued that VANOC “set a new standard for sustainability and legacy
planning.”78 The organizing committee listed its accomplishments, including offsetting
118,000 tonnes of carbon; implementing environmental management plans for Olympic
venues and facilities; and inspiring Canadian youth to live more active and sustainable
lifestyles.79 Moreover, it considered “the unprecedented Aboriginal participation in the
planning and hosting of the Games” a central sustainability and legacy achievement.80
VANOC praised Olympic sponsors’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices,
arguing that they enhanced the sustainability and legacy program.81 For example, CocaCola recycled all the bottles used during the Games and introduced the PlantBottle, which
was made partly from plant-based materials.82 It also donated $350,000 to construct an
outdoor sport course for inner-city youth in Vancouver.83 This initiative illustrates that
VANOC’s sustainability goals served corporate sponsors’ interests. In fact, the
organizing committee argued that earning money from the Games was a reasonable
sustainability and legacy goal: “A healthy and balanced economy can increase living
standards and manage the impact of human activities on nature and communities by
reducing waste and pollution and more efficiently using resources such as energy,
materials and labour.”84 Thus, the sustainability and legacy program of the Vancouver

75

Ibid., 44.
Ibid., 44.
77
VANOC, Staging the Olympic Winter Games, 43-44.
78
IOC, Marketing Report, 15.
79
VANOC, Sustainability Report, 9.
80
Ibid., 10.
81
VANOC, Staging the Olympic Winter Games, 52.
82
IOC, Marketing Report, 48.
83
Ibid., 48.
84
Ibid.,, 88.
76

182

Olympics was underpinned by the market fundamentalist drive to reduce all aspects of
social life to market principles.85
The Aboriginal Licensing and Merchandising Program, jointly developed by VANOC
and the FHFN, helped the organizing committee earn a profit from its sustainability
practices. The program sold “authentic Aboriginal products” and donated one third of the
royalties, amounting to $200,000, to the Aboriginal Youth Legacy Fund.86 Coca-Cola
also supported the Aboriginal Youth Legacy Fund by establishing an Aboriginal Art
Bottle Program. The company auctioned off Coke bottles designed by Indigenous artists
in Canada, donating all proceeds to the legacy fund.87 This practice is an example of what
Michael Silk and David Andrews describe as a “glocalized” marketing campaign.88 They
argue that, beginning in the mid-1990s, Coke began to affiliate its brand with local
cultures while still promoting itself as a global brand. For example, the company
sponsored the 1996 Cricket World Cup in India and designed ad campaigns linking red
Coke cans to red symbols of Indian culture, like red bindis and cricket balls.89
FHFN CEO Tewanee Joseph praised the Aboriginal Licensing and Merchandising
Program for sharing “the best Aboriginal artists from across Canada” with the world.90
However, Shain Jackson, who owned a company that sold artwork by Indigenous artists,
criticized VANOC for selling products that were not made in Canada or distributed by
Indigenous retailers. He circulated a petition calling on VANOC to stop describing the
commodities sold through the Aboriginal Licensing and Merchandising Program as
authentic.91 VANOC did not submit to Jackson’s request, arguing instead: “every piece of
Aboriginal Games merchandise was marked with a FHFN logo, signifying its
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authenticity. The fact is, when games enthusiasts purchased an official Vancouver 2010
licensed Aboriginal product, they invested in the future of Aboriginal peoples in
Canada.”92 This statement drew attention away from Jackson’s criticism and redirected it
to the social cause linked to the program.
VANOC Vice President of Sponsorship Sales and Marketing, Andrea Shaw, argued that
the Vancouver Games added value to the Olympic brand, noting: “what we did with the
[IOC’s] brand was raise the bar and make it even more valuable to the Olympic
Movement.”93 She does not say how VANOC accomplished this feat (the quote was
included in an Olympic-related education resource targeted to students). I argue that
VANOC enhanced the value of the Olympic brand by strengthening the pre-existing link
between this Olympic brand and positive social values. According to the IOC, “Olympic
partners enjoy a multitude of benefits, including the opportunity to align themselves with
the Olympic rings – one of the most widely recognized symbols in the world and one that
is associated with a set of ideals that resonate strongly across the globe.”94 The IOC
began conducting market research in 1985 in order to make the Olympic brand more
appealing to Olympic sponsors95 and the IOC’s marketing report for Vancouver 2010
highlighted the stakes involved in maintaining this positive brand identity. Readers were
told: the IOC relies on its marketing program to preserve “the independent financial
stability of the Olympic movement.”96 As IOC Marketing Commission Chairman
Gerhard Heiberg wrote: “Put simply, without the support of our official commercial
partners, the Games would not be able to happen.”97
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“Unprecedented and Amazingly Successful:” The New
Relationship in B.C.
In the mid-2000s, the B.C. government initiated the “New Relationship with Aboriginal
People and Communities in British Columbia” (New Relationship); VANOC’s
partnership with the FHFN became an important part of this endeavour. The New
Relationship committed the province to develop partnerships with Indigenous peoples
based on respect, reconciliation and recognition of their rights and title.98 The province
promised to consult with First Nations about relevant public policy and would ensure that
they shared in the profits earned from resource extraction practices on their land.99 As
part of the New Relationship, a $100 million New Relationship Trust Fund was
established.100 Government representatives maintain that the New Relationship is not a
replacement for treaty negotiations. Rather, they recognized that these negotiations take
time and that they needed “to find practical and timely ways to improve social and
economic conditions” for Indigenous peoples in the province.101
Two Supreme Court decisions from 2004, Haida Nation vs. British Columbia (Minister
of Forests) and Taku River Tlingit First Nations vs. British Columbia (Project
Assessment Director), influenced the government’s decision to establish the New
Relationship. These rulings obligated the government to consult with First Nations when
activities on Crown land might influence their rights and Aboriginal title.102 Caitlyn
Vernon argues that the 2010 Olympic Games also played a role in B.C. Premier Gordon
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Campbell’s decision to implement the New Relationship because “the upcoming 2010
Olympics were putting pressure on the provincial government to improve its image
regarding Aboriginal relations.”103 The B.C. Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and
Reconciliation described the FHFN’s involvement in the Games as a central achievement
of the New Relationship. Writing in 2009, it claimed that the FHFN would showcase
“British Columbia’s unique Aboriginal cultures and history to the world.”104 The follow
year, it noted that, as the first Indigenous hosts of the Olympic Games, the FHFN had
“achieved something historic, unprecedented and amazingly successful.”105 Furthermore,
the Ministry argued that the 2010 Olympic Aboriginal Pavilion, which showcased
Indigenous art, business, food and music, revealed “why Aboriginal culture – First
Nations, Inuit, and Métis – is an important part of B.C.’s past, present and future.”106
Like the B.C. treaty process, the establishment of the New Relationship helped return
economic certainty to the province. According to Penikett, the Business Council of B.C.
encouraged Premier Campbell to start the New Relationship by arguing that foreign
investment opportunities in the province would dry up if questions about land and
resource ownership remained uncertain.107 Verner interviewed government
representatives, business operators, and Indigenous peoples who all “agreed that a major
impetus to develop the New Relationship arose from the desire by the provincial
government, industry and some First Nations to secure access to lands and resources for
economic development.”108 David Rossiter and Patricia Wood argue that the provincial
government’s approach to the New Relationship “reveals a position firmly rooted in the
assumption that full and equal citizenship in the province is predicated on an economic
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relationship that puts at the top of the agenda private investment in resources and their
subsequent exploitation for individual gain.”109
Rossiter and Wood’s argument illustrates that Indigenous peoples could earn citizenship
rights by participating in the New Relationship. As Margaret Somers argues, these rights
have become privileges that individuals can receive by making material contributions to
the nation.110 The Indigenous peoples who were involved in the 2010 Games earned
citizenship right by strengthening the province’s tourism industry. As B.C. Attorney
General Geoff Plant said in 2004: “There are enormous openings emerging in Aboriginal
tourism as we prepare for the Olympics and we are working to support these.”111
Similarly, the provincial Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation argued that
the 2010 Winter Games increased support for the “Aboriginal cultural tourism
industry.”112 Rossiter and Wood argue that by emphasizing Indigenous peoples’
“participation in regimes of capitalist accumulation as the ultimate sign of equality,” the
B.C. government reduced “complex Aboriginal cultures to a single commodity that can
be peddled by knowledgeable salespeople (read: properly trained Natives) to eager
consumers (read: tourists).”113 This insight draws attention to the fact that the benchmark
by which the province measured the success of the New Relationship was underpinned
by market fundamentalist principles.
As part of the New Relationship, the provincial government committed to significantly
reducing the socio-economic gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. To
measure its progress, the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation compared
the social and economic welfare of Indigenous peoples in B.C. from 2005/2006 to
2010/2011. Its findings show that the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous

Rossiter and Wood, “Fantastical topographies,” 363.
Somers, Margaret. Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to have Rights .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008: 70-117.
111
Geoff Plant, B.C. government press release, 2004, qtd in Rossiter and Wood, “Fantastical topographies”,
364.
112
B.C., MARR, New Relationships with Aborigional People and Communities in British Columbia,
Annual report on progress 2009-2010 (Victoria: MARR, 2010): 30, italics added.
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/aboriginal-people/progress-reporting#newrelationship.
113
Rossiter and Wood, “Fantastical Topographies,” 363.
109
110

187

peoples’ quality of life in B.C. did not significantly decrease in this time period. The
report revealed that the number of long-term drinking water advisories on Indigenous
reserves rose from 19 in 2005 to 25 in 2011.114 The report revealed that “overall a Status
Indian individual is statistically 1.7 times more likely to die at any stage of their life than
other persons of the same age.”115 Perhaps most troubling, between 2001 and 2005, the
ratio of Indigenous vs. non-Indigenous youth suicides (expressed as the number of
suicides per 10, 000 people) was 3.8 to 0.8. Between 2006 and 2010, the ratio was 3.0 to
0.7.116 While the reduction in the number of youth suicides is positive, this number was
still alarmingly high. The report also revealed that the FHFN’s participation in the Games
did not have a significant impact on public perception of First Nations in the province. In
2010, 30% of British Columbians described themselves as very aware “of the diversity of
First Nations cultures” within the province, up only four percent from 2007 when the
same question was asked. The percentage of British Columbians who strongly agreed
with the statement “First Nations have made a wide range of valuable contributions to
B.C.” increased only marginally between 2007 and 2010, rising from 23% to 27%.117

Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated that the partnership between the VBC, VANOC, and the
FHFN helped Vancouver win its bid for the 2010 Olympic Games. Moreover, the VBC
used its relationship with the FHFN to showcase its commitment to sustainability and to
convince the public to support Vancouver’s Olympic bid. VANOC’s relationship with the
FHFN helped it continue, and build upon, the VBC’s dedication to sustainability, an
activity that enhanced the value of the Olympic brand and companies’ sponsorship of the
Games. The partnership also financially benefitted the FHFN and involved them in the
Olympic planning process. However, outside of this small number of First Nations, the
Olympic Games did not have a significantly positive impact on the broader Indigenous
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population of B.C. The Games largely promoted the interests of the provincial
government, which sought to restore economic certainty to the region, than they did to
advance the socio-economic and political interests of indigenous peoples throughout the
province.
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Chapter 7
Haunted History: National Identity, IndigenousSettler Relations, and the 2010 Vancouver Olympics
When the Vancouver 2010 Olympic torch relay passed through Fort Langley, B.C. on
February 8th 2010, the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) temporarily re-opened a local
trading post that had been closed for 124 years. Once filled with provisions for gold
miners, the post was now stocked with Olympic merchandise including red mittens
etched with white maple leaves and plush toys of the Olympic and Paralympic Games’
mascots, Miga, Quatchi, and Sumi.1 Animal pelts remained in the store but, as Justine
Hunter observed, “young customers were more interested in the small Quatchi-on-a-keychain.”2 Hunter wrote that the store’s 19th century customers had given “rise to the
colony of British Columbia – and eventually allowed Canada to stretch from sea to
shining sea.”3 Bruce Mavis, the town’s torchbearer, was the great-grandson of a
successful prospector, Alexander Mavis, who had passed through the Fort Langley
trading post in 1858. Mavis later returned to the area and purchased the trading post from
the HBC.4 In her article, Hunter did not mention that Indigenous peoples lived in Western
Canada before Settlers like Mavis came to the area in search of gold. However, the
animal pelts in the trading post were evidence of the commercial exchanges that HBC
traders had made with Indigenous fur trappers. Because the pelts attracted little attention,
it was easy to miss or ignore these symbols of Canada’s colonial past.
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Figure 27: Image from: Justine Hunter, “They Came for a pelt and left with a Quatchi,” the Globe
and Mail, Feb. 9, 2010, A3. The original caption reads: “While pelts of fox and other animal furs
were on display in the temporary HBC post, visitors were more interested in the mitts, Quatchi and
hats.”

The example of the torch relay’s stop in Fort Langley highlights a key question I address
in this chapter: how were national history and identity represented in the Vancouver
Olympics? I begin this chapter by identifying prominent ideas about Canadian society
promoted through the Games. These include the notion that Canada is a progressive,
culturally diverse country and that Indigenous-Settler relations have improved
dramatically in recent years. Like Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s 2008 apology to
survivors of Indian Residential Schools, these narratives made it appear as though the
oppression of Indigenous peoples occurred in the past and elided the colonialist policies
and practices that caused this oppression.5 In contrast, anti-Olympic protestors drew
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attention to such information. Olympic commodities, I argue, were fetish objects haunted
by the history and legacy of colonialism in Canada. This chapter contributes to existing
scholarship on reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples and the
Olympic Games. Although research has been done on the Sydney 2000 Olympics and
reconciliation, no comparable work has been done on the Vancouver Olympics.6

The Inukshuk is a “Symbol of Canada:” Representations of
National Identity
In April 2005, the Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic and
Paralympic Games (VANOC) announced the results of a competition it ran to select the
official emblem of the Vancouver Games. Out of 1,600 entries, organizers chose a
contemporary interpretation of an inukshuk (a stone sculpture that Inuit people use as a
directional marker)7 submitted by Vancouver designer Elena Rivera MacGregor. The
design showed five coloured stones stacked on top of each other that, combined, looked
like a person extending his arms.8 The emblem’s colour scheme (green, blue, red, and
yellow) symbolized various elements of the Canadian landscape (forests, oceans, sunsets,
and wheat fields). The emblem was called Ilanaaq, the Inuktitut word for “friend,” and
this emphasis on friendship was a key feature of the ideas about national identity that the
emblem sought to convey.9 It represented the fact that Canadian society was welcoming,
hospitable, and recognized the value of Indigenous peoples’ cultures. Ilanaaq was
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Norman Hallendy told the Globe and Mail that describing the emblem as an inukshuk (plural: inuksuit)
was misleading. An inukshuk is a collection of stones assembled by the Inuit that operate as navigational
beacons and come in many different shapes. Similar stone figures that look like humans are called
innunguaq. However, Olympic organizers said that the emblem is one person’s “contemporary
interpretation of an Inuit tradition”: Jane Armstrong, “The friend nobody likes,” Globe and Mail, April 27,
2005, A1.
8
Peter Kennedy, and Grant Kerr, “Inukshuk to be logo of Vancouver Games,” Globe and Mail, April 25,
2005, A8; The statue in Stanley Park was created by Alying Kanak of Rnaklin Inlet on behalf of the
government of the Northwest Territories and was featured in the 1986 World Exposition which was held in
Vancouver.
9
IOC, Marketing Report, 128; an inukshuk statue located near Vancouver’s Stanley Park inspired
MacGregor’s winning design.
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frequently described as a national symbol. For example, an article published in the Globe
and Mail argued: “as with the maple leaf, although the maple tree is only native to certain
regions of Canada and cannot grow in others, the inuksuit may belong first and foremost
to the Inuit but they have become a symbol of Canada.”10As such, the emblem functioned
as synecdoche, a part of something (i.e. a cultural symbol within Canada) that stands in
for the entire thing (i.e. all of Canada).

Figure 28: Vancouver Olympics emblem, VANOC, Vancouver 2010: Staging the Olympic, Winter
Games Knowledge Report, September 2010, 1.

The choice of a national emblem for the Games, rather than a regional one, contrasts with
the emblems of the 1976 Montreal and 1988 Calgary Olympics. As I argue in earlier
chapters, the Montreal Games’ emblem symbolized French-Canadian culture while the
Calgary Games’ emblem represented the co-existence of regional (Western Canadian)
and national identities. The Vancouver Games’ emblem reflected organizers’ efforts to
ensure that the Games belonged to all Canadians.11 The motto of the Vancouver
Olympics, “with glowing hearts,” was taken from a line in the national anthem and
reinforced this idea.12 Some Indigenous leaders in B.C., including Grand Chief Edward
John of the First Nations Summit and Chief Stewart Phillip, President of the Union of
B.C. Indian Chiefs, criticized VANOC for not selecting an emblem that reflected

N.a., “Olympic Medals: the Aboriginal aesthetic,” Globe and Mail, Oct. 19, 2009, A16.
VANOC, Staging the Olympic Winter Games, 8.
12
The French theme “Des plus brillants expoits” a line from the French version of the national anthem, was
the French theme: VANOC, Vancouver 2010: Staging the Olympic Winter Games, 12.
10
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Indigenous cultures from the West Coast.13 Others, like Chief Gibby Jacob of the
Squamish First Nation (who was a member of VANOC’s board of directors) defended
the emblem design by pointing out that it represented national rather than regional
identity.14
The emblem appeared on Olympic commodities like stamps and Vancouver 2010
glassware.15 Shoppers could literally consume Ilanaaq by buying shortbread cookies in
the shape of an inukshuk (dubbed “inukie cookies.”)16 Canada Post sold envelope seals
that reflected “defining aspects” of the host province, including totems and an inukshuk
that, according to the company, “speak to the region’s rich Aboriginal history and
culture.”17 This description is bizarre considering that the inukshuk reflects the culture of
an Indigenous group (the Inuit) that does not live in B.C. Some 350 million Olympicthemed coins distributed by the Royal Canadian Mint also contained the inukshuk
emblem.18 The Mint’s Olympic Pavilion included an enormous Olympic loonie on the
floor, upon which children could lay while their parents took pictures of them.19
MacGregor’s design of Ilanaaq personified the inukshuk by giving it arms, legs, and a
smile. By lying on top of the loonie and covering Ilanaaq with their own bodies, children
personified the emblem to an even greater degree.

Jim Morris, “B.C. natives criticize Olympic logo choice”, Globe and Mail, April 26, 2005, A9
Gibby Jacob, qtd in Morris, “B.C. natives criticize Olympic logo choice”.
15
IOC, Marketing Report, 115; “Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games,” CanadaPost, Jan. 12, 2010.
https://www.canadapost.ca/cpo/mc/personal/collecting/stamps/2010/2010_Olympic_Winter_Games.jsf.
16
“Inukie cookie a hot seller,” Canada.com, June 9, 2008.
http://www.canada.com/story.html?id=5bcec139-f120-49ad-b116-cd06ebc1161b.
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“Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games,” CanadaPost, Jan. 12, 2010.
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Feb. 28, 2010, S2.
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Figure 29: Vancouver Olympics loonie, Royal Canadian Mint website, www.mint.ca.

The design of the Games’ mascots was heavily influenced by Indigenous themes. The
Olympic mascots were Miga, a sea bear (part killer whale, part Kermode bear) and
Quatchi, a sasquatch. The Paralympic mascot was Sumi (an animal spirit). A marmot
named Mukmuk, which VANOC described as a “mascot sidekick,” often appeared with
the other mascots.20 The company Meomi designed the mascots based on “local
Aboriginal mythological creatures.”21 For example, Miga’s identity as a sea bear was
“inspired by the legends of the Pacific Northwest First Nations, tales of orca whales that
transform into bears that arrive on land.” 22 The Indigenous themes reflected in the
mascots helped make them representative of B.C. and Canada. According to VANOC
CEO John Furlong, the mascots “had to appeal to children from all over the world, they
needed to represent the people, geography, and spirit of British Columbia and Canada,
and they had to personify the values and essence of the 2010 Winter Games.”23
VANOC sold more than 200,000 mascot-related commodities in 2007, the year they were
unveiled. These objects included plush toys, tote bags, hats, key chains, and jewelry.24 A
picture book about the mascots, Miga, Quatchi and/et Sumi: The Story of the Vancouver
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2010 Mascots/L’Histoire des Mascottes de Vancouver, became a national bestseller.25
Lapel pins and coins recreated scenes from the picture book.26 Glen Street, president of
the manufacturing company Street Characters Inc., observed that VANOC “has done a
great job of making the character desirable. Every kid at school has a Quatchi backpack,
keychain, something.”27 The Canadian Olympic School Programme designed educational
resources “to inspire youth to become ‘Smarter, Better, Stronger,’” encouraging them to
explore Olympic values while pursuing healthy, active lifestyles.28 Sponsored in part by
RBC, the curriculum included an activity involving the Vancouver Olympic mascots; the
case study, “Brand Development and the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games,”29
asked students to write a persuasive paragraph arguing for or against the following
statement: “The mascots for the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games were a playful
representation of Canada and its Aboriginal peoples’ mythology.”30
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Figure 30: Miga, Quatchi, and Sumi commodities available for sale on eBay, www.ebay.com.

Figure 31: A bin full of Quatchis, IOC Marketing Report Vancouver 2010, 118.

VANOC’s emphasis on Indigenous cultures was similarly evident in the Olympic torch
relay and opening ceremony. The relay, which passed within an hour of 90% of the
Canadian population, included approximately 600 Indigenous torchbearers and visited
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118 Indigenous communities.31 In September 2009, RBC, a corporate sponsor of the
torch relay, hired Phil Fontaine, former National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations,
to maximize “the involvement of the aboriginal community in the 2010 Olympic Torch
Relay.”32 VANOC decided that the domestic audience for the opening ceremony was its
most important audience, reasoning that if the ceremony engaged Canadians from across
the country, they would be more likely to support the Games.33 Some 23 million
Canadians (almost 80% of the country’s population) watched the opening ceremony,34
which featured an official welcome delivered by representatives from the Four Host First
Nations (FHFN). The announcer introduced the FHFN by recognizing that the Games
were being held on their “traditional territories.”35 After their welcome, FHFN
representatives were joined on stage by more than 300 Indigenous performers who, as
VANOC noted, “wore their own traditional clothing or regalia.”36
The Vancouver Olympics did not mark the first time that Indigenous peoples had played
a central role in an international sporting event in Canada. Organizers of the 1994
Victoria Commonwealth Games pioneered many of the strategies that VANOC later used
to maximize Indigenous peoples’ participation in the Olympics. The Victoria
Commonwealth Games Society (VCGS) established a Native Participation Committee to
involve Indigenous peoples in the Games’ planning process.37 Just as VANOC
recognized that the 2010 Games were being held on the FHFN’s “traditional territories,”
the VCGS acknowledged that the “Greater Victoria area is the traditional territory of
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several bands of the Coast Salish Nation, one of the three First Nations on Vancouver
Island.”38 While the FHFN welcomed athletes and visitors to the 2010 Games, a Coast
Salish welcome ceremony linked to the Victoria Games occurred on August 8, 1994.
The participation of Indigenous peoples in the Victoria Commonwealth and Vancouver
Olympic Games conveyed the message that relations between Indigenous and nonIndigenous peoples were improving. The VCGS noted that the Coast Salish welcoming
ceremony would “wipe away the tears of the past so that a new relationship and
celebration can begin.”39 Similarly, the connotations of friendship and hospitality
reflected in the Olympic emblem, along with its connection to Inuit culture, gave the
impression that relations between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians were based
on mutual respect. This message is significant in light of the fact that Prime Minister
Stephen Harper delivered a formal apology in 2008 to former students of Indian
Residential Schools, their families, and communities. Matthew Dorrell points out that
Harper’s apology began by depicting residential schools as “a sad chapter in our history”
and concluded by expressing the desire to improve relations between Indigenous peoples
and Settler Canadians.40 A narrative of progress similar to the one in Harper’s apology
was promoted in the Olympic Games’ opening ceremony during the “landscape of a
dream” sequence. This sequence began by dramatizing the first meeting of Indigenous
peoples and European Settlers. The two groups, distinguished from one another by their
clothing, waved at each other and then came together tentatively to shake hands. A Spirit
Bear emerged from the ground and opened its arms.41 Suddenly, the floor broke apart and
people became separated from one another by cracks in the ground. Everyone on stage
looked surprised and worried when they realized that they were standing on glaciers
floating in the ocean. As the gap between the glaciers widened, the stadium went dark.
This moment, I argue, symbolized a dark period in the past when the harmonious

Program Notes for the Opening Ceremony. Series: Communications Department – Communication
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relationship between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians had broken down.

The darkness in the stadium was suggestive of a difficult period in Indigenous-Settler
relations. When the light returned, the audience was taken on a journey across the country
through oceans, forests, wheat fields, and snowy mountains (notably, these same parts of
Canada were represented through the Games’ emblem). Music, dance, spoken word, and
acrobatic performances accompanied colourful visual displays of the landscape.42 The
poem, “We are More,” recited by Shane Koyczan at the end of this visual journal
described Canada as a friendly, welcoming, and diverse country: “we are more than
genteel or civilized. We are an idea in the process of being realized. We are young. We
are cultures strung together then woven into a tapestry and the design is what makes us
more than our history. We are a design going right for a change.”43
Nathan Kalman-Lamb argues that this segment in the opening ceremony celebrated white
cultures in Canada and gave the impression that Indigenous peoples were “part of a past
that no longer exists.”44 By contrast, I argue that the welcome given by FHFN leaders
during the opening ceremony made it appear as though indigenous peoples were thriving
in Canada. The narratives promoted in the ceremony consigned the mistrust and discord
that exists between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians (rather than Indigenous
peoples themselves) to a bygone past. Eva Mackey argues that the Prime Minister’s
apology relegated “over two hundred years of colonial violence” to the past so that
Canadians could “move forward into a unified future.”45 The Vancouver opening
ceremony gave the impression that this “unified future” had arrived.
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“This is Not the Start of a New Relationship:” Haunting
Truths
Commodities of the Olympic emblem and mascot were haunted by information that
contradicted the celebratory ideas about national identity promoted by Olympic
organizers. As such, they were fetish objects that held together competing information
about the nation.46 Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida argue that ghostly hauntings are
absences that can be perceived and felt.47 Gordon asserts: “the ghostly haunt gives notice
that something is missing.”48 Olympic commodities were haunted by the fact that Prime
Minister Harper’s 2008 apology did not mark the beginning of an entirely successful
reconciliation process between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians. This fact was
evident in an article by Stella August and Philipa Ryan published in 2009. The authors
are part of the Downtown Eastside Power of Women Group, whose members include
“women from all walks of life who are working poor, homeless or on social assistance”
and describe themselves as living “in extreme poverty.”49 August is a residential school
survivor who, in her words, is “living proof of the residential school era.”50 She wrote:
Like many others, I am not satisfied with last year’s formal
apology from the federal government. The apology was
supposed to start a new relationship with Indigenous peoples,
one based on respect. But the 2010 Olympic Games represents
just one of the many examples of the continuation of the same
kind of colonial relationship; we are not consulted, are forcibly

This conceptualization of fetish is based on Anne McClintock’s definition of the term: Anne McClintock,
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displaced, and endure increasing poverty for their benefit. This
is not the start of a new relationship.51
The final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRC) illustrates
that August is not alone in her criticism. The report found that “Aboriginal leaders
identified a post-apology gap between the aspirational language of Canada’s apology and
Aboriginal peoples’ continuing realities.”52 The report concluded that the “The promise
of reconciliation, which seemed so imminent back in 2008 when the Prime Minister, on
behalf of all Canadians, apologized to Survivors, has faded.”53 The TRC report defined
reconciliation as “an ongoing process of establishing and maintaining respectful
relationships” between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians.54
Olympic commodities were intended to reflect the notion that Canada is a friendly and
welcoming place, but many Indigenous peoples in Canada faced, and continue to face, a
radically different reality. For example, the anti-Olympic group No2010.com55 argued
that VANOC’s celebration of Indigenous peoples’ cultures drew attention away from the
high incidences of unemployment, poverty, homelessness, suicide, violent death, drug
and alcohol addiction, imprisonment, HIV, and tuberculosis in Indigenous populations in
Canada.56 Soon after the Games, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the rights
of Indigenous peoples, James Anaya, released a report on the status of Indigenous
peoples’ rights in Canada. Anaya makes explicit the disjuncture between the Canada
depicted by Games’ organizers and the Canada experienced by many Indigenous peoples:
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“It is difficult to reconcile Canada’s well-developed legal framework and general
prosperity with the human rights problems faced by indigenous peoples in Canada, which
have reached crisis proportions in many respects.”57 International Olympic Committee
(IOC) member René Fasel said the emblem of the Vancouver Games reflected Canadian
values,58 but his comment raises the question: what values make it possible for Settler
Canadians to remain unaware or unmoved by the disturbing facts that Anaya and
No2010.com identified?
Rivera MacGregor has said that her Olympic emblem design was inspired by Canadian
hospitality: “As Canadians, we are proud of being friendly people; you know,
we’re...non-threatening and we smile.”59 However, this declaration was contradicted by
numerous incidents of violent confrontations in Canadian history. One such example is
the 1990 clash between provincial and federal troops and Mohawk protestors in Oka,
Quebec. The conflict began over the town’s plan to expand a golf course, which
impinged on “The Pines,” a forested area that Kanehsatake Mohawk consider sacred and
have used as a burial place. In March 1990, protestors barricaded the entrance to “The
Pines” to prevent construction of the golf course expansion. On July 11th, approximately
100 members of the Quebec police force confronted the protestors. Shots were fired and
Corporal Marcel Lemay was killed.60 The provincial police subsequently withdrew,
leaving behind several vehicles which protesters used to barricade all entrances to the
disputed land.61
As an act of solidarity with the Kanehsatake, Mohawk from the nearby Kahnawake
reserve, located near Chateauguay, Quebec, blocked three major highways in the area and
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seized the Mercier Bridge, which connects Montreal suburbs to the city’s downtown
core.62 Non-Indigenous residents of Chateauguay gathered nightly to oppose the
blockade, sometimes shouting racist remarks and burning effigies of Mohawk people.63
On August 8th, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney invoked Canada’s National Defense Act
and sent more than 4,000 federal troops to the blockades. Shortly thereafter, the Oka
municipal council agreed to sell the disputed land to the federal government, thus ending
the proposed golf course expansion. On August 29th, the Mohawk began dismantling
their barricades.64
When the Vancouver Olympic torch relay passed through Kahnawake, the legacy of the
Mohawk-Oka crisis was difficult to miss. Although they allowed the torch to enter their
community, the Kahnawake did not let the RCMP, provincial police officers or VANOC
vehicles on their land. Instead, Mohawk Peacekeepers accompanied the torch. Grand
Chief Michael Delisle Jr. told journalist Sean Gordon that no one in the community
would identify as Canadian.65 Gordon wrote that this leg of the relay illustrated a “mostly
unspoken dichotomy: the Olympic ideal is held up as a symbol of hope and achievement
to young people in Aboriginal communities, but in Kahnawake, that inspiration has little
to no connection with the national celebration the 2010 Games organizers envision.”66
The headline of Gordon’s article read: “In a town haunted by Oka, nobody is
‘Canadian’”67 and it drew attention to the fact that the torch relay’s passage through
Kahnawake brought the past to life.
Olympic commodities were haunted by the history of the Mohawk-Oka crisis and, more
broadly, colonialism in Canada. Paulette Regan argues convincingly that Canada’s
colonial past lives in the present. She writes:
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For Indigenous people, the past is a painful chronicle of broken
treaties, stolen lands, Indian residential schools, and the Indian
Act...this problematic history is not in the past: it sits with us in many
places – government offices, boardrooms, negotiating tables,
churches, hospitals, classrooms, and community halls. Whether or not
we acknowledge its presence, we know intuitively that this history is
still alive.68
This past also animated Olympic goods, making them ghost(ed) objects that merged, in
Gordon’s words, “the visible and the invisible, the dead and the living, the past and the
present.”69 As discussed in Chapter Three, the term ghost(ed) object is borrowed from
Sharon Rosenberg, Amber Dean, and Kara Granzow. They describe a picture of an
Indigenous settlement in Alberta as a ghost(ed) image that represented a “haunting
presence repeatedly disavowed” by a narrative about the province’s history; this narrative
separated “colonial history from the present.”70 By representing the idea that Canadian
society is friendly and values Indigenous peoples’ cultures, the Games’ emblem and
mascots disavowed the fact that the devastating effects of colonialism still affects
Indigenous peoples. Taiaiake Alfred argues, for example, that the “complex relationship
between the effects of social suffering, unresolved psychophysical harms of historical
trauma and cultural location” caused by colonialism in Canada has limited indigenous
peoples’ ability to be “self-sufficient, healthy and autonomous.”71
Like Olympic goods, the Victoria Commonwealth Games mascot (a smiling orca whale)
and commodities of the mascot were haunted by the past. The VCGS asked the public to
recommend names for the orca, ultimately selecting “Klee Wyck.” Four people suggested
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this name, with one person arguing: “What better name for our Commonwealth mascot,
the noble Orca, than KLEE WYCK. An Indian name meaning ‘the Laughing One,’ it was
the one given to Emily Carr, our very own famous Victoria artist.”72 As the above
quotation illustrates, the mascot’s name was intended to represent the harmonious
relationship that Emily Carr shared with Indigenous peoples. Official VCGS documents
translated the mascot’s name, Klee Wyck, as “the laughing one.” However, according to
the Victoria Commonwealth Games’ Mascot Steering Committee, this was a
mistranslation. A committee report from 1991 observed:
Klee Wyck does not, in fact, quite translate from Chinook into English as
‘The Laughing One.’ This, apparently, was Emily Carr’s interpretation of
what her Indian friends were calling her, communicated to her by them
through sign language. The actual translation is closer to ‘the smiling
one,’ and its correct anglicised written translation is one word, not two.73
The report reveals that the Victoria Games’ mascot represented a Settler’s literal
misunderstanding of Indigenous peoples. More broadly, “Klee Wyck” symbolized
instances of impaired communication between Indigenous and non-Indigenous groups,
where Settlers have been unable or unwilling to understand Indigenous peoples’
perspectives.
Confronting the ghosts that haunt Olympic and Commonwealth Games commodities can
alter their meaning and transform them into uncanny objects. According to Sigmund
Freud, the uncanny emerges when previously unknown information comes to light,
making something that used to be familiar seem unfamiliar.74 Margot Francis notes that
“an experience of the uncanny can emerge when the place one considers home is
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somehow rendered unfamiliar.”75 Trying to reconcile the official narratives about the
nation represented by Olympic and Commonwealth commodities with the truths that
haunt these commodities can be an uncanny experience. These items could become
representations of an unfamiliar version of “home” (the nation) that is no longer fully
recognizable to Settler Canadians.
The TRC report identifies the importance of recognizing unsettling truths about the
nation, and it is worth quoting at length:
non-Aboriginal children and youth need to comprehend how their own
identities and family histories have been shaped by a version of Canadian
history that has marginalized Aboriginal peoples’ history and experience.
They need to know how notions of European superiority and Aboriginal
inferiority have tainted mainstream society’s ideas about, and attitudes
towards, Aboriginal peoples in ways that have been profoundly
disrespectful and damaging. They too need to understand Canada’s history
as a Settler society and how assimilation policies have affected Aboriginal
peoples. This knowledge and understanding will lay the groundwork for
establishing mutually respectful relationships.76
Put another way, reconciliation is an ongoing process that requires Settler Canadians to
acknowledge uncanny and unfamiliar versions of the nation and use this newfound
recognition to create social change.77
Coming to terms with the truths that haunt Olympic and Commonwealth commodities
can produce unpleasant emotions, like discomfort and confusion, which contrast with the
comforting and pleasing ideas about national identity that the objects ostensibly
represented. However, as the TRC argues, “No Canadian can take pride in this country’s
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treatment of Aboriginal peoples.”78 Moreover, Keavy Martin points out that the goal of
reconciliation is not to free settler Canadians from the responsibility of remembering
Canadian history or to alleviate their guilt about the past.79 Rather, reconciliation can
make Settlers feel uncomfortable and unsettled because it requires them to, in Regan’s
words, “confront the history of colonization, violence, racism and injustice that remains
part of the IRS [Indian residential school] legacy today.”80

“This Magic Mitten Moment:” The Hudson’s Bay Company
and Brand Canada
Canadian torch bearers and athletes who marched in the Parade of Nations during the
Vancouver opening ceremony wore uniforms designed by the HBC. Subsequently, the
red and white mittens they wore became popular consumer items. These mittens
symbolized ideas about national identity and history that the HBC promoted in its
marketing campaign. When the company unveiled its Olympic apparel line in 2009,
Nathalie Lambert, Canada’s Chef de Mission for the Games, said: “Finally, we are given
an identity, a look and feel to the Canadian team. I think it will inspire millions of
Canadians.”81 Canadian Olympic Committee CEO Chris Rudge summed up the look
succinctly: “This line of apparel screams ‘Canada.’”82 The HBC intentionally designed
its Olympic merchandise to reflect national identity.83 Company executive Mark Kinnin
said: “There’s a great story around Canada and the history of Canada and the team and
how we’re getting ready for the Vancouver Games...Can we commercialize that?
Absolutely, because sports is a business.”84 Fashion journalist Amy Verner endorsed this
practice by noting that the “Games offer a global marketing op – and a chance to parlay
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the True North into lasting cool.” 85 She added that companies can “package and promote
brand Canada globally.”86 The HBC’s promotion of “brand Canada” was a central part of
the company’s re-branding strategy. In order to attract more business, HBC began
“mining the retailer’s heritage advantage by bolstering its Signature Shop with about 120
new items (canoes, trapper hats, maple sugar cubes) alongside its signature striped ‘point’
blankets and throws.”87 The company emphasized its long history (it was founded in
1670) by using its full name, original crest, and trademark “point blanket” pattern in
promotional material.88
In keeping with the HBC’s branding strategy, company President Jeffrey Sherman said
that the Vancouver 2010 Olympic clothing line displayed “a sense of history of what it
means to be Canadian.”89 This sense of history was, however, incomplete. An HBC TV
ad that aired during the Games problematically promoted the myth that Canada was
uninhabited before European explorers arrived. The ad, “We Were Made for This,”
showed Europeans arriving by boat to Canada for the first time and discovering empty
land. The narrator glorified their ability to survive the harsh conditions, noting: “We
arrived 340 years ago to a land of rock, ice, and snow. We outfitted a nation of pioneers,
explorers, and dreamers. We are the skiers, we are the sledders. We didn’t just survive
the elements. Together, we thrived in them.”90 The HBC ad obscured the fact that
Indigenous peoples inhabited land in Canada long before the arrival of Europeans. It also
failed to note that the labour of Indigenous peoples was essential to the company’s early
success. Yet actors in the ad wore clothing made from iconic HBC “point blanket” design
and this detail drew attention to the relationship fur traders established with Indigenous
peoples. Specifically, HBC employees exchanged blankets made from this striped
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material for the furs that Indigenous peoples trapped.91 Thus, like the Fort Langley
trading post mentioned earlier in this chapter, the role of indigenous people in the fur
trade was obscured but not completely invisible in the HBC ad.
Some people criticized the company for including a knock-off Cowichan sweater in its
2010 Olympic clothing line. These critics drew attention to the labour involved in
producing HBC commodities that typically remains hidden.92 Coast Salish knitters are
known for making sweaters with a distinctive design and the HBC considered asking
them to produce these items for its Olympic line. However, the company ultimately
decided that the knitters would not be able to make enough sweaters in time for the
Games. Instead, it sold a product that “nods towards this icon of Canadian fashion.”93
FHFN CEO Tewanee Joseph raised the issue with VANOC and Cowichan knitters were
eventually permitted to sell their sweaters in the First Nations Pavilion and the Olympic
Superstore in Vancouver.94
Donica Belisle’s analysis of the HBC historical publication The Beaver shows that the
company viewed itself as a major player in Canada’s early development as a nation.
“Proud of its heritage,” she writes, “the HBC did not let customers forget it had helped
create modern Western Canada.”95 For example, a 1921 article informed readers that
HBC employees had “fed, clothed and supported the natives, and held the future Western
Canada in trust for the British Empire.”96Another article published the same year noted
that as more white people arrived in Canada in the early 1900s, the HBC’s “Indian”
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customers “gradually died out.”97 Although Indigenous peoples shopped at HBC stores in
the 1920s, ads from this time period, like the article, made it appear as though only white
Settlers frequented the store.98 By 2010, such accounts would have likely been seen as
racially offensive. However, the use of the pronoun “we” in HBC’s 2010 Olympic ad
(“We arrived 340 years ago to a land of rock, ice, and snow” and “We are the skiers, we
are the sledders”) suggests a continuation of such views by exclusively targeting Settler
Canadians. 99
Verner wrote that she did not normally express her national pride through clothing:
“When it comes to fashion, I have never been a flag waver – no maple leaf patches on my
backpacks, no Canada scrawled across my sweatshirt.”100 However, she was taken with
the HBC mittens, and described herself as “captivated by this magic mitten moment.”101
Verner praised the mittens for keeping “hands feeling cozy”102 and when Canadians
embraced the mittens as positive symbols of the nation, they adopted a “cozy” view of
Canada that was untroubled by the “seething absence” of Indigenous peoples.103 The
HBC sold 3.5 million pairs of the mittens and a post on the Canadian Olympic
Committee website noted that athletes, celebrities, politicians, and fans wore the red
mittens to demonstrate “their support for the Canadian Olympians. They were, and still
are, a symbol of Canadian pride.”104
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Figure 32: Hudson’s Bay Company mittens in the Vancouver Olympics, IOC, Marketing Report
Vancouver 2010, 107, 160.

This quotation illustrates that, like the Olympic emblem, the mittens operated as
synecdoche for the nation. In fact, they looked like mini versions of the Canadian flag
and their popularity contrasts with Globe and Mail journalist Lawrence Martin’s
complaint that few Canadians at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games waved the national
flag.105 The mittens were fetish objects that obscured Canada’s colonial history. On the
one hand, they represented ideas about the nation present in the “We Were Made for
This” ad: that national identity is rooted in Europeans’ “discovery” of Canada and their
ability to survive in harsh environmental conditions. On the other hand, they were
haunted the reality that Settlers appropriated Indigenous peoples’ land and pursued a
policy of assimilation that had a devastating, inter-generational impact on Indigenous
peoples’ lives.
By purchasing the HBC mittens, Canadians made material contributions to the nation. As
such, they participated in an activity that helped them earn the privilege of citizenship.
This argument relies on Margaret Somers’ contention that individuals’ relationship with
the nation has become transformed into a “contractual quid pro quo market exchange.”
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106

She maintains that citizens earn rights by contributing to the nation in economically

profitable ways.107 The people who bought the mittens supported a charity because net
proceeds from sales went to Own the Podium, a national funding program for Canadian
Olympians.108 Additionally, by wearing the mittens, consumers enhanced the positive
affiliation between the HBC and Olympic brands and the Vancouver Games. The
Canadian Olympic Committee website encouraged people to “keep warm and show your
support for Canadian athletes in their quest for gold at the 2010 Winter Games by
wearing a pair of Vancouver 2010 Red Mittens.”109 It noted too that these items had
become “the most visible illustration of Canada’s excitement for 2010.”110 Canadians
wearing these garments, Furlong said, “literally wore their hearts on their hands.”111
They also wore a corporate and Olympic brand on their bodies.
Anti-Olympic activists made Canada’s colonial history, and HBC’s involvement in this
history, difficult to ignore. The Olympic Resistance Network (ORN) popularized the antiOlympic slogan “No Olympics on Stolen Native Land,” which drew attention to the
history of colonization in the province and, according to No2010.com, “reveals the fact
that government and corporations are involved in theft (of land & resources), and
therefore lack moral and legal authority to govern or conduct business.”112 The ORN also
published a flyer that quoted Prime Minister Harper’s surprising public statement in 2009
that “Canada has no history of colonialism.”113 The organization told readers that the
“Olympics are occurring on unceded & unsurrendered Indigenous lands” and asked
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rhetorically: “Really, no colonial history?”114 Editors of grassroots publication The
Dominion noted that the HBC “was active in the British colonization of Canada, building
forts and claiming land on behalf of Great Britain.”115 Balaclava!, a newspaper dedicated
to “2010 anti-Olympic convergence,” published a photograph of protestors smashing the
glass of an HBC storefront on February 14, 2010. The blurb under the photo read: the
HBC “represents the colonization of British Columbia directly through it’s [sic] own
involvement in the colonization and genocide” of Indigenous populations.”116
Finally, the ORN distributed pamphlets showing the red and white HBC mittens dripping
with blood under the caption “Blood On Your Hands.” The pamphlet stated that the HBC
had “acted as the colonial government” in Canada.117 The Canadian Olympic Committee
noted that “the Red Mittens became the iconic item for Canadians as the Games were
celebrated on home soil.”118 The ORN drew attention to the fact that the “soil” (land)
upon which Settlers established a “home” was already occupied by Indigenous peoples.
As I have argued earlier in this chapter, the importance of Settler Canadians openly
recognizing and coming to terms with this fact cannot be understated; it is an essential
part of meaningful reconciliation practices.
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Figure 33: “Blood On Your Hands” pamphlet, City of Vancouver Archives, PAM 2010-37, Fonds:
AM1519: City of Vancouver Archives pamphlet collection, City of Vancouver Archives.

Conclusion
This chapter has identified the dominant ideas about Canadian identity and history that
were promoted through the Vancouver Games. These ideas, I argued, were reflected in
Olympic commodities. However, they left out significant and often contradictory
information. Truths about the gap in socio-economic status between Indigenous peoples
and Settler Canadians; the history of colonialist policies and practices in Canada; and the
legacy of colonization were obscured during the Vancouver Olympics. By applying
Gordon’s theory of ghostly haunting to my analysis of Olympic commodities, I argued
that, although not overtly acknowledged, troubling facts about Canada were not
completely invisible. Additionally, anti-Olympic protestors publicized these facts,
including Canada’s colonial past. Finally, I identified why confronting the information
that haunted Olympic commodities is so important: it is an essential part of the ongoing
process of reconciliation between Indigenous peoples and Settler Canadians.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion: “Defiant Fists” and “Loyal Corporate
Bodies”
Toronto became the most recent Canadian city to consider an Olympic bid after it
successfully hosted the Pan Am and Parapan Am Games in the summer of 2015. Toronto
Mayor John Tory ultimately decided not to submit a bid, but the public discussion
surrounding the issue is instructive. Bob Hepburn of the Toronto Star wrote on July 11,
2015 that Toronto should bid for the Olympics only if it makes economic sense and much
of the public discussion around the bid has centered on the cost of the Games. 1 However,
as this dissertation has shown, politicians and citizens should consider additional factors
beyond economic ones: who will be advantaged and disadvantaged by the Games, both
economically and socially? Who will fund the Games and what role will corporate
sponsorship play? How will tax dollars and consumer dollars be used to finance the
event? What role will Indigenous peoples play? Will the majority of labour come from
volunteers or paid staff? What types of Olympic educational materials will enter the
schools? Will branding initiatives target students directly? What roles will
“sustainability” and “legacy outcomes” play and what sorts of beneficial social change
might they engender?
This dissertation, which critically analyzed the commercial practices and products of the
Olympic Games hosted in Canada, has demonstrated the importance of asking such
questions. I show that the symbolic meanings of Olympic commodities and commercial
practices linked to the Games primarily served the interests of Settler Canadians at the
expense of Indigenous peoples’ well-being. In making this argument, I fill a gap in
research on branded/corporate nationalism by devoting attention to the social and
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political significance of the symbolism of Olympic commodities.2 Additionally, unlike
existing scholarship, I consider how narratives about Canada’s colonial history shape
contemporary definitions of national identity. The 1974 Montreal Olympic mascot (a
beaver named Amik) and select Olympic coins symbolized the history of the fur trade in
Canada and were haunted by the role indigenous peoples in this important economic
activity. They were also haunted by the assimilation policies developed in Canada. As
Avery Gordon and Jacques Derrida argue, ghostly hauntings are instances when
something (like an image or an idea) is missing but not entirely invisible;3 in other words,
a haunting draws attention to the existence of a “seething absence.”4
The commemorative glassware sold by Petro Canada during the 1988 Calgary Olympics
were also haunted, this time by the fact that the Lubicon Cree’s continued survival as a
distinct cultural group was threatened by commercial activity on their land. Meanwhile,
the Vancouver Olympics emblem (a stylized inukshuk) and mascot commodities
(inspired by legends of West Coast First Nations) were haunted by facts that complicated
and/or contradicted official narratives about the nation. These facts include the idea that
past colonialist policies and practices by the Canadian state left an inter-generational
impact on Indigenous communities. The red and white mittens included in the Olympic
clothing line produced by the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) were haunted by the fact
that European explorers had established a country on land already inhabited by
Indigenous peoples. This type of haunting, I argue, makes it possible for Settler
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Canadians to avoid confronting select truths about the nation’s colonial history and the
ongoing injustices that Indigenous peoples face. As I demonstrate in Chapter Seven,
meaningful reconciliation between Settler Canadians and Indigenous peoples is not
possible if Settlers do not acknowledge these facts.
My dissertation also contributes to research on the commercialism of the Olympic
Movement. While various scholars argue that Olympic-related commercial practices
eclipse the political dimensions of the Games, I argue that, in Canada, they were mutually
reinforcing.5 Marketing and branding campaigns in the Montreal and Calgary Olympics
deepened pre-existing regional conflicts in Canada. For example, the design of the
Montreal Olympic emblem drew attention to divisions between French- and EnglishCanada and commodities bearing the emblem served as visual reminders that these were
primarily Quebec’s Olympics. During the Calgary Olympics, 40 oil and gas companies,
known collectively as Team Petroleum, sponsored the Olympics. These corporate
sponsorships complemented city and region branding practices in the Games, which
highlighted Alberta’s frontier history and booming oil and gas industry. The impression
given in the Games was that, although the federal government had tried recently to assert
greater control over Alberta’s natural resources, the province had ultimately retained
principal sovereignty over its oil and gas reserves. Moreover, many Canadians earned the
privilege of citizenship by participating in the torch relay, either as spectators or
torchbearers. This argument relies on Margaret Somers’ claim that, under market
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fundamentalism, the “government’s relationship with its citizenry changes from
noncontractualism to contractual quid pro quo market exchange.”6
The example of Team Petroleum also highlights how Olympic-related commercial
practices became implicated in struggles involving land and natural resources in Canada,
often at the expense of Indigenous peoples’ interests. Many of the same petroleum
companies that sponsored the Calgary Games were active in Northern Alberta, including
on the Lubicon Cree’s land. The Lubicon boycotted the Calgary Games to draw attention
to the devastating impact that oil and gas extraction practices were having on their
community and traditional ways of life. Their protest highlighted the human cost of
petroleum companies’ commoditization of the land. Additionally, the 2010 Vancouver
Winter Olympics were held on the territory of the Lil’wat, Musqueam, Squamish, and
Tsleil-Waututh Nations, known collectively as the Four Host First Nations (FHFN). They
helped Vancouver win its Olympic bid and were the first Indigenous group to officially
partner with an Olympic Games organizing committee. This partnership added value to
the Games’ international and domestic corporate sponsorship programs. The FHFN’s
involvement in the Vancouver Olympics also benefitted the B.C. government by helping
it manage the threat that Indigenous land claims posed to the provincial economy. Few
First Nations in B.C. have signed treaties with the Crown and, beginning in the 1990s,
many began to assert their jurisdiction over the province’s natural resources. Companies
became concerned that the government would not be able to protect their investments in
the province’s resource sectors; the FHFN’s involvement in the Vancouver Olympics was
part of a broader strategy and set of practices aimed at restoring economic certainty to
B.C.
My dissertation contributes to studies of branded nationalism and the commercialism of
the Olympic Movement by identifying the socio-economic factors that made the
intersection of commercialism and nationalism possible. I show that organizers of the
Montreal Olympics fundraised for the Games by selling commodities containing symbols
of French-Canadian identity. Consumers were told that they could support the Games by
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purchasing Olympic coins and stamps. However, sales fell far below expectations in part
because, in the 1970s, Canadians were unfamiliar with cause-related marketing
campaigns. Additionally, many people believed that the 1976 Olympics were Quebec’s
Games, not Canada’s. In contrast to the Montreal Games, the 1988 Calgary Winter
Olympics were a profitable endeavour. Organizers ran the Games in accordance with
market fundamentalism, a comprehensive worldview and political movement governed
by the belief that market capitalism exists in a natural state outside the realm of politics
and government and, as such, should not be heavily regulated.7 Additionally, consumer
goods from the Calgary Games, especially commemorative Petro Canada glassware, sold
very well and helped raise money for Canadian athletes. Similarly, the red and white
mittens sold by HBC during the Vancouver Olympics were popular consumer items that
symbolized Canadians’ national pride. People who bought and wore these mittens earned
the privilege of becoming full-fledged citizens.
Adding to scholarship on Indigenous peoples’ involvement in, and opposition to, the
Olympics in Canada, I consider how anti-Olympic campaigns drew attention to the
competing ideas about the nation that were embedded within Olympic objects.8 The
Lubicon’s boycott of the Calgary Olympics highlighted their plight, while the “No
Olympics on Stolen Land” campaign in Vancouver made Canada’s colonial history
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difficult to ignore. Anti-Olympic campaigners also made land rights and questions around
jurisdiction over natural resources key issues in 1988 and 2010. These activists
undermined the coherency of the ideas about Settler society that were promoted through
the Olympics and represented by commodities. On a related note, protestors turned
Olympic commodities into uncanny, unrecognizable symbols of Canada. As Freud
famously noted, the uncanny emerges when something familiar becomes unfamiliar.9
Jim McKay has written about the stark difference between the “defiant fists” of Tommie
Smith and John Carlos, who gave black power salute at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics,
and the “loyal corporate bodies” of the 1992 Barcelona Games. 10 At the latter, Nikesponsored basketball players used the American flag to cover the Reebok logo on their
uniforms.11 This study has examined both defiant gestures of protest and instances of
compliant, branded bodies related to the Olympic Games in Canada. In 2010, antiOlympic protestors on Vancouver streets provided stark contrasts to the bodies of
Olympic supporters wearing red and white HBC mittens to show their national pride.
Protestors drew attention to the fact that supporters’ bodies were marked by “impassioned
objects” which were haunted by “seething absences”12 and made it impossible to
completely ignore these absences.
Put another way, anti-Olympic protests added to broader efforts aimed at reckoning with
the ghosts that haunt Settler colonial Canada. What is at stake in such a reckoning is the
success of efforts to restructure the relationship between Indigenous peoples and Settler
Canadians through practices like honouring Indigenous peoples’ land rights and
respecting their sovereignty rights. Thus, the political costs of defining Canadian identity
and creating social inclusion through consumer culture include cementing the authority of
the Settler state and preventing the kinds of social change necessary to address
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contemporary inequalities within Canadian society. Instead of using commodities and
consumption as a way of understanding their national identity, Settler Canadians can
take the opportunity afforded by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada to
listen to Indigenous peoples testify about their experience in residential schools.13
Settlers can also learn about the resiliency of survivors, many of whom resisted the
state’s assimilationist agenda. As Paulette Regan argues, Settlers should act on the moral
and ethical obligation to “own the residential school history and legacy” in Canada14 and
recognize that such history “cannot be addressed in isolation from Indigenous people’s
political struggle to live as self-determining, self-sufficient, healthy communities in
accordance with their own customs, laws, and connections to the land.”15
As an example of unofficial commemorative acts that “restoried” history, Regan
describes commemorative marches held in Minnesota beginning in 2002. These marches
remembered and honoured Dakota people who were forcibly relocated from their
homelands in 1862. Some Settlers participated in the march as allies while others were
sympathetic observers. 16 Applying this example to a Canadian context illustrates that,
instead of defining and enhancing their national identity through consumption, Settler
Canadians can become actively involved in civil society. As Somers convincingly argues,
civil society “is central to the balance of power in the triadic configuration of state, civil
society and market.”17 In Canada, Settlers can participate in civil society by doing things
like collaborating with Indigenous peoples to raise awareness about the high number of
missing and murdered Indigenous women in the country and participating in protest
movements like the Idle No More Movement. Other activities include volunteering for a
local representative, writing letters to the editors, and becoming involved in artistic and
cultural events in their community.

13

See: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada Website. http://www.trc.ca.

14

Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and
Reconciliation in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 43.
15

Ibid., 62.

16

Ibid., 78-79.

17

Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship, 31.
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Many works of art being produced in Canada reckon with the ghosts that haunt the nation
and are valuable counterpoints to the haunted, fetish objects I discuss in my research.
Margaret Francis provides trenchant examples of Indigenous artists whose work engages
with the ghosts of the national imaginary, engendering “a different kind of
remembering.”18 She describes a series of photographs from Jeff Thomas showing his
son, Bear, in front of contemporary historical artifacts (like statues of early Canadian
Settlers). Francis argues that this work invites viewers to consider how markers of
racialized identity are inseparable from the historical images that “ghost them.”19
Similarly, a series of paintings by Kent Monkman, called the Moral Landscape, draws on
and subverts the norms of landscape painting and highlight how such paintings have
traditionally been used to promote Settlers’ entitlement to the land.20 Like Monkman’s
paintings, my research refutes the “empty lands” myth and exposes stories, events, and
information that haunt the nation.

18

Margot Francis. Creative Subversions: Whiteness, Indigeneity, and the National Imaginary. (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2011), 127.
19

Ibid., 144.

20

Ibid., 153.
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